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Abstract
Focusing on a selection o f Shakespeare’s plays and narrative poems, I examine 
the way in which violence is articulated in language and argue that language 
not only figures acts o f violence but is also violent in itself. I begin by situating 
my argument historically, exploring perceptions o f language and its effects in 
Renaissance England, and demonstrate that there was a keen sense o f the 
materiality o f language. Following on from this, I outline the theoretical 
insights that inform my argument, highlighting the way in which Marx’s 
assertion that the subject is socially constructed can be usefully considered in 
conjunction with Lacan’s conception o f the role o f language in the 
development o f the subject. I argue that because language precedes our entry 
into it, it effects a violent circumscription o f the limits o f the subject. I 
examine the representations o f sexual violence in Titus Andronicus and The Tape 
of Hucrece and identify the ways in which assumptions about gender difference 
are encoded within language, producing a female subject position largely 
shaped by patriarchal imperatives. In Chapter Four, I discuss executions as a 
highly visible form of state violence during the period and suggest that as a 
recurring spectacle, they contributed to the changing attitudes towards death. 
Paying particular attention to the representations of death in /  Henry IH, I 
consider the way in which the production o f history occurs at the level of 
language and emerges out o f violent contestation. The violence o f the bear-pit 
provides the focus for Chapter Five, and I offer a reading o f Coriolanus which 
interrogates the significance o f the metaphors o f bearbaiting found
throughout the play. I argue that the paradigm o f unremitting violence offered 
by the sport addresses aspects o f an anxious subjectivity neglected by the 
teleological form o f tragedy. Finally, I discuss domestic violence in relation to 
A  Yorkshire Tragedy, emphasising that the violent potentiality embodied within 
linguistic structures is often the agent o f violence inflicted within the domestic 
sphere.
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Introduction
I - Shakespeare and the Language of Violence
The works o f Shakespeare have, since the publication o f the first folio, 
functioned collectively as a privileged signifier o f English, and subsequently 
British, culture. In his verses ‘To the Memory o f ... the author Mr. William 
Shakespeare’, Ben Jonson writes, ‘Triumph my Britaine, thou hast one to 
showe,/ To whom all scenes o f Europe owe’ (1954: 286) and Leonard Digges, 
in the 1640 edition o f Shakespeare’s poems, praises his ‘language exquisite’ 
(Kermode 1965: 38). The elevated position afforded to Shakespeare’s works 
exemplifies the common equation o f language with ‘high’ culture. Violence, in 
contrast, is frequendy perceived as a menacing presence, traversing the 
margins o f culture. I disagree profoundly with this perceived opposition. The 
purpose o f this dissertation is to demonstrate that violence and culture are in 
fact inextricably linked, and specifically, to argue that because the relationships 
which constitute ‘culture’ take place within language, violence and language are 
inextricably linked.
My argument necessarily forms part o f a larger challenge to the inherited idea 
that Shakespeare’s works exist in a vacuum, unaffected by the conditions in 
which they were produced, and interpreted by an audience and readership that 
remain equally detached from their cultural moment. This idea, which has 
proved remarkably persistent, contributes to a perception that Shakespearean
literature and drama transcends its historical bounds, and promotes an 
abstracted notion o f ‘Shakespeare’ and in particular ‘Shakespearean language’ 
which is upheld as the ultimate example of, and appropriated in the name of, 
elite culture. Frank Kermode claims to be able to pinpoint c[t]he years 1599- 
1600’ as the time when Shakespeare’s language ascends ‘to a new level o f 
achievement and difficulty’ (2000: ix). Harold Bloom even suggests, in an 
argument which if nothing else tacitly acknowledges language as the place in 
which the social subject is produced, that Shakespeare invented ‘what has 
become the most accepted mode for representing character and personality in 
language’ and ‘thereby invented the human as we know it’ (1999: 714). These 
kinds o f suggestions perpetuate a conception o f Shakespeare as an ultimate 
authority, the source o f a fixed and coherent body o f meanings. Recent 
scholarship, particularly that of the last three decades, has done much to 
dismantle the essentialist framework which underpins these ideas, 
interrogating the way in which texts become and remain canonical, insisting 
upon a critical engagement with texts which recognises the importance o f the 
cultures in which they are embedded, and radically problematising any notion 
o f stabilised meaning.1
John Drakakis notes that ‘the way to displace ‘Shakespeare’ from his pedestal 
as a supreme icon o f English culture is to return him to context’ (1996: 243). A 
significant contribution to this process has been made by a number o f works
1 Critics such as Catherine Belsey, Jonathan Dollimore, John Drakakis, Stephen Greenblatt, 
Terrence Hawkes and Alan Sinfield have been instrumental to this process.
which foreground issues o f violence that have previously been taboo for the 
study o f Shakespeare and his contemporaries. R.A. Foakes’ study, Shakespeare 
and Violence, is characterised by his suspicion o f the current trends in critical 
thinking; nevertheless, he concedes that £[v]iolence is culturally constructed in 
different ways in different ages’ (2003: 17), and provides a useful introductory 
section outlining the paradigms o f violence in circulation during the 
Renaissance. However, Foakes reinforces the conception o f violence as 
‘other’, suggesting that it is a disruptive element which culture works 
unsuccessfully to contain. He contends that violence is an ‘unruly dimension 
that cannot be contained by the concepts o f culture, and ... may be related to 
the deepest instincts in human beings, especially in males’ (1993: 17). Rather 
than speculating about the biological determinants of violence and aggression, 
Derek Cohen understands violence as integral to the structures and agency o f 
power, arguing that it is ‘an inherent feature o f the political system of 
patriarchal authority’, and asserting that ‘[a]cts o f violence belong to patriarchy 
as surely as fathers do’ (1993: 1). He examines the ways in which patriarchy 
both produces and condemns violence, and, affirming that ‘female chastity is 
the cornerstone o f patriarchy’, pays particular attention to the way in which 
violence impacts upon women.
In his important study, The Culture of Violence, Francis Barker places a similar 
emphasis upon the ways in which violence was embedded within Renaissance 
society. He argues that violence, far from existing on the margins o f culture, is 
central to the dynamics o f power which produce ‘culture’. In Shakespeare’s
4representations o f violence, however, he suggests that ‘even when violence is
shown it is occluded’ (1993: 194) and that this
raises questions about the politics o f representation ... in 
Shakespeare’s oeuvre ... and in the Elizabethan and Jacobean 
theatre as a whole, questions in particular o f the extent to 
which the theatre either underwrites the signifying practices 
o f the dominant culture (and by way o f that the political and 
social power o f the dominant, as well as its cultural authority) 
or alternatively unsettles such structures and institutions by 
transgressing, erasing, confusing, contesting or making 
‘disfunctional’ the categories and representations they support 
and which in turn support them (1993: 194-5).
At the same time, Barker interrogates the politics o f current critical practices, 
criticising aspects o f New Historicism. He takes issue with the tendency to 
produce a reading o f history which substitutes ‘notions o f circulation for those 
o f oppression, anxiety for terror’ (1993: 124) in a process complete with its 
own violence, which obfuscates the modalities and functions o f violence. In 
addition, he warns against the ‘received hierarchisation o f literature and 
background’ and stresses the need to maintain an awareness o f the 
‘hierarchisation o f discourse, whose description should continue to allow the 
discussion and apprehension o f the (traces of) structures and practices o f 
dominance and resistance’ (1993: 125). Fundamental to his thesis, and to mine, 
is the assertion that discourse and violence should be recognised as ‘likes 
rather than opposites’ (1993: 126).
Throughout the dissertation, I pursue this idea further, and through readings 
o f selected plays and poems o f Shakespeare, attempt to foreground the 
violence o f language. I argue for an understanding o f the materiality o f
5language and show that language has the capacity to effect violence. J.L. 
Austin’s seminal discussion, How to do things with Words, explains that 
performative utterances involve ‘doing something as opposed to just saying 
something’ (1962: 133), demonstrating that language can and frequently does 
have material effects. But more than this, I contend that violence inheres 
within the very structures o f language and that from his/her entry into 
language the subject is thoroughly penetrated by these structures: from this 
point onwards, the individual is subject to the violence which is an integral 
aspect o f the signifying process. Bearing this in mind, I discuss the ways in 
which literary texts are involved with the processes o f selecting and obscuring, 
contesting and prioritising the meanings o f violence, and indeed, the way in 
which these processes are themselves dramatised. I argue that representations 
are never simply neutral reflections, but active and politically motivated events 
replete with their own violence.
II - Violence in Political Context
Violence permeated every aspect o f life across the social spectrum, from the 
food and anti-enclosure rioting o f the extremely poor to the stylised martial 
displays that were the mark o f a courtier. In diverse and often conflicting 
ways, violence effected social change, disrupting and redistributing the 
functional relations o f power. The state sanctioned acts o f corporal 
punishment as part o f the judicial process in an ongoing attempt to maintain
6political stability. A t the same time, agrarian workers exercised a dynamic and 
inclusive community politics o f direct action. The institutional upheavals 
initiated by religious reforms affected the physical and verbal structures of 
Christian worship, implicating all o f England’s Christians. Ongoing disputes 
with France and the aggravated tensions o f the Anglo-Spanish relationship 
informed the national identity, which was ultimately fortified by these 
conflicts. Violence was unavoidable; it operated across and between social 
groups, working at an interpersonal and communal level.
N orbert Elias’s assessment o f the civilising process explores the changes in the
way in which violence operates within society. He suggests that
In the social spaces where violence is an unavoidable and 
everyday event, and where individuals’ chains o f dependence 
are relatively short, because they largely subsist directly from 
the produce o f their own land, a strong and continuous 
moderation o f drives and affects is neither necessary, possible 
nor useful ... The moderation o f spontaneous emotions, the 
tempering o f affects, the extension o f mental space beyond 
the m oment into the past and future, the habit o f connecting 
events in terms o f cause and effect — all these are different 
aspects o f the same transformation o f conduct which 
necessarily takes place with the monopolization o f physical 
violence, and the lengthening o f the chains o f social action 
and interdependence. It is a “civilising” change o f behaviour 
(1994: 370).
Richard Halpern identifies primitive accumulation, or ‘the genealogy o f capital’ 
in English Renaissance culture, which is suggestive o f the expansion o f the 
individual’s chains o f dependence (1991). This necessarily required an active 
connection between cause and effect and was contingent upon and indeed 
consolidated by the emerging sense o f social security.
7During Elizabeth’s long reign, she gradually achieved a previously unforeseen 
stability. Through progresses, she ensured that she was accessible to her 
subjects through a ‘privileged visibility’ (Greenblatt 1988: 64), and in her 
speeches she consistently maintained that there was an unequal, but 
nonetheless, mutually constitutive relationship between monarch and subject. 
In her celebrated speech to the troops at Tilbury, she asserts, £I would not 
desire to live to distrust my faithful and loving people ... I have so behaved 
myself that under God I have placed my chiefest strength and safeguard in the 
loyal hearts and goodwill o f my subjects’ (Marcus et.al. 2000: 326).
Elizabeth famously lacked a standing army, however. A militia, to which all 
able men between sixteen and sixty belonged, provided the defensive arm of 
state violence. Their weaponry consisted mainly o f pikes, calivers, muskets, 
and also bills and bows, which were stored throughout the country, either in 
the private armouries o f aristocrats or common armouries in towns, usually 
located in gatehouses or, in rural areas, in churches. In addition, those who 
had an annual income o f ten pounds or over were obliged to maintain their 
own stock of arms and armour. The extent o f an individual’s personal 
armament was, therefore, a symbol o f status, and one’s skill in the use o f 
particular weapons was also an indicator o f position. Organised in this way, 
the militia was a broad based, decentralised fighting force whose very 
diffuseness meant that the implications o f a popular uprising were potentially 
extremely serious. This threat was managed in large part by the militia’s
prom otion o f a religiously defined self-image that was articulated within an 
increasingly hierarchical internal structure.
The militia gained status in the 1580s as its role became more clearly defined 
in relation to the external threats to national security. As these threats were 
increasingly identified with Catholicism, it became associated with a 
particularly militant brand o f Protestantism. A clear set o f religious objectives 
was instrumental to the way in which the force achieved a sense o f internal 
coherence. Sir George Carey, a muster master in the 1580s, instructed his 
Captains to,
caswse all their Centonne [company] at tymes appointed, to 
frequente the Churche, both for the use o f divine prayer, for 
receavinge the holie sacramente, and for hearinge the 
preachinge o f godes worde, whereby they maie knowe their 
dewtie chieflie to god, then to her Majestie, nexte to their 
neighboure. I f  anie o f frowardnes or by seducement o f the 
Pope’s confederates, Jesuites, and seminarie priests, professed 
enemies to our state and contrie, wilfully refraine resortinge 
to divine service, or if anie be spotted with anie notable vice, 
that yow make presente advertisement o f suche persons unto 
me, leste your and my suffereance o f such unpunished 
worthelie provoke godes heavie wrathe and displeaure 
againste us (cited in Boynton 1971: 101).
Religious observance shaped the ethos o f the militia. N ot only did it provide a 
theological justification for the potential use o f force, but it also functioned 
coercively, invoking the prospect o f God’s wrath, or divine violence, to ensure 
compliance.
9Internally, this same belief system was central to the corporal and capital
punishments regularly deployed by the state. William Harrison
comprehensively details the ‘Sundry Kinds o f Punishments Appointed for
Malefactors’ in his description o f England:
In cases o f felony, manslaughter, robbery, murder, rape, 
piracy, and such capital crimes as are not reputed for treason 
or hurt o f the state, our sentence pronounce upon the 
offender is to hang till he be dead. For o f other punishments 
used in other countries we have no knowledge or use, and yet 
so few grievous crimes committed with us as elsewhere in the 
world. To use torment, also, or question by pain and torture 
in these common cases, with us is greatly abhorred, sith we 
are alway to be such as despise death and yet abhor to be 
tormented, choosing rather frankly to open our minds than to 
yield our bodies unto such servile halings and tearings as are 
used in other countries ... our jailers are guilty o f felony by 
an old law o f the land if they torment any prisoner committed 
to their custody (1994: 187).
Harrison emphasises the rarity o f serious violent crime in England in 
comparison with other countries, and voices a sense of national pride in the 
authorities’ reluctance to use violence for coercive purposes. Writing in the 
1570s, Harrison was able to contrast the relative stability o f England with the 
more volatile conditions on the continent. The Spanish Inquisition was 
notorious for its formidable use o f force: an inquisitor operating in the 1570s 
asserted that ‘the main purpose o f the trial and execution is not to save the 
soul o f the accused but to achieve the public good and put fear into others’ 
(Kamen 2000: 174). In addition, the Wars o f Religion traumatised France.2
2 Montaigne’s meditations ‘On Cruelty’ describe the distressing events in France:
1 live in a season when unbelievable examples o f this vice o f cruelty flourish ... If 1 had not seen it 
I could hardly have made m yself believe that you could find souls so monstrous that they would 
commit murder for the sheer fun o f it; would hack another man’s limbs and lop them o ff and 
would cudgel their brains to invent unusual tortures and new forms o f murder, not from hatred or 
for gain but for the one sole purpose o f enjoying the pleasant spectacle o f the pitiful gestures and
Francis Barker argues that ‘[n]o one alive in Early Modern England could fully 
have believed that the location of violence was elsewhere, but we know that 
ideology — perhaps especially when deployed in the form o f ‘cultural 
performance’ — works in mysterious but effective ways’ (1993: 191). In 
Harrison’s account o f the justice system, English violence was meaningful as 
part o f a coherent body o f judicial practices, and functioned as a marker of 
national and religious difference.
As Harrison tacitly acknowledges, violence signifies by degree, and the various 
corporal punishments meted out by the state encoded social and gender 
hierarchies. Foucault notes that torture -  the infliction o f pain as a mode o f 
punishment — ‘correlates the type o f corporal effect, the quality, intensity, 
duration o f pain, with the gravity o f the crime, the person o f the criminal, the 
rank o f his victims’ (1979: 34). The signs o f criminality were inscribed upon 
the bodies o f offenders, simultaneously marking them out as deviants and 
reinforcing the image o f a coherent and meaningful policy o f state violence. 
Rogues and vagabonds could be stocked and whipped, or permanendy scarred 
by a burn through the ear. If  caught, thieves could loose a hand or be burned 
through the thumb. Seditious speech against the magistrate could leave the 
speaker without one or both ears and those who committed perjury could be 
pilloried or branded on the forehead with a ‘P’. There were also a number o f 
gradations in the execution o f the death penalty. Murder was usually punished
twitchings o f a man dying in agony, while hearing his screams and groans. For there you have the 
farthest point that cruelty can reach (1991: 181).
by public hanging, but when a woman murdered her husband it was 
considered treason because it subverted the ‘natural’ order that required 
women to be subject to their spouse. A woman found guilty o f spousal 
murder would be burned at the stake, just as she would have been punished 
for high treason. The penalties for men who were convicted o f high treason 
were different again. Social status was taken into account and could influence 
the method o f trial and punishment. Members o f the nobility were entitled to 
be tried by peers and could escape hanging, drawing and quartering, and be 
hung instead. Even death, the great leveller, was recovered for the temporal 
realm and used to reinforce the social distinctions o f the living.
I ll  - Approach
In order to explore the language o f violence and to demonstrate the violence 
o f language, I offer a reading o f selected plays and poems o f Shakespeare 
focusing upon the violence they represent, considering their relationship to 
incidences and discourses of violence during the period, and highlighting the 
violence inherent within the representational practices they deploy and 
contest. Literary texts, as examples o f the way in which a culture represents 
itself to itself, provide an important point o f convergence for the discourses in 
which and through which violence is understood. I begin, in the first two 
chapters, by setting out the historical and theoretical co-ordinates o f my
12
argument. I illustrate that central aspects o f Renaissance culture emerged out 
o f conflicts which took language and the written and spoken word as both 
their means and their end, and demonstrate that during the period there was a 
well-developed sense o f the materiality o f linguistic structures. In addition, I 
outline the way in which the insights o f Lacanian psychoanalysis and Post­
structuralism elucidate the violence which inheres within the structures o f 
language. Whilst the subject of this study is itself violence, I attempt to 
maintain a tripartite focus upon the way in which language figures acts o f 
violence, effects violence and is in itself violent. Concentrating on Titus 
Andronicus, The Rape of Tucrece, I  Henry V I, Coriolanus and A  Yorkshire Tragedy 
respectively, I explore these issues in relation to sexual violence against 
women, state executions, bearbaiting, and violence within the domestic 
sphere.3
3 For the purposes o f  this study, I exercise considerable latitude by including A Yorkshire Tragedy 
as one o f Shakespeare’s plays. As an expediency, I do so on the grounds o f Tucker Brooke’s 
classification o f the play as part o f The Shakespeare Apocrypha.
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Chapter One 
‘The strong rein of commanding words’
Language’s capacity to articulate violence is always both insufficient and 
supplementary: it can never render an experience o f violence fully or with 
adequate economy, but is always implicated in the violent act itself. Michel 
Foucault writes that ‘[w]e know that discourse has the power to arrest the 
flight o f an arrow in a recess o f time’ (1977: 53). Language, as a system o f 
signs, has the capacity to circumscribe violence ‘so that misfortunes will never 
be fully realized, so that their fulfilment will be averted in the distance of 
words’ (Foucault 1977: 54). But in his influential study o f violence and the 
sacred, Rene Girard asserts that c[t]he procedures that keep men’s violence in 
bounds have one thing in common: they are no strangers to the ways of 
violence’ (1988: 23), and indeed, language is no stranger to the ways o f 
violence. Language mediates all human experience and, at the most 
fundamental level, violence is immanent in the signifying process itself.
Shakespeare and his contemporaries were writing during a period o f 
unprecedented awareness of, and attention to, the materiality o f language, 
where language was both the subject and object o f violent controversy. In 
radically different ways, Reformed theology and classical humanism, the 
cornerstones o f Elizabethan and Jacobean culture, affirmed and contested 
material conceptions of the word. The Reformation divided Western 
Christendom irrevocably, and as a consequence political and religious
14
authorities were realigned within national boundaries and the English 
language, and the national identity it helped to foster, were strengthened in 
opposition to other European nation states. In addition to the conflict with 
the Papacy and those countries under its jurisdiction, the emerging status o f 
the English language was consolidated by the contact with other languages and 
cultures brought by the exploratory travel o f the age. The vernacular overtook 
Latin to become the language o f literature, the liturgy and almost all written 
discourse. And o f course, as Francis Bacon suggests, ‘[w]e should note the 
force, effect and consequences o f ... printing’ (1960: 118), which allowed for 
the reproduction and dissemination o f written materials, in English and Latin, 
on an unprecedented scale.
Discussions o f the material dynamics o f language that were endemic to the 
foremost social, political and theological debates o f the period implicitly 
acknowledged the possibility o f linguistic violence. In the chapters that follow, 
I explore some o f the ways in which Shakespeare’s plays and narrative poems 
were involved in the process o f making violence meaningful in Renaissance 
culture. The aim o f this chapter, however, is to examine the self-conscious 
attention to language and the discursive production of meaning that 
characterised the prevailing religious and pedagogical discourses, and to 
demonstrate that violence was always, overtly or covertly, implicated at all 
levels o f linguistic signification.
15
In seeking to characterise popular perceptions o f the agency o f language, it is 
tempting to draw parallels with contemporary academic debates in the 
humanities. Jonathan Dollimore has suggested (in a self-confessedly 
provocative move) that ‘post-structuralism rediscovered what the Renaissance 
already knew’ (1989: xlvi). Post-structuralism’s engagement with the radically 
unstable qualities o f language is certainly recognisable in writing o f the period: 
Francis Bacon observed that c[t]here are ... in words certain degrees of 
distortion and error’ (LX, 1960: 58) and his acknowledgement that ceven 
definitions cannot cure the evil in dealing with natural and material things, 
since the definitions themselves consist o f words, and those words beget 
others’ (LIX, 1960: 56) is analogous to Jacques Derrida’s ideas o f the deferred 
presence o f meaning and the play o f the linguistic sign (2001: 351-370). But as 
Margretta de Grazia has noted, c[t]he trend is to assume that Shakespeare, like 
writers o f our own century, mistrusted the faulty medium o f his trade’ (1978: 
374).
In the current critical understanding, the insufficiencies and excesses o f 
language as a signifying system are seen as consequences of the inevitable gap 
between the signifier and the signified. During the Renaissance, however, 
Christian and humanist discourses informed perceptions o f language, and the 
deferred presence of meaning, which complicated language’s effectiveness as a 
means o f communication, was believed to be a punishment from God. 
Adam’s language was seen as originally divinely ordained, allowing for perfect 
communion with God: in the Garden o f Eden, ‘the Lord God formed o f the
16
earth everie beast o f the field and everie fowle o f the heaven, & broght them 
unto the man to se how he wolde call them: for howsoever the man named 
the living creature, so was the name thereof ('Genesis II: 19).1 This privileged 
status was lost after the fall and although the language spoken remained the 
same, its efficacy did not. According to the Old Testament, it was not until the 
construction o f the tower o f Babel that this single language was divided.
Genesis recounts a time when £[t]he whole earth was o f one language and one
speache’ (11: 1). The descendants o f Noah
said, Go to, let us buylde us a citie and a tower, whose top 
may reach unto the heaven, that we may get us a name, lest we 
be scatred across the whole earth. But the Lord came downe 
to se the citie & tower, which the sonnes o f men buylded.
And the Lord said, Beholde, the people is one, & thei all have 
one language, & this thei beginne to do, nether can thei now 
be stopped from whatsoever thei have imagined to do. Come 
on, let us go downe, and there confound their language, that 
everie one perceive not an others speache ('Genesis 11:1-7).
This biblical explanation again identifies sin as the cause o f language’s
imperspicuity. In Babel, the punishment for overreaching ambition was the
fragmentation o f the single unified language into many different tongues. This
idea translated into an understanding o f language as a medium, not faulty in
itself, but skewed by the inherent sinfulness o f those that use it. As Margretta
de Grazia has observed, the perception was that c[w]hen language fails, the
fault is with the speaker, not with speech’ (1978: 377).
1 All quotations are taken from the Geneva Bible o f 1560 unless otherwise stated.
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The cultural significance o f the story o f Babel is demonstrated by its 
reworking in the literature and drama o f the period. In The Spanish Tragedy, 
Hieronimo’s instructions for the play within the play refigure this act o f G od’s
vengeance:
HIERONIMO: Each o f us must act his part
In unknown languages,
That it may breed the more variety,
As you my lord, in Latin, I in Greek,
You in Italian; and for because I know 
That Bel-imperia hath practised the French, 
In courtly French shall all her phrases be ... 
BALTHASAR: But this will be a mere confusion,
And hardly shall we all be understood__
HIERONIMO: Now shall I see the fall o f Babylon,
Wrought by the heavens in this confusion.
(IV.ii. 172-196)
The performance o f Solimon and Perseda is used by Hieronimo to entrap his 
son’s murderers. Kyd uses this episode to highlight the players’ sinfulness and 
their distance from God: the babbling confusion he invokes belongs to the 
Christian-based linguistic economy which underpinned Renaissance culture.2
In this perceptual framework, the linguistic confusion visited upon Babel did
not, however, amount to a permanent deferral of meaning. The New Testament
book o f A.cts describes the Holy Spirit’s descent to earth and the temporary
removal o f all language barriers:
And when the day o f Pentecoste was come, they were all with 
one accorde in one place. And suddenly there came a sounde 
from heaven, as o f a rushing and mightie winde, and it filled 
all the house where they sate ... And they were all filled with 
the holie Gost, and began to speake with other tongues, as
2 In his notes on the text, David Bevington explains that the fall o f Babylon and the Tower o f  
Babel were frequently confused or conflated during the period, and clearly both meanings are in 
play here (Kyd 1996: 117n. 195).
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the spirit gave them utterance ... Now when this was noised, 
the multitude came together and were astonied [sic], because 
that everie man heard them speake his owne language (Acts 
II: 1-6).
Pentecost counteracted the disordering after-effects o f attempts to build the 
tower o f Babel and allowed unfettered access to G od’s word. The Holy Spirit 
made meaning present in language: essentially, both the presence and the 
meaning o f the W ord were God. This passage maintains a focus upon personal 
responsibility for the transparency o f language, and suggests that is through 
charity that the individual can achieve linguistic clarity. Fulke Greville wrote 
‘The divers tongues, and Babylon’s downfall,/ Are nothing to the man’s 
renewed birth’ (Jones 1991: 359) and studies o f rhetoric often claimed that 
they offered a way to such a renewal. Thomas Wilson begins his treatise, The 
Arte of Jkhetorique-. ‘Eloquence first geven by God, after loste by man, and laste 
repaired by God agayne’ (1553: 9).
In a culture which was inescapably self-conscious o f language, a great deal o f
time was devoted to the study o f linguistic structures. Rhetoric was a central
part o f the humanist education, and the profusion o f manuals and handbooks,
such as Thomas Wilson’s, that provided instruction in the subject are a
testament to its enduring status. Wayne Rebhorn goes so far as to suggest that,
considering the central place rhetoric had in education during 
the Renaissance as well as the enormous volume o f material 
that was published about it, perhaps it would be best to speak 
o f the Renaissance not in traditional terms as the rebirth of 
antiquity or the age of exploration, but as the age o f rhetoric 
(2000: 2).
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Aristotle affirmed that ‘Rhetoric is the counterpart o f dialectic’ (1991: 66) but 
during the Renaissance, rhetoric took precedence. The humanist educational 
program marked a movement away from the Scholasticism of the Middle 
Ages, which had been characterised by pedantry and extreme rigidity. 
Scholasticism, which had its basis in the thought o f Aristotle, and in particular 
his work on dialectic, used syllogistic reasoning with the aim o f establishing 
absolute truth. In  a deliberate movement away from the inflexibility o f this 
form o f Aristotelian praxis, the subsequent Neoplatonic fusion of the Platonic 
ideal forms and Aristotelian hierarchies allowed for a more robust Humanist 
pedagogy.3
The Neoplatonism that was revivified in Europe from the late Middle Ages
onward advanced a conception o f language which emphasised its importance
as the vehicle for man’s ascendancy to the divine. Trapezuntius declares that
‘nothing was ever given to us by God that is better than speech’ (Rebhorn
2000: 31), and this idea is reproduced in Thomas Campion’s Observations in the
A r t of English Poesie. In his introductory dedication to Lord Buckhurst,
Campion asserts that ‘In two things ... it is generally agreed that man excels all
other creatures, in reason, and speech: and in them by how much one man
surpasseth an other, by so much the nearer he aspires to a celestial essence’
(1602). The humanist study o f language was touted as a means o f active
reparation for the divine violence visited upon the Tower of Babel: in A n
Apologie for Poetrie, Sir Philip Sidney opines that ‘those cumbersome differences
J For a comprehensive discussion o f humanist education see Anthony Grafton and Lisa Jardine, 
(1986).
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o f Cases, Genders, Moodes, and Tenses ... I thinke was a peece o f the Tower 
o f Babilons curse, that a man should be put to school to learne his mother- 
tongue’ (1915:60).4 But the humanist engagement with language was itself 
stratified by violence.
When, in Samuel Daniel’s Musophilus (1599), Philocosmus asserts that 
‘T h’unmateriall swellings o f your p en / Touch not the spirit that action doth 
im port’, Musophilus responds with a sonorous defence o f the ideals and 
effects o f eloquence:
Powre above powres, O heavenly JEloquence,
That with the strong reine o f commanding words,
D ost manage, guide and master th’eminence 
O f mens affections, more than all their swords:
Shall we not offer to thy excellence 
The richest treasure that our wit affords?
Thou canst do much more with one poor pen 
Than all the powers o f princes can effect:
And draw, divert, dispose, and fashion men 
Better than force or rigour can direct:
Should we this ornament o f glorie then
As th’unmateriall fruits of shades, neglect?
(Norbrook, 1993: 716)
The Christian exhortation with which this passage opens situates the text 
within an expiationary tradition. But this extract also provides a point of 
convergence for the various modalities o f humanistic violence. Musophilus 
confidently asserts the materiality of language, defending the ‘strong reine’ and 
‘commanding’ qualities o f words and demonstrating that language has material 
effects which can be violent. This idea is reinforced with the metaphor, 
familiar to humanist discourse, o f armed conflict, where the linguistic sign
4 Here, Sidney conflates Babylon with the Tower o f Babel.
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forms part o f a rhetorical arsenal affording the word a greater authority than 
the sword. Significantly, and touching upon another issue at the centre of 
Humanist education, ‘the powers o f princes’ are also subject to the pen. Whilst 
Musophilus defends ‘th’unmateriall swellings’, he calls attention to the political 
ramifications o f the violent potential o f rhetoric. His question -  ‘ Should we 
this ornament o f glorie then ... neglect?’ — inquires into the implications o f 
this agency for those in positions o f authority, who could be ‘disposed’ o f as a 
result o f the powers o f persuasive speech.
Rhetoric’s purpose is to persuade, to effect changes to people’s thoughts,
actions and the conditions of their material existence. Trapezuntius produced
Rhetoricontm U bri V  (Five Books on Kioetoric), the first comprehensive treatment
o f rhetoric in the Renaissance. In his Oration in Praise ofFJoquence he expounds
his belief in the supreme status o f the art o f rhetoric, arguing that:
Rhetoric excels the other arts inasmuch as it alone embraces 
almost every aspect o f human life ... rhetoric alone has 
undertaken the managing of private as well as public matters.
For what could be thought up or said in the conduct o f our 
affairs that does not require the power o f oratory? In court, it 
defends what is right. In the Senate, it shows you both the 
useful and the useless. In public meetings, it has always 
protected the state as a whole. It teaches us to be provident 
and to avoid adverse things before they happen. If  they 
should happen through chance or ignorance, rhetoric alone 
will come to our aid and will support us with hope or 
consolation. It adorns our successes and mitigates our 
disasters. It intimidates our enemies and strengthens our 
friends. It founds, preserves, and enlarges cities. It both 
promulgates and abrogates laws (Rebhorn 2000: 31-32).
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Trapezuntius demonstrates that there is nothing outside language and 
therefore nothing that cannot benefit from rhetorical training. He 
acknowledges and celebrates the way in which language mediates all human 
experience, marking a decisive shift away from the medieval scholasticism 
which tried to force a correspondence between word and concept, or verba and 
res. Rhetoric revealed the fundamentally contingent nature o f meaning.
This very contingency was the basis o f much o f the criticism of rhetoric. The
emphasis upon the possibilities generated by the fundamentally unstable
relationship between words and concepts was, for a number o f reasons,
profoundly unsettling. Rhetoric discredited the idea that language provided a
neutral mode o f expression, and instead promoted an understanding o f the
way in which all thought is mediated and manipulated by linguistic structures.
In Heinrich Agrippa’s On the Uncertainty and Vanity of the A rts and Sciences, he
explains his anxieties about the use of rhetoric:
To know how to speak precisely, ornately, gravely, and 
copiously is certainly beautiful, delightful, and always useful, 
but it is sometimes base and inconsiderate, more often 
dangerous, and always suspect ... Plato thought they [orators] 
should be excluded from his republic together with tragic 
actors and poets, and surely he is right, for nothing is more 
dangerous to civic functions than this art, since it produces 
prevaricators, shifty tricksters, perverters o f the law, 
sycophants, and all kinds o f men with wicked tongues. 
Equipped with it, many people plot against the state and 
foment sedition, while by means o f their artful loquacity, they 
betray others, attack them, satirize them, flatter yet others, 
and obtain something like a tyranny over the innocent 
(Rebhorn 2000: 78-79).
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The trajectory o f Agrippa’s and Trapezuntius’ arguments are similar but the 
tenor differs. Both writers acknowledge the material consequences of 
persuasive speech, the dual purposes o f rhetoric and the contingency of 
meaning, but Agrippa places a much stronger emphasis on the intention o f the 
speaker. He posits eloquence as a suspect practice which always carries the 
threat o f transgression by ‘perverters o f the law’ who manipulate the skills o f 
rhetoric for illegal purposes. Indeed, he identifies rhetoric as a means of 
inciting insurrection, of committing treason, and as a favoured tool o f the 
tyrannical.
The myth o f the orator, which originated in classical antiquity with Cicero’s De 
inventione, remained influential in the Renaissance. The orator was said to have 
established ‘civilised society’: his art o f speaking had innovative and 
constructive effects, demonstrating and symbolising the materiality of 
language. For Cicero, however, the orator’s power was exercised within a 
republican state where political decisions were informed by debate. Under the 
monarchical rule of Elizabethan and Jacobean England, however, the 
decisions o f government were not reached transparently within the public 
domain, nor were they directly influenced by it. In this context, the 
conception o f the orator’s role was subject to modification, and aligned more 
closely with the figure o f a prince. According to this perception, the 
benevolent orator — Quintillian’s good man skilled in speaking — was involved 
less in the process o f debate and more with the promotion o f a singular aim.
The humanist pedagogues o f the English grammar schools replicated this 
singularity o f purpose in their teaching methods. The imitative methods o f 
learning, which required students to model themselves upon their tutors, were 
inextricably bound up with an ideal o f sovereignty. Rigid grammatical 
categories, which Sidney claims are a part o f G od’s punishment, engendered a 
binary logic governing language use. Figured in these terms, the student has a 
choice o f obedience or disobedience to grammatical rules. This paradigm 
extended to the idea o f obedience more generally, with the tutor assuming a 
position that was identifiable with that o f the monarch. This scholastic 
philosophy created the conditions for an unquestioning reproduction, not only 
o f humanist ideologies, but also o f the ideology o f sovereignty.
Jack Cade’s rebellion against the crown in Shakespeare’s II Henry H I challenges
the authority o f the sovereign. Significantly, he directs an attack against Lord
Saye, an exponent of English humanist education, as an extension o f this
authority. Cade lambastes Saye, claiming:
Thou hast most traitorously corrupted the youth of the realm 
in erecting a grammar school ... It will be proved to thy face 
that thou hast men about thee that usually talk o f a noun and 
a verb, and such abominable words ... Away with him, away 
with him! He speaks Latin.
(IV.vii.29-53)
The contempt with which Cade talks o f the grammar school and the learning 
which it promotes is symptomatic o f the social inequalities of the period. Lord 
Saye seems curiously unaware o f the motivation for Cade’s hostility and in his 
defence, pleads, ‘my book preferred me to the King:/ And seeing ignorance is
the curse o f G od,/ Knowledge the wing wherewith we fly to heaven’ 
(IV.vii.67-69). He acknowledges that learning brought him social advancement 
and he articulates the humanist preoccupation with lofty spiritual attainment. 
This only serves to call attention to the disparities between the two men and 
antagonise Cade, who subsequently calls for his beheading. Saye’s plea for his 
life, which reflects his rhetorical training, does effect a momentary change o f 
heart, and in an aside, Cade admits ‘I feel remorse in myself with his words, 
but I’ll bridle it. He shall die, an it be but for pleading so well for his life’ 
(IV.vii.98-100). Although Cade’s barbarity seems antithetical to the ideals o f 
humanism, violence was, on several levels, embedded within humanist praxis.
The final call for Saye’s removal is made on the basis o f his command of
Latin. Whilst Cade’s animosity is directed against education in general, training
in Latin was representative o f a high level o f learning that was not
commensurate with the distribution o f literacy. The grammar schools, which
Cade believed had ‘most traitorously corrupted the youth o f the realm’,
provided a Latin-based humanist education for boys. Halpern asserts that,
[t]he schools’ exclusionary function was ... complemented by 
a hegemonic one in which the behavioural disposition o f the 
‘middle sort’ was imposed on a relatively broad array of 
classes. In the second function the school neither signified an 
already-existing class system nor simply reproduced it; it 
helped reform both the ruling and the subaltern classes along 
the lines of a proto-bourgeois model (1991: 26).
Cade is doubly marginalised by the school system. He is subject, in the first 
instance, to its exclusionary practices, and subsequently, to the hegemony of
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the schools’ Latin curriculum which functioned as an instrument of 
institutional force.
Questions o f violence dominated humanist pedagogy, as the use force o f was 
not restricted to its exclusionary practices. Institutional force and politically 
motivated violence formed a recurring topos in the curriculum. Students 
studied classical texts whose accounts o f tyrannical leaders had often originally 
formed the basis o f discussions about republican government, which was 
anathema to the English political system. As Stephanie Jed has argued, ‘an 
exercise o f domination and suppression may be implicated in the very 
conditions o f humanistic codification’ (1989: 29). Humanist practice was 
instrumental to the process o f re-evaluating, transforming and transmitting the 
political import o f violence within a complex network o f figures and tropes.
It was, however, the schoolmaster’s use o f violent punishment in the 
classroom which provoked one o f the fiercest internal debates within the 
humanist pedagogical tradition. Corporal punishment was endemic in the 
English school system. Roger Ascham, Elizabeth Tudor’s former tutor, 
complained o f the ‘cruelty in schoolmasters in beating away the love of 
learning from children’ (1967: 38) and encouraged pedagogic ideals to come 
into line with the ideals o f eloquence, so that ‘the schoolhouse should be 
counted as a sanctuary against fear’ (1967: 38). But despite the moderate aims 
o f Ascham and others, extreme violence remained a commonplace. Ramus, 
one o f the foremost Renaissance educators, was reputedly prone to repeated
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outbursts o f such ferocious temper that he beat children in his care almost to 
death (Ong 1959: 114). Although this is an extreme example, very rough 
treatment was evidendy not uncommon. One English schoolboy articulates 
his resentment o f his overbearing schoolmaster in a short rhyme, claiming ‘I 
would my master were an hare/ And all his bokes howndes w ere/ And I 
myself a joly hontere;/ To blow my horn I would not spare,/ For if he were 
dede I wold not care’ (Martin 1979: 2). Walter Ong, however, suggests that 
physical punishment was an integral part o f Latin language study in the 
Renaissance, and functioned as a puberty rite (Ong 1959: 103-124). The 
schoolmaster’s violence, he argues, marked the boy’s initiation into learning, 
separating him from the domestic sphere and signalling his membership o f an 
educated male elite.
Increasingly, the elevating powers of language were asserted in patriotic terms
and were related specifically to the English language. In his treatise on The Arte
of English Poesie, George Puttenham asks,
If  th’art o f Poesie be but a skill appertaining to utterance, why 
may not the same be with us aswel as with them, our 
language being no lesse copious pithie and significative then 
theirs, our conceipts be the same, and our wits no lesse apt to 
devise and imitate then theirs were? If  againe Art be but a 
certaine order o f rules prescribed by reason, and gathered by 
experience, why should not Poesie be a vulgar Art with us 
aswell as with the Greeks and Latines, our language admitting 
no fewer rules and nice diversities then theirs? (1589: 5).
The English language was enjoying a new-found status. It became a dynamic 
symbol o f the nationalism that was consolidated as a result o f the conflicts o f
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the 1580s. The vernacular became central to an English identity that 
developed in opposition to other nation states and cultural heritages. In The 
Tempest, Ferdinand’s delight at hearing his own language is suggestive o f the 
way in which identity is constructed through language and strengthened in 
relation to difference: ‘My language! Heavens!/ I am the best o f them that 
speak this speech,/ Were I but where ’tis spoken’ (I.ii.431-433).
Richard Mulcaster writes in even stronger terms o f the need to establish a
distinctive tradition o f learning, separate from Italy. He contends,
is it not in dede a mervellous bondage, to become servants to 
one tung for learning sake, the most o f our time, with losse o f 
most time, whereas we maie have the verie same treasur in 
our own tung, with gain o f most time? our own bearing the 
joyfull title o f our libertie and freedom, the Latin tung 
remembering us of our thraldom & bondage? (1582: 254).
Surprisingly for an educator who was one of the few to openly advocate the
use o f corporal punishment in schools, Mulcaster’s attempts to persuade
people o f the need for change are realised in the metaphor o f humiliating
physical subjection.5 The Italian tongue, associated with the Roman Church, is
figured as a tyrannical jailor keeping the English tongue in ‘thraldom and
bondage’.
As the organ o f speech, and as such, the corporeal location o f language, the 
tongue came to symbolise a belief in, but ambivalent relationship to, the 
materiality o f language. Employing the symbol o f the tongue or ‘lingua’ as a
5 For Mulcaster’s views on corporal punishment see Positions ... fo r  the Training up o f  Children 
(1591: 150-151).
representation o f the materiality of language, an often-cited quotation during 
the period from the Old Testament book o f Proverbs states that ‘Death and life 
are in the power o f the tongue’ (18: 21). Specifically, the tongue became the 
locus o f pervasive anxieties about the relationship between utterance and 
inward thoughts. Occupying a unique position precisely because of its 
liminality and its capacity to transgress the body’s boundary, its physical, 
linguistic and symbolic attributes were frequently conflated, as Carla Mazzio 
has demonstrated. She explains that ‘[r]epresenations o f the tongue in the early 
modern period often encode crises o f logic, o f  language, and o f sense’ (1997: 
53).
The stereotype o f the scold or shrew is symptomatic o f the fact that the 
female tongue was widely thought to be particularly troublesome. Women’s 
tongues threatened to usurp phallic authority. William Whately, in A  Pride 
Push, warns,
we have some women that can chase and scold with their 
husbands, and rail upon them, and revile them and shake 
them together with such terms and carriage, as were 
unsufferable towards a servant. Stains o f womankind, 
blemishes o f their sex, monsters in nature, botches o f human 
society, rude, graceless, impudent, next to harlots, if not the 
same with them. Let such words leave a blister behind them, 
and let the canker eat out those tongues (1617: 36).
Whately’s fulminations reveal an intense fear o f the material consequences o f
women’s words, which, he believed, could ‘shake’ men with their force. He
develops this idea, soliciting the causticity o f words to blister scolds’ tongues,
and summoning a canker to eat them out altogether. The tongue was seen as
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the physical location o f women’s emasculating powers and these alarming 
suggestions illustrate the way in which obsessive concerns about female 
speech were displaced onto it. The scold’s bridle is an example o f the brutal 
punishments devised to physically correct the use o f the tongue as a means o f 
maintaining social control. In response to the concerns about its equivocal 
status and its destabilising effects, numerous tracts and sermons were 
produced during the period proffering advice on the ‘government o f the 
tongue’ (Perkins 1593: 1).
In his instructions ‘O f the duty o f maids and young unmarried women’,
Thomas Becon advises women:
be not full o f tongue, and o f much babbling, nor use many 
words, but as few as they may, yea and those wisely and 
discretely, soberly and modestly spoken, ever remembering 
this common proverb: a maid should be seen and not heard.
Except the gravity o f some matter do require that she should 
speak, or else an answer is to be made to such things as are 
demanded of her: let her keep silence. For there is nothing 
that doth so much commend, avaunce, set forth, adorn, deck, 
trim and garnish a maid, as silence. And this noble virtue may 
the virgins learn o f that most holy, pure and glorious virgin 
Mary, which when she either heard or saw any worthy and 
notable thing, blabbed it not out staightways to her gossips as 
the manner o f women is at this present day, but being silent 
she kept all those sayings secret and pondered them in her 
heart (1564: 513r).
There was an urgency surrounding the efforts to subjugate the tongue’s verbal 
powers. In the Christian tradition, the tongue was thought to give voice to the 
inner thoughts that were located in the speaker’s heart: ‘those things which 
procede out o f the mouth, come from the heart and they defile the man. For 
out o f the heart come evil thoughts’ ('Matthew 15: 18-19). This notion o f a
correspondence between an individual’s utterance and their sinful interior
reality was stressed by the Puritan preachers o f the period. The English
Calvinist, William Perkins, in his sermon ‘A Direction for the Government o f
the Tongue According to G od’s W ord’ states that,
The government o f the tongue is a vertue pertaining to holy 
usage o f the tongue according to Gods worde. And for the 
well ordering o f it, two things are requisite: a pure heart, and 
skill in the language o f Canaan. The pure heart is most 
necessarie, because it is the fountaine o f speech, and if the 
fountaine be defiled, the streames that issue thence can not 
be cleane (1593: A3r).
That the human heart was necessarily sinful was, for Calvinists, an
incontrovertible fact. Indeed, Calvin states that man’s ‘heart is so thoroughly
envenomed by sin that it can breath out nothing but corruption and
rottenness’ (1949: II.v.19). Perkins is at pains to stress that the purity of the
heart is the most important factor in the government o f the tongue, but in
arguing for this he reveals a rather different concern.
In Psalm 141, the speaker asks, ‘Set a watche, o Lord, before my mouth, & 
kepe the door of my lippes’ (3). In his sermon, Perkins develops this idea and 
counsels that
The minde is the guide o f the tongue: therefore men must 
consider before they speake. The tongue is the messenger o f 
the heart, and therefore as oft as we speak without meditation 
going before, so the messenger runneth without his arrand.
The tongue is placed in the middle o f the mouth, and it is 
compassed in with lippes and teeth as with a double trench, 
to showe us, howe we are to use heede and preconsideration 
before we speake and therefore it is good advice to keep the
key o f the m outh not in the mouth, but in the cupboard of 
the heart (1593: l l ) .6
Despite prioritising the heart as the originator and the mind as the regulator of
speech, the text returns repeatedly to the tongue itself. Whilst the heart and
mind are associated with the category o f the metaphysical, the tongue is
discussed in overtly physical terms. Although the text purports to counsel the
Christian subject on how best to maintain an inner reverence and piety, it
focuses obsessively upon the tongue as a recalcitrant organ with the capacity,
and indeed the intent, to act in isolation from the rest o f the body. The
imagery Perkins uses suggests that the teeth and the lips should actively
obstruct the tongue, cas with a double trench’ and work to contain it. As
Mazzio has persuasively argued,
The spectacle of the independent organ o f speech ... in many 
ways perfectly embodies anxieties about reference itself, not 
only about the movement o f speech away from the individual 
body but also about the movement o f signs away from any 
singularly discernable, naturalized context’ (1997: 54).
The tongue functioned as the cathexis of metaphysical worries about the
destabilisation of divinely ordained social hierarchies and o f gendered bodily
difference. However, it is the symbolic importance o f the tongue as an isolated
entity that is suggestive o f an implicit anxiety that language could function
independently from the speaker’s intentions. This idea is represented in
George Wither’s emblem of the ‘Evill Tongue’ which is shown below:
6 This image is mirrored in Richard 11\ told o f his banishment Mowbray responds ‘Within my 
mouth you have engaol’d my tongue,/ Doubly portcullis’d with my teeth and lips’ (I.iii. 166-167).
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No H eart can thinke^toicbatJlrmge ends>
TheTongues mruely M otion  tends
The ‘Evill Tongue’, in George W ither’s Collection of Cmblemes (London, 1635)7
The airborne tongue has its own 'unruley m otion’ which is not influenced by
the heart’s moral governance. A similar image is used in Shakespeare’s II Henry
IJC where Rumour appears 'painted full o f tongues’. Rumour acknowledges
'the wind my post-horse’ and declares:
Upon my tongues continual slanders ride,
The which in every language I pronounce,
Stuffing the ears of men with false reports.
I speak of peace, while covert enmity 
Under the smile of safety wounds the world
(Induction, 5-10)
7 The Latin m otto reads ‘W here is your tongue taking y o u ? ’ This em blem  had been in circulation  
for around tw enty years before its inclusion in W ither’s co llection .
34
The tongue came to represent the generalised anxiety that individuals were, as 
a result o f sin, subject to the (potentially destructive) processes of language 
rather than the other way around.8 It is not anachronistic then to suggest that 
there was a concern that language was a system with an agency which 
functioned in isolation from the speaker. N or is it anachronistic to suggest that 
this idea was bound to a materialist conception o f language.
Protestantism profoundly influenced this materialist understanding. Martin 
Luther’s Disputation on the Power and, Efficacy of Indulgences o f 1517 initiated the 
reform of the Western Church through a radical questioning o f the material 
effects o f the word. The Catholic Church had sought to make money by 
offering remission o f the penalties it had imposed upon individuals in return 
for cash, but in time, the practice of issuing written indulgences extended 
beyond the bounds of the ecclesiastical polity and the Church proposed a 
monetary equivalence for the penalties to be enforced by God in the afterlife. 
W hen Luther was writing his theses, the material effects o f the written word 
were highly visible: Pope Leo X was using the money raised from the sale of 
indulgences to fund the construction of St Peter’s Basilica in Rome.
Luther was troubled by pardon-preachers’ promises o f immediate release from 
purgatory and the increasingly secular uses to which the resulting funds were
8 For Renaissance examples o f writing about the tongue, see Erasmus Lingua 1525 (1989), 
Thomas Tomkis (1607), Thomas Adam (1619), and John Abemethy (1622). Peter Stailybrass 
discusses the kiss and significance o f the lips. He draws attention to the metonymical link between 
the lips and the anus, which provides a further insight into the social encoding o f language and the 
tongue (1991: 210-220).
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put, and was concerned that the time spent raising money for worldly goods
was detracting attention from true Christian engagement. He asserted that
‘[tjhey are enemies of Christ and o f the pope who forbid altogether the
preaching o f the Word o f God in some Churches in order that pardons may
be preached in others’ (Thesis no. 53, 1957: 30). Moreover, he challenged the
assumed correspondence between the letters o f indulgence and the
posthumous rewards they promised. He was impelled to confront the growing
licence afforded to the clergy and maintained that
The pope neither desires nor is able to remit any penalties 
except those imposed by his own authority or that o f the 
canons ... Thus those indulgence preachers are in error who 
say that a man is absolved from every penalty and saved by 
papal indulgences (Theses nos. 5 & 21,1957: 26-27).
The clergy issued indulgences to Christians on G od’s behalf but their ability to
do so was predicated upon the assumption that the Church had the authority
to interpret and communicate Biblical teaching. However, the printing press,
which had enabled the relatively speedy dissemination o f Luther’s theses, was
responsible for an irrepressible circulation and uptake o f written materials and
this upsurge in popular print opened up a multitude o f unprecedented
possibilities. Theological debate had been the preserve o f the Church and the
universities, but was now accessible to a much wider readership. The
increasing levels of literacy throughout Europe meant that printed sermons,
broadsheets and chapbooks were read and read aloud, allowing a far greater
dissemination o f information: the lay community was no longer excluded from
the processes o f contesting the meanings o f the biblical teachings to which
they were subject. For Luther, only the Holy Scripture could provide access to
G od’s saving grace, and as written materials became more accessible, the 
implications o f his disputations heralded a radical repositioning o f the 
individual in relation to the Church. Indeed, his attack upon the Catholic 
Church went to the very heart o f the relationship between the Christian 
subject and the word o f God initiating a struggle for meaning at the level o f 
language.
The debate following the publication o f the ninety-five theses had material 
implications at both religious and secular levels. Luther’s text challenged the 
intermediary role o f the Catholic Church by advocating a scripture-based faith. 
As a consequence o f the Reformation, the Protestant Church no longer had 
the same power to authorise and prioritise the meanings generated by the 
Bible and, free from the tutelage o f the Church, the individual was now able to 
forge a personal relationship with God. This effected a radical repositioning of 
the Christian subject in relation to the dominant scriptural ideology which 
shaped the material conditions o f existence. The new emphasis upon 
individual religious response was dependant upon the individual’s access to the 
Scriptures and the improvements o f the printing press were accompanied by 
the immensely important translation of the Bible into the vernacular. The new 
materiality of the word was instrumental to the geographically and 
psychologically wide-reaching effects o f the Reformation. In England, 
however, it was not until almost a decade after its publication in 1526, that 
Tyndale’s translation o f the Bible into English helped to transform the 
religious landscape.
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As texts influenced by the reformed theology of northern Europe began to 
arrive in England in the 1520s, there was an increased awareness o f the 
subversive potential o f the written word. Earlier attempts to suppress the 
Lollards’ English translation o f the Bible had been relatively successful in 
restricting their circulation. In 1408, before the invention o f the printing press, 
a ban was placed upon any unauthorised translation o f the scripture and, for 
the laity, the cost o f the licence that was needed in order to read the 
translations ensured that they were only accessible to an elite. Because the 
ecclesiastical authorities had been granted the power to prosecute those 
involved with the production o f heretical texts over a hundred years previously 
in 1414, Cardinal Wolsey was responsible for taking action against these 
imports. Henry VIII was initially sympathetic to the Church’s concerns, and in 
1521, after Pope Leo X had denounced the ninety-five theses, Henry earned 
himself the title of "Defender of the Faith’ for his pugnacious response to 
Luther, Assertio Septum Sacramentnm. Following the publication o f Tyndale’s 
translation, Henry supported the attempts made by the Church to suppress its 
circulation but although severe and often violent punishments were meted out 
to anyone found in possession o f the text, the Church’s attempts were, broadly 
speaking, unsuccessful. N ot only did they fail to prevent imports, but illicit 
copies o f Tyndale’s Bible were also being produced in England.
For Henry, however, the German reformation coincided with opportunities 
for personal advancement, and the written word became a powerful political
tool. Whilst publicly condemning the dissemination o f Protestant literature, he 
privately supported its distribution. The Church was increasingly dependent 
upon the support of the monarch, and when, in 1529 the King published a list 
o f prohibited books, this marked a shift to the secular control o f print. In 
1534, Parliament passed the "Act o f Supremacy’ and Henry finally broke with 
Rome, consolidating his position as King o f England, head o f the Church o f 
England and overseer o f the press. The first authorised translation o f the Bible 
to be printed in England was supervised by the King and was published in 
1537. The breakdown o f Catholic hegemony was politically expedient for the 
monarchs o f the emerging European nation states. Therefore, whilst the 
worldly hierarchies o f the Church were in many places dissolved, political 
authority was reconstituted anew, emerging out of the conflict on behalf of, 
and at the level of, the written word.
Successive translations o f the Bible continued to act as barometers o f the 
political, and religious, climate. Whilst the English translation of the Bible had 
helped to facilitate the break with Rome, for the very same reasons, it called 
Henry’s position into question: it did not provide explicit justification for 
Papal authority, or for Henry’s sovereignty. The "Act for the Advancement of 
True Religion’ o f 1543, which prohibited the working classes from reading the 
Bible in Church, is indicative o f these anxieties. The Geneva Bible o f 1560, 
which was produced ‘with most profitable annotations upon all the hard 
places and other things o f great importance’ (1560: title page), created similar 
problems. The translation, undertaken by Protestant reformers exiled during
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Mary Tudor’s reign, was explicitly aimed at widening access to the Scripture 
and encouraging personal engagement. The marginal notations reflect the 
socially levelling aims that characterised the reformers’ emphasis on Bible- 
based faith. Official opposition did not diminish the popularity o f the 
translation among England’s Protestants and after James’ accession, many 
were hopeful that he had sympathies with the austere Protestantism o f the 
Scots. Politically, however, James was acutely aware o f the Geneva Bible’s 
potential to undermine the ideological underpinning o f the monarchy. The 
King James Bible, commissioned by James in 1604 and published in 1611, is a 
textual monument to the sovereign’s anxieties that scriptural authority 
threatened his position. The various translations o f the Bible reflected and 
actively negotiated the tensions generated by the monolithic imperatives of the 
monarchy and the increasing personal freedom advanced by Reformed 
theology, printing and the steady increase in the number o f people able to 
read.
Literacy levels, although notoriously difficult to determine, are suggestive o f 
standards o f education which had a profound effect upon the material 
conditions of peoples’ lives. The signature is the favoured method of 
measuring literacy. Whilst relatively accurate figures for those able to sign their 
names have been produced, this measure does not take into account the fact 
that reading and writing were taught as separate skills. Although necessarily 
crude, David Cressy affirms that this method o f measurement cis remarkably 
sensitive to changes in the distribution and progress of literacy’ (1980: 42).
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Throughout the reigns o f Elizabeth and James there was a sustained and 
significant increase in the levels of literacy across society. Literacy had always 
been closely related to social status but it was now also influenced by an 
individual’s location and occupation. W hether they lived in the town or the 
country, men at the top o f the social hierarchy were almost universally literate. 
The majority o f rural workers were illiterate, however, with only about one in 
four able to sign their name. London saw an exponential growth in population 
during the period and the growing numbers o f tradesmen had a greater need 
for literacy skills than their rural counterparts. Consequently, the number of 
literate tradesman rose sharply from fifty-five percent in 1590 to around eighty 
percent in 1600. The number of illiterate women in London remained more or 
less the same from 1580 to 1610 with less than ten percent of women 
signature literate.9
Over time, however, the illiterate were marginalised and the status and 
opportunities that literacy afforded gave rise to social divisions and hostility. 
This tension is reflected in various texts o f the period; in Christopher 
Marlowe’s Dr Faustus, Envy declares ‘I cannot read, and therefore wish all 
books were burnt’ (II.i.133-134). And in Shakespeare’s II Herny L7, Jack 
Cade’s proposed social reforms would honour the working man and overturn 
the hierarchies that prioritise the literate:
WEAVER: The clerk o f Chartham: he can write and read and cast
account.
CADE: O, monstrous!
WEAVER: We took him setting o f  boys’ copies.
9 A ll figures taken from Cressy (1980: 141-163).
41
Here’s a villain!
H ’as a book in his pocket with red letters in’t.
Nay, then, he is a conjuror.
Nay, he can make obligations and write court-hand.
I am sorry for’t. The man is a proper man, o f mine 
honour; unless I find him guilty, he shall not die. Come 
hither, sirrah, I must examine thee. W hat is thy name? 
Emmanuel.
They use to write that on the top o f letters. ’Twill go 
hard with you.
Let me alone. D ost thou use to write thy name? O r has 
thou a mark to thyself, like an honest plain-dealing 
man?
Sir, I thank God I have been so well brought up that I 
can write my name.
He hath confessed: away with him! H e’s a villain and a 
traitor.
Away with him, I say! Hang him with his pen and 
inkhorn around his neck.
(IV.ii.78-101)
Cade draws the crowd’s attention to the Clerk’s ability to sign his name and to 
the copybooks he has prepared as calligraphy primers. Whilst the Clerk thanks 
God for his education, Cade insists that the pen and inkhorn, the symbols o f 
literacy, should be placed around his neck, coterminous with the hangman’s 
noose as lasting markers of shame and humiliation.
This event evokes the practice o f allowing what was known as ‘benefit of 
clergy’, a practice that exemplifies the intimate bond between language and 
violence. Men facing execution were granted a dispensation commuting their 
sentence to a lesser punishment if they could read. Nearly one in three men 
sentenced to death during Elizabeth’s reign were able to escape the gallows in 
this way and in accord with rising levels o f literacy, this number rose to almost
CADE:
WEAVER:
CADE:
BUTCHER:
CADE:
CLERK:
BUTCHER:
CADE:
CLERK:
ALL:
CADE:
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forty percent during James’s reign (Wheale 1999: 30).10 This background 
throws the irony o f Cade’s comments into relief. He asks, ‘Is this not a 
lamentable thing that the skin o f an innocent lamb should be made 
parchment; that parchment, being scribbled o’er, should undo a man? 
(IV.ii.72-74). Literacy and printing, under Cade’s control, become the agents 
o f degradation and corruption, and not the vehicle for advancement proposed 
by the exponents o f Reformed theology and humanism. Indeed, Cade’s 
rebellion identifies a significant tension: the egalitarian ideals o f the 
Reformation were, at that time, incompatible with the social and gender 
hierarchies which played a large part in determining who had access to literacy 
skills.
Literacy was a key element in the reformation of the Church in England but 
the textual basis of reformed theology ran contrary to the overwhelmingly oral 
and ritual-based Catholicism inherited from the late medieval period. The 
Reformed Church was at the forefront o f efforts to inculcate the virtues o f 
reading and writing in the lay community. Individuals were encouraged to 
enter into a personal relationship with God through individual study o f the 
scriptures and this was to be supplemented with reading from the widely 
available religious works that were produced as a result o f the zeal and 
assiduity o f the reformers. Estimates suggest that at least forty percent o f the 
books published during Elizabeth’s reign focused upon religious matters 
(Wheale 1999: 56).
10 Because the condemned were almost always given Psalm 51 to read, it is highly likely that many 
men were reciting rather than reading the passage.
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The relationship that Elizabeth established with the Church reflects the
particular difficulties she had to negotiate on her ascendancy and is suggestive
of the political importance o f the way in which religious ideas were
linguistically encoded. In a speech delivered to the Lords on November 20th,
1558, one o f the first o f her reign, Elizabeth stated
I am G od’s creature, ordained to obey His appointment, I 
will thereto yield, desiring from the bottom  of my heart that I 
may have assistance o f His grace to be the minister o f His 
heavenly will in this office now committed to me ... I am but 
one body naturally considered, though by His permission a 
body politic to govern (Marcus et al. 2000: 51-52).
Here, she outlines her belief in the divine right o f her sovereignty, a belief
which was reiterated in the homilies recited, by instruction o f the crown, in
churches throughout the country. Elizabeth’s own rhetoric reinforced the idea
of her divine appointment and she encouraged the powerful iconography
which developed around her. Indeed, her style o f governance was markedly
different from previous Tudor monarchs. As Leonard Tennenhouse suggests,
‘she redefined the concept o f the body politic’ (1991: 27) and actively engaged
with the politically charged representations that brought together her gender
and status. Tennenhouse notes that ‘[t]he identification of the queen’s sexual
body with the political body was no less absolute that than the iconic bonding
o f the political body to the sacred authority o f the Church’ (1991: 29). Since
Henry VIII passed the ‘Act o f Supremacy’ and broke with the Church of
Rome, the monarch held the title o f ‘Supreme Head’ o f the Church o f
England. Elizabeth was the first female ruler to assume this role and her sex,
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combined with the problematic theological implications o f the position, meant 
that the title was amended to ‘Supreme Governor’. The language Elizabeth 
used to represent herself was heavily dependent upon religious imagery, but as 
Susan Fry notes, these representations used ‘religious forms o f expression 
while repressing religious questions’ (1993: 45).
The structure o f religious observance changed after Elizabeth’s accession, and 
the changes took place at the level o f language. In April, 1559, the ‘Act o f 
Uniformity’ was passed abolishing the Mass and altering the prayer book first 
introduced by her brother, Edward VI. The significant changes to the 1552 
prayer book, particularly in the wording o f the administration, reflected the 
circumspect Protestant line that Elizabeth wished to pursue. In July o f the 
same year, the Injunctions re-instituted an English liturgy. Although the 
direction in which she steered the Church was purposely moderate and 
propitiatory, and the revisions deliberately ambiguous, those who oversaw the 
implementation o f the changes had their own political agenda. Several o f the 
Protestant commissioners had been exiled during Mary’s Catholic regime, and 
on their return, undertook their duties with particular zeal. But whilst Edward 
VI achieved a high level of conformity throughout England with the sweeping 
changes he made, the response to Elizabeth’s revisions was decidedly half­
hearted and the transition to her brand o f moderate Protestantism was slow. 
However, as Eamon Duffy concludes,
Cranmer’s sombrely magnificent prose, read week by week, 
entered and possessed their minds, and became the fabric o f 
their prayer, the utterance of their most solemn and their
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m ost vulnerable moments. And more stringent and strident 
words entered their minds and hearts too, the polemic o f the 
Homilies, and o f Jewel’s Apology, o f Foxe’s Acts and Monuments 
and o f a thousand ‘no-popery’ sermons (1992: 593).
A copy o f Foxe’s Acts and Monuments, more commonly known as the Book of
Martyrs, could be found in every Church in England by 1570. This self-
professedly monumental text represents a systematic attempt to extrapolate,
contextualise and control the conditions o f the reproduction o f meaning from
horrendous acts o f religiously motivated violence. The widespread changes in
attitude were a consequence o f the terminological shifts produced by this body
o f texts and speeches. Thoroughly embedded within the linguistic practices of
the church, this new vocabulary became the means through which personal
experience was understood and articulated
Eli2abeth’s early attempts to depoliticise the Church were characterised by an 
implicit tolerance o f religious heterodoxy but this policy was largely dictated 
by circumstance: in the 1550s and 1560s, the conjuncture o f unstable internal 
politics and the volatile conditions in Europe meant that her resolute 
ambiguity was tactically adroit. Prosecuting cases of heresy with the fervour of 
her predecessor, Mary, would have been widely unpopular and would have 
threatened the delicate balance of her power. In the first year o f her reign she 
repealed all previous statutes relating to heresy and, for the first time, set clear 
guidelines for what constituted the crime (Blackstone 1979 Vol. IV: 48). 
Common censures were to be administered by the ecclesiastical courts and 
only the provincial synod was licensed to condemn the heretic to be burned at
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the stake. Such action was received positively as the first instance o f a lucid 
definition o f the crime o f heresy, but it was also a shrewd political move which 
served to distance ecclesiastical and monarchical authority, and, in doing so, to 
obfuscate the mutually constitutive nature of their powers.
By the 1580s however, Catholic attempts to install Mary Queen of Scots upon 
the English throne and the conflict with Spain radically altered the political 
and religious landscape. Elizabeth could no longer afford to be equivocal 
about religious matters and was unable to dismiss the differences between the 
Catholic and Protestant faiths as ‘disputes over trifles’. Religious opinion 
polarised and anti-Catholic feeling reached fever pitch. Sedition, treason and 
heresy were frequently linked, and were all crimes against the state that could 
be committed through the agency o f the written or spoken word. Moreover, 
they all carried the death penalty. Whilst allegiance to the Church of England 
was demonstrated by a series o f performative gestures, verbal rituals, such as 
the saying of Mass, constituted illegal and treasonous acts of Catholic worship.
When, in 1603, James I ascended the throne, he was initially able to exploit the 
uncertainty o f his intentions: although he was a Protestant, and the King o f 
the fiercely Calvinist Scots, his wife was a Catholic. James had inherited a 
Church which had worked retrospectively to produce the history from which 
it now derived its authority. In 1604, James met with the Anglican bishops and 
the Puritans, who were now eager to work with the Church to provide an 
evangelical emphasis. The King James Bible was a pre-emptive attempt to diffuse
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the potentially subversive emphases o f the Geneva Bible, but the treasonous 
Gunpowder Plot to blow up the Houses o f Parliament in 1605 demonstrated 
the strength of Catholic feeling.
Many types o f actions amounted to treason, but the possibility o f its being
committed verbally proved a contentious issue. In Shakespeare’s Richard HI,
Richard, Duke o f Gloucester initiates a sustained campaign against his brother,
King Edward IV. He urges Buckingham to tell ‘how Edward put to death a
citizen/ Only for saying he would make his son / Heir to the Crown —
meaning indeed his house’ (III.v.75-77).11 This betrays the very real problem
of the uncertainty of the speaker’s intention and the instability o f linguistic
signifiers. Indeed, in his Commentaries on the L am  of England, William Blackstone
reflects at some length upon the complexity o f this issue:
How far mere words, spoken by an individual, and not 
relative to any treasonable act or design then in agitation, has 
been formerly matter o f doubt ... words spoken amount only 
to a high misdemeanour, and no treason ... their meaning 
depends always on their connection with other words, and 
things; they may signify differently even according to the tone 
o f voice with which they are delivered ... As therefore there 
can be nothing more equivocal and ambiguous than words, it 
would indeed be unreasonable to make them amount to high 
treason ... If  the words be set down in writing, it argues more 
deliberate intention: and it has been held that writing is an 
overt act of treason; for scribere est agere. But even in this case 
bare words are not the treason, but the deliberate act of 
writing them (Vol. IV 1979: 79-80).
11 Blackstone also touches upon this issue. He recounts this and another instance in the reign o f  
Edward IV where a man was executed for treasonable utterances: ‘the one a citizen o f  London, 
who said he would make his son heir o f  the crown, being the sign o f the house in which he lived; 
the other a gentleman, whose favourite buck the king killed in hunting whereupon he wished it, 
horns and all, in the king’s belly’ (1979 Vol. IV: 80).
Blackstone accounts for the contingency o f meaning here, and during the 
period there was evidendy a keen awareness o f the slippery nature o f the 
signifying process. John Harrington offers a persuasive explanation for the 
difficulty o f establishing treason, claiming that ‘Treason doth never prosper, 
what’s the reason?/ For if it prosper, none dare call it Treason’ (Norbrook 
1993: 120). Although utterance, in and of itself, may not have been regarded as 
treasonous, sedition, the use o f language to incite insurrection undoubtedly 
was.
The performativity o f language is explored in Shakespeare’s Richard III with 
the vivid dramatisation o f treason incited by persuasive speech. Richard 
mounts a concerted verbal assault upon his brother Edward. Richard is 
actively involved in the dissemination o f rumours and lies and despite his early 
assertion that W e speak no treason’ (I.i.90) he uses his rhetorical skill to 
facilitate his political advancement. He recognises that the monarchical 
authority which motivated his treasonous attempts to usurp the crown is 
linguistically constructed, asserting that ‘the King’s name is a tower o f 
strength/ Which they upon the adverse faction want’ (V.iii.12-13). In order to 
achieve his sovereign ambitions, he recognises and exploits the power of 
speech, but is also wary o f the way in which this power can work to his 
disadvantage. He issues a warning to the men he has employed to kill 
Clarence, instructing them to ‘be sudden in the execution ... do not hear him 
plead;/ For Clarence is well-spoken, and perhaps/ May move your hearts to
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pity, if you mark him (I.iii.346-349). In this instance, life and death really are in 
the power o f the tongue.
Fears about the performativity o f language led to greater organisation in the
attempts to suppress undesirable texts. Throughout the reigns o f Elizabeth
and James, the Worshipful Company o f Stationers had control over the press.
Established in 1557 by Mary Tudor, the Company was granted a royal charter,
which conferred exclusive privileges. In return, it was expected to prevent
seditious Protestant publications. After her accession in 1558, Elizabeth was
keen to exploit this mutually beneficial relationship and politically repositioned
the Stationers’ powers of censorship. Around the same time, Elizabeth issued
a proclamation Trohibiting Unlicensed Interludes and Plays, Especially on
Religion or Policy’. According to this proclamation, those involved in the
licensing o f stage plays should
permit none to be played wherein either matters o f religion or 
o f the governance o f the estate o f the commonweal shall be 
handled or treated, being no meet matters to be written or 
treated upon but by men o f authority, learning, and wisdom, 
nor to be handled before any audience but o f grave and 
discreet persons (Hughes Vol. II 1969: 115-116).
The Elizabethan regime’s most effective censorship was aimed at civic
religious drama, which had all but disappeared by the end o f the 1570s. Her
involvement with plays and players endured throughout her reign, and she
kept a closer control over all aspects of the production o f plays than any other
Tudor monarch (Tennenhouse 1991: 31). Plays became the preserve of
licensed professional players and were increasingly performed in purpose-built
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playhouses. The system of licensing plays and players was beneficial for actors 
because the ‘Acte for the punishment o f Vacabondes and for the Releif of the 
Poore and Im potent’ (1572) deemed any actors ‘not belonging to any Baron o f 
this Realme or towards any other honourable Personage o f greater Degree’ as 
‘Rogues Vacaboundes and Sturdy Beggers’ (Chambers 1923 IV: 270). The 
status that was afforded the players protected them from the often-intolerant 
local authorities. In addition, this system served the interests o f the state 
because it provided the opportunity to censor politically sensitive material.
Censorship was intended to prevent seditious, libellous and heretical texts and 
speeches. Implicit in the very idea o f censorship is the knowledge that the 
written and spoken word has material effects. The Exhortation concernyng Good 
Ordre and Obedience to Bailers and Magistrates was originally published in 1547 and 
was reprinted in 1559 shortly after Elizabeth’s accession to the throne. It was 
reprinted on several occasions during her rule and again during James I’s reign. 
It states that:
Almighty God hath created and appointed all thinges in 
heaven, earth and waters in a moste excellent and perfect 
ordre ... Every degre o f people, in their vocacion, callying 
and office, hath appoynted to them their duetie and ordre.
Some are in high degre, some in lowe, some kynges and 
princes, some inferiors and subjectes, priestes and laimen, 
masters and servauntes, fathers and chyldren, husbandes and 
wifes, riche and poore, and every one hath nede o f other 
(Bond 1987: 161).
The homily posits a divinely prescribed hierarchical and patriarchal order 
where everyone is subject to God, and to the monarch as G od’s appointee.
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Monarchical authority was inextricably linked to that o f the Church, to the 
extent that the values of one were used to sanction the actions o f the other, 
and any attack made on the legality o f either institution necessarily implicated 
the other. It was within these parameters that the suitability o f the material 
contained in plays and publications was assessed. The censors had the power 
to prohibit anything which was thought to have the potential to subvert this. 
Indeed, the homily cautioned that “W here there is no right ordre, their: reigneth 
all abuse, carnall libertie, enormities, syn and babilonicall confusion’ (Bond 
1987: 161).
In her extended study o f Elizabethan press censorship, Cyndia Clegg describes 
the general practice as ‘a crazy quilt o f proclamations, patents, trade 
regulations, judicial decrees, and privy council and parliamentary actions 
patched together by the sometimes common and sometimes competing 
threads o f religious, economic, political, and private interests’ (Clegg 1997: 5). 
The Master o f the Revels oversaw the licensing and production o f stage plays 
and the Worshipful Company o f Stationers had a similar regulatory role in the 
production o f printed materials after the charter granted in 1557. In addition, 
the Church played an important part in the detection o f schismatic and 
heretical works. Censorship was largely centralised in these bodies, but the 
Privy Council and the Monarch retained the ultimate authority. Despite the 
ominous forecasts made in the Homily on Obedience, the censors seemed to 
allow a reasonable degree o f latitude. This was politically expedient, as Bacon 
suggests in his essay ‘O f Seditions and Troubles’: ‘Libels and licentious
discourses against the state, when they are frequent and open, and (in like sort) 
false news, often running up and down to the disadvantage o f the state, and 
hastily embraced, are amongst the signs o f troubles’. He goes on to warn that 
‘Neither doth it follow that because these fames are a sign o f troubles, that the 
suppressing of them with too much severity should be a remedy o f troubles’ 
(1985: 101-102). Elizabeth was eager to avoid a repetition o f the kind of 
oppressive regime that characterised her sister Mary’s time on the throne and, 
as a consequence, she took a deliberately lenient approach to the matter.
Ben Jonson, writing mainly in the Jacobean and Caroline periods, was, 
however, famously subject to repeated investigation by the censors. His 
experiences are documented in his Epigrammes where he poignantly draws 
attention to the material effects o f his written works. ‘On Play-wright’ traces a 
tangible link between his drama and the experience o f physical violence:
Play-wright convict of publicke wrongs to men,
Takes private beatings, and begins againe.
Two kindes o f valour he doth shew, at ones;
Active in’s braine, and passive in his bones.
(1954: 33)
Although he identifies valour in the two distinct locations o f the brain and the 
bones he simultaneously strains the distinction between the physical and 
linguistic effects of the written and spoken word to breaking point. It was 
alleged that his play Sejanus contained treasonous material, but it is not clear 
whether the threat came from an allusion to the Earl of Essex or a veiled
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comment upon the political climate after James’s accession to throne.12 What 
this highlights, however, and what Jonson himself made reference to, is the 
potentially problematic contingency o f m eaning.13
Located on the margins o f the city, London’s purpose-built theatres, cthe quick 
forge and working-house o f thought’ (.Herny L7, V.0.23), were instrumental to 
what Stephen Greenblatt calls the ‘circulation o f social energy’ (1988). 
Dollimore, in his discussion o f the drama o f Shakespeare and his 
contemporaries, argues that the theatre ‘anticipates, and is therefore usefully 
explored in relation to, a central tenet o f materialist analysis, namely that the 
essentialist concept o f ‘man’ mystifies and obscures the real historical 
conditions in which the actual identity o f people is rooted’ (1989: 153). 
Although prohibited from touching explicitly upon matters of religion or 
government, the drama interrogated the relationship of the individual to God 
and the state, dramatising and engaging with the processes o f representation 
and the circulation of competing and collaborating discourses which 
constituted the real historical conditions in which the subject is constituted. In 
A  Refutation of the Apology for Actors, I.G. reviles actors for their involvement 
with ‘obsceane Stage-playef which he claims are ‘the most impious and 
pernitious o f all other unlawful! artificiall Pleasures’ (1615: 4). The anti- 
theatricalists had a fundamental mistrust o f the distinction between
12 Annabel Patterson has explored the implications o f censorship for writers and readers o f the 
Early Modem period, and has argued that Jonson’s work actively incorporated these tensions to 
produce a ‘poetics o f censorship’ (1984: 57).
|J The impact o f censorship on the written word has been examined by Richard Dutton (2001) and 
Patterson (1984). For a discussion o f dramatic censorship, see Clare (1999), Dutton (1991) and 
Finkelpearl (1986: 123-138).
54
representations and ‘real life’ and their attacks on the theatre were predicated 
upon a belief that ‘mimicall inventions’ did not simply ‘represent’; they had an 
affective and effective agency.14 Whilst it is difficult to concur with many of 
the purported effects of attending the theatre, the basis o f their argument is 
correct. The theatre, the main focus o f the following chapters, provided a 
distinctive representational mode through which the meanings and effects of 
violence were contested and re-negotiated. Moreover, it actively questioned 
ways in which language was implicated at all levels of this process.
Many o f Shakespeare’s dramatic works draw attention to their own status as 
representations: the Chorus opens Henry V , asking the audience to ‘Piece out 
our imperfections with your thoughts’ (Prologue, 23), drawing attention to the 
inconsistencies o f the performance, and, pointedly, the boy actor playing 
Cleopatra had to deliver the lines, ‘I shall see/ Some squeaking Cleopatra boy 
my greatness’ (Antony and Cleopatra V.ii.218-219). Striking visual images and 
verbal descriptions o f events were often in competition, and, as Andrew Gurr 
explains:
The contrast between the attractions o f witplay and 
swordplay is part o f the larger story o f the conflict between 
stage verse and stage spectacle, and the priority that the poets 
fought the players for, o f hearing and beholding. The poets 
wanted audiences, hearers, to use their ears for the words, 
while the players went for spectators and spectacle, the 
pleasures of the eye (1992: 173).
14 See, for example, John Rainolds (1599).
There was conflict even at the site o f representation as the ideology that 
governed the exchange of representations between society and the theatre was 
contested in the very process o f performance.
Violence on the stage, unlike that o f the neighbouring bear-pit, was not real: 
the theatre provided a platform upon which ‘to make an act o f tragic violence’ 
(Richard III, II.ii.39). Whilst on many occasions acts o f violence were only 
related to the audience second hand — for example, the rape of Lavinia, and 
the death o f Autolycus at the hands of a bear — there were many ghastly on­
stage representations o f excruciatingly graphic violence. Suffolk’s body and 
severed head are displayed as a ‘barbarous and bloody spectacle’ (II Henry HI,
IV.i.146), Titus’s hand is hacked off with an axe (Titus A.ndronicus, IILi.), 
Desdemona is smothered (Othello, V.ii), and ‘vile jelly’ is extirpated from 
Gloucester’s eye sockets as he is blinded (King Hear, Ill.vii). Although the 
violence was not real, the effects of representing violence were. The signifying 
codes governing theatrical representations translated acts o f physical damage 
suffered only by the individual into meaningful occurrences intelligible within 
a wider cultural context. The method of translating physical pain into cultural 
meaning was itself subject to dispute and these codes were also forcibly 
contested.
Many o f these codes were inherited from an eclectic mix of materials which 
provided the sources o f Shakespeare’s dramatic works. Livy’s History of Rome, 
Ovid’s Fasti and Metamorphoses, Seneca’s tragedies, Plutarch’s Fives of the Noble
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Grecians and Romans and Holinshed’s Chronicles were among the diverse 
influences upon Renaissance drama. The reading o f a grammar school 
education, these works were already involved in the transmission and 
codification o f violence, but these meanings were in turn contested in the 
theatre. In the process o f performance, multiple discourses were invoked, 
challenged and refigured as a result o f their confrontation. Tragedies and 
histories had the most clearly defined interest in representing acts o f violence. 
Although Renaissance tragedy is characterised by its heterogeneity as much as 
its homology, it is widely understood as a profoundly teleological mode. 
According to this understanding, violence is circumscribed within an 
inexorable movement towards an end. For the histories, however, ‘blood is 
their argument’ {Henry V , IV.i.143) and in broad terms they approach violence 
more as a force integral to the production o f historical narrative. Each genre 
codifies violence according to different criteria, working to recuperate it for 
the spheres o f historical, political and metaphysical knowledge. However, this 
process is complicated by the fact that the discursive production of meanings 
is not subject to any teleological imperative: it is endlessly deferred and 
continually in play.
In their dramatic and literary work, Shakespeare and his contemporaries 
contributed to the discursive production o f meanings. New and self-conscious 
forms o f representation emerged, which were both a product o f and 
engagement with the foremost cultural debates. The theatre interrogated the 
ideologies o f Protestant theology, the monarchy and the pedagogical tradition,
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which was greatly influenced by both. But in addition, it allowed a questioning 
o f the very conditions under which these positions were articulated. Taking 
language as its object as well as its principal medium, drama explored the 
implications o f its materiality and the grappled with the problems o f finding a 
language with which to speak o f violence, and indeed, with the violence 
effected by language itself.
h ) . o r ' d k - . M '  ■. ;■ /  :
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Chapter Two
‘Men are but blankes where pow’r doth write her lust’1
There is something problematic about the Biblical account o f the fall o f the 
tower o f Babel. When the people o f Babel declared, le t us buylde us a citie 
and a tower, whose top may reach unto the heaven, that we may get us a name’ 
(Genesis 11: 4), they precipitated the fragmentation of their language into 
several different languages. Yet, their motivation for building the tower — to 
get a name — suggests that they were actively seeking a marker o f difference: a 
name which would distinguish them. Like the description o f the Fall o f Adam 
and Eve, this account functions not as an aetiology o f certain desires, 
impulses, and states but rather as confirmation o f their always-already anterior 
quality. In this instance, the narrative attempts to provide an explanation for 
linguistic differences, but instead, it posits language as the source o f difference 
and addresses the issue o f its constitutive quality. The people o f Babel required 
language to construct their sense o f self and the subsequent act o f the vengeful 
god o f the Old Testament is suggestive o f how violent this process can be.
To think about the language of violence is to think about many complex and 
intertwined issues concerning the agency o f linguistic structures. My aim here 
is threefold: to explore the ways in which language figures violence, to 
consider violence as an effect o f language, and to assert that violence inheres 
within the structures of language. Language thoroughly structures our thought: 
the fact that language always precedes our entry into it requires and effects a
1 Greville (1965: 49).
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violent circumscription o f the limits o f the subject. In the previous chapter, I 
demonstrated that Renaissance culture was, to a large extent, preoccupied by 
linguistic issues. In this chapter, I look at the way that language is once again at 
the forefront o f our cultural consciousness as the focus for discussions o f all 
aspects o f the social totality. Here I examine these issues as they relate 
specifically to violence.
1
Fulke Greville, writing at the turn o f the seventeenth century, reflected in his 
‘Treatise on Monarchy’ upon the relationship between the state and the 
subject:
Men are but blankes where pow’r doth write her lust,
A sprightlesse masse, which for it cannot weld 
It self, at others pleasure languish must;
Resolve to suffer, and let power doe all
(1965: 49)
Greville’s conception o f the subject as a ‘sprightlesse’ or soulless ‘blank’ 
inscribed upon by an external authority is profoundly unsettling, and 
ostensibly, startlingly modern.2 Man, he is suggesting, is not the ‘author of 
himself (Coriolanus, V.iii.36), but shaped and welded by forces from without. 
This passage has a particular resonance when considered alongside Marx’s 
influential assertion that ‘[i]t is not the consciousness o f men that determines 
their being, but, on the contrary, their social being determines their
2 The first posthumous collection o f Greville’s work was printed in 1633 and later attracted 
controversy with Richard Baxter, the non-conformist clergyman and chaplain o f Cromwell’s army. 
He remarked that ‘Sir Fulke Grevil ... hath a Poem lately Printed ... which I greatly wonder this 
age would bear’ (Greville 1965: vii).
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consciousness’ (1963: 67). cThe real nature o f man’ Marx argues, ‘is the totality 
o f social relations’ (1963: 83). Greville’s idea that the individual is formed 
through a process o f inscription is suggestive of the fundamentally linguistic 
structure o f both authority and the subject; that is to say, o f the social totality. 
Indeed, as Marx and Engels state, ‘language is practical consciousness’ (1970: 
51). The subject, whether s /he  is subject to the monarch, as in Greville’s 
treatise, or to any other authority, is first and foremost subject to language.
Language forms the totality o f all social relations, and although neither Marx 
nor Engels wrote much more on language specifically, subsequent thinkers 
have explored the implications o f Marxist thought for the study of linguistics.3
V. N. Volosinov, writing in 1929, anticipated the direction in which left-wing 
thinking about language was to develop. In Marxism and the Philosophy of 
Language he states that ‘[consciousness takes shape and being in the material 
o f signs created by an organized group in the process o f its social intercourse 
... individual consciousness is nurtured on signs; it derives its growth from 
them ’ (1973: 13). Ideology, he goes on to explain ‘may not be divorced from 
the material reality of sign’ (1973: 20). In Greville’s ‘Alaham’ the Chorus o f the
3 See, however, ‘Language and Thought’ where they state that ‘Language is the immediate 
actuality o f thought. Just as philosophers have given thought an independent existence, so they 
make language into an independent realm. This is the secret o f philosophical language, in which 
thoughts in the form o f  words have their own content. The problem o f descending from the world 
o f thoughts to the actual world is turned into the problem o f  descending from language to life. We 
have shown that thoughts and ideas acquire an independent existence in consequence o f  the 
personal circumstances and relations o f  individuals acquiring independent existence. We have 
shown that exclusive, systematic occupation with these thoughts on the part o f ideologists and 
philosophers, and hence the systematisation o f these thoughts, is a consequence o f  the division o f  
labour, and that, in particular, German philosophy is a consequence o f petty-bourgeois conditions. 
The philosophers would only have to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from 
which it is abstracted, to recognise it as the distorted language o f the actual world, and to realise 
that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that they are only 
manifestations o f real life’ (Marx and Engels 1970: 118).
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People state that ‘O f words we are the grammar’ (1965: 144), suggesting the 
indissoluble connection between subjectivity and linguistic structures.
In his discussion o f ‘Ideology and the State’, Louis Althusser pursues this idea, 
suggesting a theoretical scene o f the interpellation o f subjects within 
apparatuses embodied in linguistic practices. Althusser’s notion o f 
interpellation proposes a process whereby an officer o f the Law, as a 
representative o f ideology, ‘hails’ the subject, and the subject, recognising that 
the call is addressed to him/her, is, by virtue o f this recognition, created as a 
subject. Although this process is described sequentially, Althusser explains 
that, ‘in reality these things happen without any succession. The existence o f 
ideology and the hailing or interpellation o f individuals as subjects are one and 
the same thing ... individuals are always-already subjects’ (1971: 163-164). The 
theoretical scene posed by Althusser functions in a similar way to the biblical 
narratives o f the fall o f the tower o f Babel, and the Fall o f Adam and Eve. 
Althusser stages an event in order to explain a particular state — that o f being 
interpellated by ideology — but it is an event which has always already 
happened. Emphasising the fundamentally linguistic nature o f ideology, and 
stating that ‘the category o f the subject is constitutive o f all ideology’ (1971:
160), Althusser looks specifically at the mechanisms which disseminate and 
reproduce the body of ideas which support and maintain the social order. 
Examining how these mechanisms Ex a place for the individual, he identifies 
various ‘Ideological State Apparatuses’ (ISAs) and ‘Repressive State 
Apparatuses’ (RSAs) responsible for the circulation and implementation of
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formative ideological discourses. Religious organisations, schools, family units, 
media groups and various entertainments can function as the state’s 
ideological apparatuses: during the Renaissance, ISAs would have included the 
Church o f England, the grammar school curriculum and various printed 
materials such as sermons, homilies and conduct manuals. The Army and the 
police form repressive apparatuses, but whilst England lacked a standing army 
or police force engaged in the active prevention o f crime, the seemingly 
ubiquitous intelligence agents, who worked to detect potential threats to 
national and monarchical security, functioned as a repressive arm of the state. 
Althusser explains that the primary difference between repressive and 
ideological apparatuses is their mode o f operation: ISAs operate
predominantly at the level of discourse, whereas RSAs function predominantly 
by force and violence. Language and violence, Althusser concludes, collude to 
serve the interests of the state.
In a letter to J. Bloch in 1890, Engels wrote, £[a]ccording to the materialist 
conception o f history, the ultimately determining element in history is the 
production and reproduction of real life. More than this neither Marx nor I 
have ever asserted’ (cited in Coward and Ellis 1977: 69). Following on from 
this, Althusser notes that ‘no production is possible which does not allow for 
the reproduction o f the material conditions o f production’ (1971: 124). 
Specifically, he highlights the way in which ideologies must, in addition to 
maintaining the power of the state, ensure the conditions o f their own 
reproduction. He explains that,
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the reproduction o f labour power requires not only a 
reproduction o f its skills, but also, at the same time, a 
reproduction o f its submission to the rules o f the established 
order, i.e. a reproduction o f submission to the ruling ideology 
for the workers, and a reproduction o f the ability to 
manipulate the ruling ideology correctly for the agents of 
exploitation and repression, so that they, too, will provide for 
the domination o f the ruling class cin words’.
Ideologies function through language but have a material existence in the 
subject. By locating a functional ideology within a linguistic system, Althusser 
suggests that the reproduction o f the existing order is achieved through 
discourse, or collective arrangements of utterance. What is more, he suggests 
that ideology works to imbue and delineate the significations of these 
utterances to the extent that those subjected to a discourse regard the practices 
and positions it sets up as the ‘natural order’. Therefore, the power o f an 
ideology lies in its inability to be perceived as such, and by its assimilation into 
a seemingly innocuous notion of common sense. Indeed, ‘the obviousness of 
the “transparency’ of language’ is itself, he claims, ‘an ideological effect’ (1971:
161).
Drawing a parallel between the ideas expressed in Greville’s treatise, where the 
individual can do no more than ‘let power doe all’, and Marxism, where the 
subject is an absolute product of the social conditions o f their existence, 
highlights one of the fundamental problems o f Marxist thought, however. As 
Greville goes on to write,
No native notion, lawe, or vyolence 
Fashion his hard heart to an humble scene.
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But that hee still should grudge at government,
Scorne mercy, yet rebell at tyrannie,
Repine at discipline, rest discontent 
Both with his equalls, and authority:
(1965: 40)
How can a subject produced by ideology rebel at the tyranny exercised on 
behalf o f that ideology? Marxism is a revolutionary philosophy: The Communist 
Manifesto calls for the ‘forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions’ 
(Marx and Engels 2002: 258), yet it conceives o f a subject that is both 
produced by the totality of social relations and capable of effecting the radical 
change o f these same relations. Coward and Ellis explain the contradiction: for 
Marx, ‘the human subject is constituted in ideology and by history, and at the 
same time acts to make history and change society, without having full and 
self-sufficient knowledge o f or control over the actions it undertakes’ (1977: 
61). The speaker of Greville’s treatise speaks from an impossible position, 
therefore. The conditions upon which the subject is purportedly predicated 
would automatically prohibit the knowledge that would allow an articulation 
o f this kind. The very statement that ‘men are but blanks’ demonstrates a 
profound but, in Marxist terms, unthinkable understanding of the conditions 
o f subjectivity. The speaker, by virtue o f language use, has already been 
inscribed by the structures of power, but part o f the process o f an ideology’s 
inscription is to conceal its own status as ideology. Despite these problems, 
subsequent critical theories have pursued Marxism’s attack upon humanist 
essentialism and maintained its insistence that the subject is a socially
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constructed entity. Once this conceptual framework is dismantled, the 
constitutive qualities o f language are thrown into relief.
II
In the opening sentences o f the first section o f the ‘Treatise on Monarchy’,
Greville writes that:
There was a tyme before the tymes of story,
When nature raign’d, in stead o f lawes or artes,
And mortall Goddes with men made upp the glory 
O f one republique, by united hearts.
(Greville 1965: 35)
His idea o f the primitive conditions of unity can usefully be considered in 
relation to the insights o f Freudian psychoanalysis, which heralded an equally 
radical rethinking o f the subject and continues to exert an extraordinary 
influence upon critical practice. Indeed, Freud’s formulations have come to 
serve as paradigms in various areas o f literary and cultural criticism and the 
implications o f psychoanalysis are such that the difficulties o f thinking outside 
its bounds are now virtually insurmountable. Whilst Marx focused on the 
material conditions o f collective existence and advocated the Violent 
overthrow’ (Marx and Engels 2002: 232) o f capitalist structures, the 
subsequent work of Freud identified violence in the developmental processes 
o f the individual, and understood societal conflict as a corollary o f these 
processes.
Freud believed that mental processes were not restricted to the conscious 
domain and that a significant proportion o f mental activity occurred 
unconsciously. The contents o f the unconscious, he theorised, are
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“representatives’ o f the instincts’ (Laplanche and Pontalis 1973: 474) governed
by the primary processes o f symbolisation, condensation and displacement. In
addition, Freud postulated a tripartite division o f the psyche into the id, the
super-ego and the ego where the id is the instinctual and unconscious aspect
o f the personality, the superego, governed by ideals, exercises judgement or
censure and is often associated with the codes o f conduct instituted by
parental demands and prohibitions, and the ego is the domain o f conscious
life. The ego is the sense o f self which emerges from the tensions between the
id and the super-ego. At the beginning of a child’s life, Freud claimed, there is
no distinction between the superego and the id because the child perceives
her/him self and the external world as a single entity:
Originally the ego includes everything, later it detaches itself 
from the external world. The ego-feeling we are aware of now 
is thus only a shrunken vestige of a far more extensive feeling 
-a feeling which embraced the universe and expressed an 
inseparable connection of the ego with the external world. If 
we may suppose that this primary ego-feeling has been 
preserved in the minds of many people - to a greater of lesser 
extent - it would co-exist like a sort of counterpart with the 
narrower and more sharply outlined ego-feeling o f maturity, 
and the ideational content belonging to it would be precisely 
the notion o f limidess extension and oneness with the 
universe (1994: 4).
The developmental process circumscribes the child’s sense o f self as it comes 
to realise the distinction between its body and that of its mother. This process 
is not a smooth one, however, and, according to Freud, the ego emerges out 
o f violent conflict:
The tendency arises to dissociate from the ego everything 
which can give rise to pain, to cast it out and create a pure 
pleasure ego, in contrast to a threatening outside, not self.
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The limits o f this primitive pleasure ego cannot escape 
readjustment through experience. Much that the individual 
wants to retain because it is pleasure-giving is nevertheless 
part not o f the ego but o f an object; and much o f what he 
wishes to eject because it torments him yet proves to be 
inseparable from the ego, arising from an inner source (1994:
4).
In common with Marx, Freud noted that external events play a formative role 
in the development o f the self However, he suggests that the initial state of 
the immature ego serves as a prototype for subsequent erotic experience, 
which may be understood as the desire to recreate this primary feeling of 
limitless extension, o f £united hearts’. In a similar manner, the process o f the 
ego’s maturation sets the precedents for violence in later life. Violence inheres 
within the process of establishing the ego’s boundaries and subsequent acts of 
violence are dependent upon these limits; violence may be motivated by an 
individual’s enforced separation from a desired object, or by the desire to 
appropriate an object outside o f the self. Indeed, any notion o f violence would 
be unthinkable without the anterior bonds that allow the immature ego to 
experience a form of continuity with the outside world.
Civilisation and its Discontents discusses the ways in which violent and erotic 
impulses affect an individual’s concept of her/him self and influence their 
interaction in the world. Freud suggests that £the two kinds o f instinct seldom 
- perhaps never - appear in isolation, but always mingle with each other in 
different, very varying proportions, and so make themselves unrecognizable’
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(1994: 47).4 The concepts of the life and death instincts, which he develops in 
Civilisation and its Discontents, were introduced in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 
where he postulates that the life instinct, Eros, responsible for the impulse to 
create and maintain unity, exists in conjunction with the death instinct, 
Thanatos, which also aims to alleviate tensions, but is compelled to achieve 
this through the elimination o f all suffering, in death. The singularity of 
ultimate aim leads to the chiasmatic ambivalence of each drive; however, the 
continual state o f tension generated by these two instincts is instrumental to 
the establishment of cohesive social groups. Freud recognised, however, that 
social structures, once formed, are not impenetrable. The impulses towards 
self-preservation which motivate their formation, can also put them at risk. 
The way in which an individual’s psychic life develops, must, therefore, 
involve the suppression o f destructive impulses to allow the maximisation of 
the benefits of communal living. There are points, however, at which 
suppressive strategies (whether they be positive or negative) collapse, leaving 
open the possibilities for violence and eroticism. This is compounded, Freud 
suggests, by the fact that violence is intrinsic to mankind: ‘men are not gentle, 
friendly creatures wishing for love, who simply defend themselves if  they are 
attacked ... a powerful measure o f desire for aggression has to be reckoned as 
part o f their instinctual endowment’ (1994: 40).
4 Slavoj Zizek warns that a ‘confusion to be avoided here is with the common-sense notion (to 
which, from time to time, all great theoreticians o f antagonism succumb ... Freud in Civilisation 
and its Discontents, for example) o f Eros and Thanatos or expansion and contraction as two 
opposed forces engaged in an unending and unrelenting battle for domination. The co-dependence 
o f the two antagonistic forces does not reside in the fact that one force needs the other as the only 
ground against which it can assert itself (no light without darkness, no love without hate ...); the 
logic at work here is much closer to what Marx had in mind apropos o f his crucial concept o f a 
‘tendency’ which can lead to counter-effects’ (1996a: 28).
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Perhaps o f greatest importance to this argument, however, is the way in which 
Freud centred the psychoanalytic project on an interchange o f words between 
patient and analyst, thereby acknowledging and making explicit the materiality 
o f language. In his introductory lectures o f 1916 Freud explains:
By words one person can make another blissfully happy or 
drive him to despair, by words the teacher conveys his 
knowledge to his pupils, by words the orator carries his 
audience with him and determines their judgements and 
decisions. Words provoke affects and are in general the 
means of mutual influence among men. Thus we shall not 
depredate the use of words in psychotherapy and we shall be 
pleased if we can listen to the words that pass between the 
analyst and his patient (1991: 41-42)
The so-called 'talking cure’ was based upon an understanding that words are
not just the vehicles that enable the transmission o f knowledge: they are the
things to be known. Indeed, much o f Freud’s work dealt with psychological
processes that were o f a fundamentally linguistic character. In The Interpretation
of Dreams, The Pychopatholo^y of Lverday Life, Jokes and their Relation to the
Unconscious, and Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, Freud demonstrates that
language cannot be divorced from the totality o f mental processes, and that
symptoms, the result o f conflict between the ego and super-ego, often
manifest themselves linguistically.
Following on from the work of Freud, Georges Bataille develops the thesis 
that violence and eroticism are inseparable. He argues that 'the domain of 
eroticism is the domain o f violence, o f violation’ (1962: 16) and explores the
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expression o f this problematic partnership. Although suggesting that ‘[ejrotism 
always entails a breaking down o f established patterns, the patterns ... o f the 
regulated social order basic to our discontinuous mode o f existence as defined 
and separate individuals’ (1962: 18) he also asserts that integral social 
institutions are born out o f this seemingly amorphous and potentially anarchic 
impulse. In  his important study, Erotism, Death and Sensuality, Bataille contends 
that eroticism can operate on physical, emotional and religious levels, and he 
identifies some o f the material effects o f violent and erotic impulses, 
highlighting the importance o f literature and the structures and practices o f 
Judeo-Christian religious observance.
At a physical level, Bataille explains the impulse towards eroticism saying
simply, ‘I f  you die, it is not my death. You and I are discontinuous beings’ (1962:
12). The only true source o f continuity is the certainty and actuality o f death.
Violence and eroticism have to do with a vertiginous force which compels the
subject to the brink of annihilation, experienced either through the desire for
continuity, or in the attempts to reject this attraction. Bataille reasons:
If  the union o f two lovers comes about through love, it 
involves the idea o f death, murder or suicide ... On a lower 
level than this implied violence — a violence matched by the 
separate individual’s sense o f continuous violation — the 
world o f habit and shared egotism begins ... Only in the 
violation, through death if need be, of the individual’s 
solitariness can there appear that image o f the beloved object 
(1962: 21).
Both violence and eroticism involve jouissance, the ecstatic but temporary loss 
of self, the moment at which pain becomes pleasurable and pleasure borders
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on the painful. However, as Bataille observes,‘[continuity is what we are after, 
but generally only if that continuity which the death o f discontinuous beings 
can alone establish is not the victor in the long run’ (1962: 18-19). That is to 
say, the act o f transgressing the ego’s boundaries — of losing oneself — has 
considerable erotic potential, providing the transgression is transient. The 
possibilities for physical continuity, therefore, tare found only in sexual acts or 
death, with the motivation always involving some form o f nihilistic self- 
preservation. Indeed, Bataille asserts that ‘[p]hysical erotism has ... a heavy, 
sinister quality. It holds on to the separateness o f the individual in a rather 
selfish and cynical fashion’ (1962: 19).
In contrast to physical eroticism, Bataille’s notion of emotional eroticism is 
not constrained by the same corporeal boundaries. Rather, the erotic energies 
derived from an emotional intimacy have the ability to transcend the purely 
physical realm, thereby elevating sexual activity to a ‘spiritual plane’ (1962: 19). 
Hence, the aim of an individual in a loving relationship is to ‘substitute for 
their persistent discontinuity a miraculous continuity between two beings’ 
(1962: 19). This involves the experience of jouissance as the subject surrenders 
their individuality in exchange for continuity with their loved one, often 
repeatedly, but never permanently. The implications o f an emotional 
interaction are consequently greater than in those instances where there are 
only physical sensations. Freud previously made reference to this state, 
explaining that
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towards the outer world, at any rate, the ego seems to keep 
itself clearly and sharply outlined and delimited. There is only 
one state o f mind in which it fails to do this - an unusual 
state, it is true, but not one that can be judged pathological.
At its height, the state o f being in love threatens to obliterate 
the boundaries between the ego and object (1994: 3).
In this circumstance, the subject is vulnerable. The threat o f violence from the 
introjection o f the other painfully exposes, or in fact creates an absence, so 
that ultimately, as Bataille notes, ‘this continuity is chiefly to be felt in the 
anguish o f desire’ (1962: 19).
Religious eroticism, Bataille suggests, removes our dependence upon the 
favourable actions o f an external object. In contrast to the feelings 
experienced when in love, mystic experience substitutes the beloved object for 
a divine love where violent and erotic energies become concentrated on an 
immaterial object that has no tangible correspondence with an immediate 
reality. Bataille believed that a more profound understanding is afforded by 
mystic experience, which transcends the possibilities o f emotional, and, to a 
greater extent, physical eroticism. An appreciation of ‘divine love’ brings about 
awareness that an individual’s temporal discontinuity can only ever be 
superimposed upon a fundamental and unalterable continuity; indeed, a 
‘problem arises when man is faced with death which seems to pitch the 
discontinuous creature headlong into continuity’ (1962: 21). However, by 
suggesting that religious participation, or ‘mystical experience’, ‘reveals an 
absence o f any object’ (1962: 23), he renders the notion of discontinuity
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problematic, provoking questions about the nature o f the structure which 
establishes discontinuity and holds meanings and identities in place.
Bataille’s theoretical perspective is exceptional because it locates violation and 
eroticism, at their most intense, not in any physical activity but in an emotional 
or spiritual realm. Although Bataille maintains a somewhat idealised 
conception of ‘inner experience’ and the ‘spiritual’, his insights, when recast in 
terms o f mental processes, are compelling. Having stated that ‘[e]rotic 
experience will commit us to silence’ (1962: 252), he tentatively identifies his 
own personal difficulty in finding an appropriate language with which to write 
about eroticism and proclaims his desire to find a language sufficiently ‘silent’, 
and suitably unobtrusive for his discussion. However, as he acknowledges, 
‘[l]anguage does not exist independently o f the play o f taboo and 
transgression’ (1962: 276). Language is the structure in which and through 
which limits are constructed.
W hat Bataille touches upon, but does not provide a systematic examination of,
is the instrumentality o f language to the formation o f the subject as a
discontinuous being. The development o f the subject’s sense o f self, or ego,
occurs in language: the individual achieves ‘discontinuity’ through the system
of differences instituted by language. But, as Bataille writes,
language scatters the totality o f all that touches us most 
closely even while it arranges it in order. Through language 
we can never grasp what matters to us, for it eludes us in the
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form o f interdependent propositions, and no central whole to
which each o f these can be referred ever appears’ (1962: 274).
The lack o f a ‘central whole’ fixing meaning in place is precisely what threatens 
the subject with a radical non-differentiation. As Derrida, writing shortly after 
Bataille, notes, ‘the notion o f a structure lacking any center represents the 
unthinkable itself (2001: 352). Violence and eroticism are experienced at their 
most extreme when an external object does not govern the impulse towards 
continuity. The moments at which the structures o f language no longer hold 
the subject in place, and no longer maintain its discontinuous identity, are the 
moments at which the subject experiences radical violence. Indeed, as Bataille 
goes on to write, ‘Where would we be without language? It has made us who 
we are. It alone can show us the sovereign moment at the farthest point of 
being where it can no longer act as currency’ (1962: 276). Language is the thing 
to be dissolved in violent and erotic experience.
Rene Girard’s study of Violence and the Sacred starts from a similar premise of 
fundamental continuity, derived from Freud and paralleling aspects o f the 
work of Bataille. Girard shared with Freud a belief that violence was an 
unavoidable aspect of human society and suggested that continuity, which he 
termed ‘undifferentiation’, was an essentially violent condition. Focusing 
specifically upon the structures o f primitive religions, Girard examines the way 
in which sacrifice functions to contain and make meaningful the violence 
inherent within social groups. Through the mechanism of sacrifice, he argues, 
violence is given a definitive object outside the community and, as a result, the
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possibilities o f internal conflict are reduced or removed as the identification o f 
an external target constructs a clear distinction between community members 
and others.
In order to maintain ritual systems and the order they confer upon the 
community, they must be invested with authority. Girard suggests that this is 
achieved by situating ritual practices within a theological superstructure, which 
provides an interpretative overlay. Sacrifice, as Girard reminds us, is based on 
the substitution of a potential victim for an actual victim. The custom is 
therefore predicated on a fundamental misunderstanding: Girard insists that 
‘the celebrants do not and must not comprehend the true role of the sacrificial 
act’ (1988: 7). What the theological configuration offers, then, is a coherent 
structure within which to misunderstand. Consequently, a fundamental tenet 
o f Girard’s argument is that ‘the reality o f the divine rests in its transcendental 
absence’ (1988: 143). The individual’s subjection to the sacrificial process is, 
therefore, founded upon lack and misunderstanding, a misunderstanding of 
the true human condition. Re-reading Bataille’s notion o f religious eroticism in 
the light o f Girard’s argument produces a rather more sinister apprehension of 
the ‘profound understanding’ afforded by mystic experience. What is glimpsed 
transiently in an experience of religious eroticism is nothing other than the 
deeply disturbing reality of a continuity that is intrinsically violent, anarchic 
and traumatic. Paradoxically, the moment at which the subject becomes aware
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of this misunderstanding is the moment at which the necessity o f the structure 
is reaffirmed.
One o f Girard’s most compelling arguments is that ‘[i]t is not differences but 
the loss o f them that gives rise to violence and chaos’ (1988: 51). The 
sacrificial rituals employed by primitive religions are required to implement a 
system of differences within the community, thereby managing violence to 
create ‘differentiated’, or discontinuous subjects. But the implications o f 
Girard’s thesis are more widespread than this and are particularly important 
for a discussion o f language and violence. The influential work o f the linguist, 
Ferdinand Saussure provides the critical backdrop for the insights contained in 
Girard’s study. Saussure asserted that language gives form to the ‘shapeless 
and indistinct mass’ of thought (1915: 111). Language, he argued, is made up 
of signs, which are comprised of a signifier — the word itself — realised aurally 
or visually, and the mental concept to which the word, or signifier, refers. The 
sign’s relationship to the concept which it denotes is arbitrary and, therefore, 
signifies only as a consequence of its difference from other signs. This means 
that it is language which divides up our conception o f reality: language does 
not provide a means through which to articulate concepts already in existence, 
but is the structure through which these concepts come into being. Reality is 
constituted for us by language, a system of signs which signify as a result o f 
their difference from other signs. It is in this context that Girard’s 
observations derive their significance.
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Girard explains that, ‘[b]eing made up o f differences, language finds it almost 
impossible to express undifferentiation directly. Whatever it may say on the 
subject, language invariably says at once too much and too litde’ f l988: 64). 
Linguistic systems impose order, but because they signify through difference 
they run into difficulty when they attempt to signify the points at which there 
is a lack o f difference. Approaching this from the perspective o f the violent 
breakdown of differences afforded by erotic experience, Bataille makes much 
the same point, noting that ‘descriptive language becomes meaningless at the 
decisive instant when the stirrings o f transgression itself take over form the 
discursive account o f transgression’ (1962: 275). Violence is, in many ways, 
antithetical to language because ‘[cjommon language will not express violence’ 
(Bataille 1962: 186).
Jacques Derrida, following on from the work o f Saussure, introduced the 
concept o f ‘differance’ to connote the way that language signifies through 
difference and deferral. Because, as Saussure explained, signs signify only by 
virtue o f their difference from other signs, their meanings cannot be realised 
until the signifying chain, o f which the sign is a part, comes to end. That is to 
say, because the meaning of the sign is derived from its relationship to other 
signs, its meaning can never be fully realised and is therefore, constantly and 
endlessly deferred. Just as Girard and Bataille consider the o f effects o f a 
breakdown of language’s differential system, Derrida warns that ‘[wjhat must
78
not and cannot be approached is the origin o f difference: it must not be 
presented or represented and above all not penetrated’ (1992: 205).
I ll
In the work o f Jacques Lacan the anti-essentialist insights o f Marx and the 
developmental processes proposed by Freud are brought together to produce 
a radical understanding of the place o f language in the formation o f the 
subject. Lacanian psychoanalysis illuminates the violence inherent within the 
structures o f language, and the processes through which language figures 
violence. In place o f the tripartite division o f the psyche proposed by Freud, 
Lacan conceptualises the division rather differendy, positing three orders: the 
imaginary, which is the realm of images, the symbolic, which is the realm of 
symbols, and the real, which is constituted by that which is neither symbolic 
nor imaginary. Central to Lacan’s thesis is the mirror stage. He explains that 
the human infant, ‘still sunk in his motor incapacity and nursling dependence’ 
(1977: 2) is, nevertheless, able to recognise him /herself in the mirror. The 
child holds on to this coherent image as an ‘Ideal-I’, an idealised image o f the 
self which does not correspond to the infant’s lack of full bodily control. The 
‘Ideal-I’, at this point interior and specular, functions as an immature ego as 
yet unmediated by external socio-material forces. Indeed, the mirror image 
exhibits
in an exemplary situation the symbolic matrix in which the I  
is precipitated in a primordial form, before it is objectified in 
the dialectic of identification with the other, and before 
language restores to it, in the universal, its function as subject 
(1977: 2).
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The child’s jubilant identification with the mirror image gives rise to a ‘primary 
narcissism’ where the image o f the self is invested with a profound libidinal 
dynamism. The specular image forms the basis of the ‘Imaginary’ order, which 
Lacan identifies as the realm of outward and often misleading appearances of 
coherence and completeness. Remembrance o f the first identification with this 
image is never completely lost, therefore, but serves as a prototype for the ego, 
which is ultimately circumscribed by the subject position posited by the 
structures of language, where powerful prescriptions and proscriptions, 
governing all aspects o f subjectivity, are embodied. Language, therefore, is an 
agent o f psychological violence, operating at the most fundamental level.
Lacan notes that ‘language and its structure exist prior to the moment at which 
each subject at a certain point in his mental development makes his entry into 
it’ (1977: 148). When a child enters into language, it takes on the subject 
position ‘I’ which simultaneously confers upon it its sense of self and 
constitutes it as a social subject. It is language, he argues, which enables the 
distinction of the ego from the outside world and which objectifies the subject 
in ‘the dialectic of identification with the other’. However, the signifier ‘I’ can 
never fully correspond with the child’s ‘Ideal-I’. Lacan’s conception o f the 
relationship between violent and erotic impulses marks a departure form the 
work o f Freud, who had previously proposed that these highly ambivalent 
energies could be located in either the death drive or the libido. Lacan suggests
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instead a perpetual struggle between the specular Ideal-I and the linguistically
constructed social subject:
the term primary narcissism ... reveals in those who invented 
it the most profound awareness of semantic latencies. But it 
also throws light on the dynamic opposition between this 
libido and the sexual libido, which the first analysts tried to 
define when they invoked destructive and, indeed, death 
instincts, in order to explain the evident connection between 
the narcissistic libido and the alienating function o f the I, the 
aggressivity it releases in relation to the other (1977: 6).
More than a simple conflict between life and its destruction, subjectivity is
problematic in its form and not in its matter. It is either a struggle towards an
imaginary, unattainable and internally imposed ideal, or towards an external
subject position, equally predicated upon lack. In this way, the relationship
between violence and eroticism may be conceived as a dialectic between
language and the body, that is between the categories of the linguistic and the
pre-linguistic.
Whilst Freud acknowledged the materiality o f language, insofar as he 
recognised that the exchange of words between the patient and analyst 
constituted the analysable material o f psychoanalysis, Lacan, through a careful 
re-reading of Freud’s work, expands and develops the linguistic implications of 
psychoanalysis by employing ideas derived from Saussure’s and Jakobson’s 
linguistics. cIt is Freud’s discovery’, Lacan affirms, which ‘gives to the 
signifier/signified opposition the full extent o f its implications: namely, that 
the signifier has an active function in determining certain effects in which the 
signifiable appears as submitting to its mark, by becoming through that
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passion the signified.’ (1977: 284). The signifier, therefore, is always logically
anterior to the signified. As he goes on to explain:
This passion of the signifier now becomes a new dimension 
o f the human condition in that it is not only man who speaks, 
but that in man and through man it speaks (fa parle), that his 
nature is woven by effects in which is to be found the 
structure of language, o f which he becomes the material, and 
that therefore there resounds in him, beyond what could be 
conceived of by a psychology o f ideas, the relation o f speech 
(1977: 284).
Lacan’s approach to linguistics demonstrates an important difference from 
Saussure’s in that he does not accept a constitutive relationship between the 
two elements o f the sign. Rather, he insists that the relationship between the 
signifier and the signified is radically unstable. Because linguistic signifiers are 
meaningful only as a consequence o f their difference from other signifiers, and 
because the signifying chain in which the signifier is a differential element is 
effectively endless, signification, and therefore the subject, is always in process, 
a process which is not and will never be complete. Indeed, cit is in the chain of 
the signifier that the meaning “insists” but ... none of its elements “consists” 
in the signification of which it is at the moment capable’ (1977: 153). The 
unstable relationship between the signifier and the signified means that c[w]e 
are forced ... to accept the notion o f an incessant sliding of the signified under 
the signifier’ (1977: 154) and signification and the subject are only held in 
place by certain anchoring points — points de capiton — which serve to pin down 
the relationship between the signified and the signifier. Nevertheless, 
signification can never be fully present to us, and as a result, we can never be
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fully present to ourselves. The signifying process, therefore, violently imposes 
a fundamental absence upon the subject.
Lacan argues that because o f this absence, there is a resistance to signification 
inherent in language. He suggests that this can only be overcome through the 
use o f metaphor and metonymy, claiming that the ‘properly signifying function 
... depicted in language ... is metonymy’ (1977: 156). Rather than denoting the 
substitution o f part for the whole (or vice versa), Lacan’s conception o f 
metonymy is derived from the work o f Roman Jakobson and suggests the 
process o f combining signifiers to produce a signifying chain: ‘it is in the word- 
to-mrd connexion that metonymy is based’ (1977: 156). Metaphor, however, is 
the process whereby a signifier becomes the signified. He explains that ‘[t]he 
creative spark o f metaphor does not spring from the presentation of two 
images, that is, o f two signifiers equally actualized. It flashes between two 
signifiers, one o f which has taken the place o f the other in the signifying chain’ 
(1977: 157). It is these linguistic operations, Lacan argues, which govern the 
primary processes which Freud suggested were at work in the unconscious. 
Displacement, the process whereby the associations connected to one idea are 
passed on to another, corresponds to the linguistic concept of metonymy; and 
condensation, the process by which a single idea provides the intersection of 
several associative chains, corresponds to metaphor.
Lacan’s dictum that ‘the unconscious is structured like a language’ (1993: 167), 
underpins his linguistic-materialist understanding of the subject. He affirms
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the materiality o f the signifier, stating that ‘signifiers are well and truly 
embodied, materialized’ (1993: 289), and asserts the role o f the signifier in the 
unconscious, explaining that ‘the unconscious is structured as a function o f the 
symbolic’ (1992: 12). Although effectively a linguistic order, the symbolic is the 
domain o f the signifier rather than of signification, which is associated with 
the illusory coherence o f the imaginary. Lacan suggests that c[t]he exteriority o f 
the symbolic in relation to man is the very notion of the unconscious’ (1966: 
469); therefore, whilst Marx affirmed that consciousness was the product o f 
the social totality, Lacan asserts that the social totality takes place in language, 
and looks at the implications o f language/the social totality, for the 
construction o f the unconscious. He re-conceptualises the unconscious as a 
discourse where the meanings o f repressed material are constituted in conflict, 
that is to say, dialectically.
In The Violence of Language, Jean-Jacques Lecercle pursues the implications o f 
Lacan’s ideas, asserting that ‘the necessity o f violence lies deep in the structure 
of language’ (1990: 242). Lecercle identifies the violence inherent in the 
linguistic construction of the subject, and acknowledges the limitations placed 
upon the speaking subject. He observes that the user o f language is ‘is cast in 
the mold o f a system exterior and anterior to him, he negotiates his meaning 
with the expressive potentialities that language allows him’ (1990: 104). By 
focusing upon the violence that inheres within the structures o f language, he is 
therefore necessarily examining the way in which the subject is constituted by 
this violence.
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Specifically, Lecercle’s study focuses upon the notion o f the remainder.; and is
derived in part from a theory o f linguistics which is devoted to an
understanding o f the way in which meaning is generated in excess o f any given
language system. The term langue, which corresponds to those aspects of
language such as vocabulary, grammar and pronunciation, and may be
identified as the ‘the symbolic object par excellence (1990: 36)5 is considered in
conjunction with the remainder; that which remains inassimilable to the
symbolic order. Lalangue is posited as the combination o f the ‘remainder* with
‘langue’ and is defined as that which is outside language, yet constituted by it. It
is ‘something in language that exceeds scientific enquiry’ (1990: 33): clalangue is
language at play’ (1990: 39). Indeed, as Lecercle goes on to note:
What is treated by langue as a lack, an exception, and is largely 
ignored by it as it would like to ignore the points where the 
system fails, where the structure becomes uncertain and 
threatens to collapse, is treated by lalangue as an excess, a 
locus for the proliferation of meaning ... The dialectic of lack 
and excess rules the relationship between langue and lalangue.
It also governs the relationship between language and the 
remainder — it is basically the same relationship (1990: 40).
Lack and excess are at once anarchic and affirmative, inspiring movement
away from the centre that is at once desired and yet repudiated. Consequently,
the remainder may be identified as an agent o f violation, which in the same
movement effects a frisson o f erotic excitement at the moment of
transgression, and whilst c langue is articulated on the unconscious, lalangue
5 Lecercle draws attention to J.C. Milner’s position, however, explaining that, for Milner, whilst 
‘langue is the epitome o f what one knows as ‘the symbolic’ it can also be viewed in its real and 
imaginary and aspects: ‘langue is real. The object o f linguistics ... is not a fantastical construction 
o f the human mind: it is independent o f man, imposed on him, impervious to manipulation’ (1990:
34).
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returns within it’ (1990: 38). Threatening and necessary, meaning is generated 
by the remainder in excess of, and despite the lack inherent in the signifier.
In addition to the violence that is an inescapable consequence o f the 
remainder’s return within the signifying process, Lecercle insists that there cis 
an inescapable materiality to language’ (1990: 105) and that language can effect 
actual violence:
The violence of language cannot be limited to the violence of 
agrammaticality, as the remainder subverts the rules o f langue. 
Exploring the material violence of language will take ... two 
directions: the direction of history ... where language is both 
the locus o f and the means of historical (political) 
intervention, and the direction o f the social, o f the body and 
the body politic (1990: 179).
In order to explore the social and historical implications of this position, 
Lecercle advocates a reconsideration of Althusser’s brand o f Marxism. 
Although rejecting the base/superstructure distinction o f traditional Marxism, 
and simultaneously, the idea of language as ideology, Lecercle notes that 
language, Tar from being a neutral instrument placed at the disposal o f each 
individual speaker, is an institution in that sense; that it is pervaded not only by 
the violence of affects but by the symbolic violence o f institutional struggle’ 
(1990: 107). He goes on to argue that ‘the subject can only say what is made 
available to him by the historical conjuncture — he speaks within a collective 
arrangement o f utterance’ (1990: 106). Utilising Althusser’s notion o f 
interpellation, he suggests that,
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The concept ‘social formation’... seeks to account for the 
specific mixture o f modes o f production, some dominant, 
some mere ‘survivals’, within a nation state, at a given 
moment in history. In the same vein, when we speak o f 
‘English’, we speak o f a multiplicity o f dialects, registers, and 
styles, o f the sedimentation o f past conjunctures, o f the 
inscription of social antagonisms as discursive antagonisms, 
o f the coexistence and contradiction o f various collective 
arrangements o f utterance, o f the interpellation o f subjects 
within apparatuses embodied in linguistic practices (1990:
228).
Therefore, to ascertain the expressions and treatments o f violence in any given 
age, the various modes of production, the social and discursive antagonisms, 
the cultural codes and the ‘collective arrangements of utterance’ must be 
interrogated. To be able to understand the subjectivities that language 
produces during any given period, its linguistic practices and social apparatuses 
must first be examined.
Slavoj Zizek undertakes a reconsideration o f Althusser’s notion o f 
interpellation in relation to the idea o f a ‘remainder’. He argues that Althusser 
‘never succeeded in thinking out the link between Ideological State 
Apparatuses and ideological interpellation’ (1989: 43).6 He explains his 
objection:
this external ‘machine’ o f State Apparatuses exercises its force 
only in so far as it is experienced, in the unconscious 
economy of the subject, as a traumatic, senseless injunction. 
Althusser speaks only o f the process of ideological 
interpellation through which the symbolic machine of 
ideology is ‘internalized’ into the ideological experience of 
Meaning and Truth: but ... this ‘internalization’, by structural 
necessity, never fully succeeds, that there is always a residue, a 
leftover, a stain of traumatic irrationality and senselessness
6 For additional discussion and criticism o f Althusser’s theory o f interpellation, see also Judith 
Butler (1997: 106-131) and Michel Pecheux (1982:103-109).
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sticking to it, and that this leftover, far from hindering the full 
submission o f the subject to the ideological command, is the 
very condition of it (1989: 43)
If  we can assume, then, that some part o f the individual remains ‘non- 
integratable’ within the symbolic matrix, interpellation is always in essence 
incomplete. The representation o f coherence that ideology offers is, therefore, 
a necessarily imaginary one because it is a Tantasy-construction ... an illusion 
which structures our effective, real, social relations and thereby masks some 
insupportable, real, impossible kernel’ (1989: 45). A functioning ideology must 
enforce an ostensibly ‘natural’ order to maintain the subject’s distance from 
the ‘real’ (in the Lacanian sense), that is to say, ‘to offer us the social reality 
itself as an escape from some traumatic real kernel’. Nevertheless, there is 
always the latent danger that the ‘kernel’ or the ‘real’ will surface transiently, in 
excess o f the ideological system.
Foucault conceptualises the agency of language rather differently from 
Althusser. He locates discourse as the point at which power and knowledge 
converge. Instead o f inhering in the discourse o f a particular governing body 
or identifiable set of institutions, power is seen to function in a far more fluid 
manner. Rejecting the idea of a power residing solely in a principality or state 
authority, Foucault asserts that ‘[pjower is everywhere; not because it 
embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere’ (1990: 94) and 
stresses ‘the strictly relational character of power relationships’ (1990: 95). He 
goes on to say that
power must be understood in the first instance as the 
multiplicity o f force relations immanent in the sphere in 
which they operate and which constitute their own 
organization; as the process which, through ceaseless 
struggles and confrontations, transforms, strengthens, or 
reverses them; as the support which these force relations find 
in one another, thus forming a chain or a system, or on the 
contrary, the disjunctions and contradictions which isolate 
them from one another; and lastly, as the strategies in which 
they take effect, whose general design or institutional 
crystallization is embodied in the state apparatus, in the 
formulation o f the law, in the various social hegemonies 
(1990: 92-93).
This concept o f the workings o f power and o f force relations contrasts with 
the Althusserian notion of a discourse that must be revolutionised before 
ultimately being dissolved. Power, as Foucault understands it, is a ‘complex 
strategical situation’ which is ‘permanent, repetitious, inert and self- 
reproducing’ (1990: 93) and therefore, is never able to be located in any one 
‘discoverable’ site. Language’s potential for violence, is therefore, part o f its 
structural make-up.
This ‘complex strategical situation’ may be understood as discourse. Foucault 
examines the dynamics in play within linguistic systems and suggests:
it is in discourse that power and knowledge are joined 
together. And for this very reason, we must conceive 
discourse as a series o f discontinuous segments whose tactical 
function is neither uniform nor stable. ... [w]e must not 
imagine a world of discourse divided between accepted 
discourse and excluded discourse, or between the dominant 
discourse and the dominated one; but as a multiplicity o f 
discursive elements that can come into play in various 
strategies. ... Discourses are not once and for all subservient 
to power or raised up against it, any more than silences are.
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We must make allowance for the complex and unstable 
process whereby discourse can be both an instrument and an 
affect o f power, but also a hindrance, a stumbling-block, a 
point o f resistance and a starting point for an opposing 
strategy. Discourse transmits and produces power; it 
reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it, renders it 
fragile and makes it possible to thwart it (1990: 100-101).
In such a system, then, the conditions o f production are never reproduced in 
exactly the same way, making for a more mobile and fragmentary notion o f a 
society that is always already in process, and not set up under the domination 
o f a monolithic discourse o f power.
Foucault asserts that ‘[Relations o f power are not in a position of exteriority 
with respect to other types o f relationship (economic processes, knowledge 
relationships, sexual relations), but are immanent in the latter’ (1990: 94) and 
he locates the agency of language in the realm o f the erotic, which, as Bataille 
claims, is always the domain o f violence. Foucault argues that,
Sexuality must not be described as a stubborn drive, by 
nature alien and of necessity disobedient to a power which 
exhausts itself trying to subdue it and often fails to control it 
entirely. It appears rather as an especially dense transfer point 
for relations of power ... Sexuality is not the most intractable 
element in power relations, but rather one o f those endowed 
with the greatest instrumentality: useful for the greatest 
number of maneuvres and capable o f serving as a point of 
support, as a linchpin, for the most varied strategies (1990:
103).
At the most fundamental level, sexual relations are a ‘dense transfer point’ of 
relations o f power because they constitute the principal means o f ensuring the
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reproduction o f the conditions o f production. It is evident, then, that ‘the 
deployment of sexuality is linked to the economy through numerous and 
subtle relays, the main one o f which, however, is the body - the body that 
produces and consumes’ (1990: 107). In order for a discourse to have a 
material reality it must function at the level of the material subject, that is to 
say, upon the body. And, because subjectivity is always embodied, discourses 
o f sex, he claims, are applicable to all and, therefore, they come to serve as the 
linchpin of strategies o f power. However, Foucault goes on to suggest that 
sexuality is dialectically constructed within discourse, and he explains that it 
should not be considered a ‘natural given which power tries to hold in check, 
or as an obscure domain which knowledge tries gradually to uncover. It is the 
name that can be given to a historical construct’ (1990: 105). Sexuality is not 
only the level at which discourse functions, it is constructed in discourse at the 
very moments that questions are asked o f it. Rather than being understood or 
discovered by questioning, sexuality is actually constituted in this process. 
Therefore, at all levels, relations o f power are not only inscribed in the 
structures o f language, as Lacan explains, but are produced dialectically in the 
operations o f language.
IV
Raymond Williams notes that ‘[a] definition of language is always, implicitly or 
explicitly, a definition o f human beings in the world’ (1977: 21), and, as I have 
shown, a definition of language is also a definition of violence. The process of
91
figuring acts o f violence cannot be divorced from the violence which inheres 
within the structures o f language or from that which arises as an effect of 
language. The insights of Marx and Lacan provide a significant contribution to 
our understanding of the immanent violence o f language. Expanding upon the 
theoretical framework o f psychological development proposed by Freud, 
Lacan suggested that the violent process o f individuation occurs with the 
child’s entry into language. This is the decisive point at which the 
subject/object distinction is instituted and it effects a radical and violent 
separation. It is the point at which the child comes to experience absence; 
indeed, the lack or absence exposed by language is central to the linguistic 
function. Because signifiers generate meaning through difference from other 
signifiers, the signifier precedes the signified, and therefore, the signifying 
process is always structured by absence, by the gap or slippage between the 
signifier and the signified. The subject is an effect o f this relationship; 
however, the conditions under which the subject assumes language remain 
unarticulable.
Lacan, Lecercle, Foucault and Zizek all engage with the potentially anarchic 
notion o f the remainder, o f that which is excluded from the structure of 
language but nevertheless returns within it. This concept is articulated in 
several different terms, perhaps an indication o f its refusal to be symbolised. 
In psychoanalysis, the remainder is understood as the primordial lie upon 
which subjectivity is predicated — the fundamental and constitutive 
misrecognition (for example, Lacan’s specular image). Lecercle explains the
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remainder as the excess that is generated at the point where the signifying 
process fails. Again, this is based upon the idea o f an intrinsic lack, and an 
awareness o f the effects produced by approaching a temporary awareness o f it. 
Foucault develops this idea as he suggests a dialectical process through which 
the hidden secret (for example, sexuality) is actually produced in discourse. 
The site o f absence, he claims, necessarily proves to be the site o f a 
proliferation o f meanings.
It is Zizek, however, who provides one o f the most detailed interrogations of 
this ‘indivisible remainder’ or ‘sublime object of ideology’. He explains that 
there is always a kernel o f the non-integratable leftover. The leftover is non- 
symbolisable precisely because it is what, in the first instance, provided the 
conditions and the necessity o f the symbolic. He identifies the nature o f the 
violence inherent within the linguistic structures, and asserts that the lesson of 
Lacanian psychoanalysis is ‘that this coincidence o f the highest form o f 
violence with the absence of violence can occur only within the symbolic 
universe — that is, in an order where the very absence o f a determination 
functions as a positive determination’ (1994: 204). The highest form of 
violence, to which we are all subject, is also the least perceptible.
In addition to the process o f acquiring language, the production o f meaning — 
the process of ascribing a signified to a signifier — also has the potential for 
violence. Hayden White explains that ‘certain sign-systems are privileged as 
necessary, even natural ways o f recognizing a “meaning” in things and others
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are suppressed, ignored, or hidden in the process of representation’ (1982: 
288). That is to say, cthe words we use to represent the subjects and objects o f 
violence are part and parcel o f events themselves’ (Armstrong and 
Tennenhouse 1989: 24). Indeed, the violence o f signification and 
representation is at its most intense when it is not recognized as violence. 
Zizek explains this further:
the well-known paradox of (social-symbolic) violence is that 
supreme violence is no longer experienced as violence, since 
it determines the ‘specific colour’ o f the very horizon within 
which something is to be perceived as violence. The task of 
dialectical analysis, therefore, is to render visible the violence 
that maintains the very neutral, ‘non-violent’ framework that 
is subsequently perturbed by the eruptions o f (empirical) 
violence, the very standard by means o f which we measure 
the extent of violence. When we are able to perceive this 
fundamental violence as violence, the first step towards 
effective liberation is already accomplished (1994: 204).
Any analysis of the language o f violence must therefore be predicated upon an
understanding o f the way in which our perceptions o f violence are coloured by
the violence o f language. Language is implicitly performative, therefore and
violence can be effected through linguistic structures.
The violent effects o f language can be explicit as a well as implicit, however, 
because as J. L. Austin makes clear, it is possible to do things with words 
(1962). Language is performative and enunciation can be violent: with words a 
person may be condemned to death. I concur with the position Lecercle 
outlines and assert that ‘if there is such a thing as violence in language, the 
term must be taken literally — not the violence of the symbol, but the violence 
of intervention, of an event the immateriality of which does not prevent it
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from having material effects’ (1990: 227). In the chapters that follow, I explore 
the way in which acts of violence are articulated, maintaining an awareness that 
the articulation can never be separated from violence itself. Montaigne 
suggests that we need to interpret interpretations rather than things (1991: 
369) and, with this in mind, I look at the various ways in which violence is 
made meaningful, how it is codified in Renaissance culture, and how certain 
signs systems are privileged and while others repressed. However, as 
Armstrong and Tennenhouse remind us, c[t]o regard certain practices as 
violent is never to see them just as they are. It is always to take up a position 
for or against them’ (1989: 9). This analysis is itself subject to the cultural 
codes and discursive antagonisms in which and through which it has been 
produced.
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Chapter Three
‘This helpless smoke of words’: Titus Andronicus and The Rape o f Lucrece1
i A * .
mm
‘The Triumph o f  Chastity’ 1488
1 The Rape o f  Lucrece (1027).
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The meanings o f sexual violence are not produced in isolation from the social 
conditions in which they operate: perceptions o f sexual assault encode wider 
cultural assumptions. To recognise certain acts as violent, as Armstrong and 
Tennenhouse have suggested, always involves taking up a position for or 
against them. Rape was mimetically reproduced as a form of entertainment 
with remarkable frequency during the Renaissance, and therefore the repeated 
figuring o f violation occupied a prominent position in cultural consciousness. 
Representations of rape on the Renaissance stage and in literary works were 
informed by the circulation o f social significations and in their turn, were 
engaged in a process o f contestation and redefinition. As a corollary o f this 
process, these representations exemplify, not only the difficulties o f 
articulating violence, but also the violence effected by language and the 
violence that inheres within the signifying process.
Rape, defined by Blackstone as ‘the carnal knowledge of a woman forcibly and
against her will’ (1979 Vol. 4: 210) accounted for one in every hundred
indicted felonies in early modern England (Walker 1998: 1). In The Taw’s
Resolution of Women’s Rights, T.E. explains the process of pursuing a rape case:
if any virgin, widow, or single woman be ravished, she herself 
may sue an appeal o f rape, prosecute the felon to death, and 
the king’s pardon (it seemeth) cannot help him. If a feme 
covert be ravished, she cannot have an appeal without her 
husband ... But if a feme covert be ravished and consent to 
the ravisher the husband alone may have an appeal (1632:
393).
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Sexual violence against women was not conceptualised solely in terms o f the 
injury suffered by women. A husband’s interests were perceived to have been 
equally violated by rape, and married women were unable to prosecute a case 
without their husbands’ consent. Rape was punishable by death, and during 
the reign o f Elizabeth I, the convicted man’s right to claim benefit o f clergy 
was withdrawn. But despite the severity o f the punishment, rape was an 
extremely difficult charge to prove, and it is very probable that the incidence 
of rape was far higher than the number o f convictions would suggest. Because 
o f the difficulties o f providing evidence in support o f an accusation o f rape, a 
successful prosecution required proof o f the female accuser’s virtuous 
character and the onus was on her to establish the veracity o f her testimony. 
Purely by virtue of their sex, however, this was not easy for women to do.
A profound inequality existed between the sexes, and an implicit, and often- 
explicit assumption persisted that women were always ultimately culpable for 
any violence to which men subjected them. This assumption was derived from 
-  or at least legitimised in large part by -  the popular interpretation o f the 
passages in Genesis which describe the fall o f mankind. Because the serpent 
tempted Eve, and because she in turn incited Adam to sin, the burden of 
responsibility for the post-lapsarian state rested collectively but firmly upon all 
women. In his widely circulated ‘Sermon on the Epistle of St Paul to the 
Ephesians’, John Calvin asserts that ‘women ought to feel the fruit o f their 
sins’, explaining that ‘women must needs stoop and understand that the ruin 
and confusion o f all mankind came in on their side, and that through them we
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be all forlorn and accursed and banished the kingdom of heaven’ (1577: 277v- 
283v). Regardless of how faithful, modest and chaste a woman may be, she 
was a priori tainted by Eve’s transgression.
Chastity, or sexual purity, was nevertheless central to Renaissance culture, and
was, as Laura Gowing observes, ‘a measure o f female virtue that could outdo
every other way of defining a woman’ (1996: 251).2 In The Fairie Queene,
Spenser’s epic treatment o f ‘Morall vertues’, ‘The Legend o f Britomartis’
affirms chastity as ‘That fairest vertue, farre above the rest’ (III.i.4), excelling
friendship, temperance, justice and even holiness. Conduct literature o f the
period, written primarily by men for a male readership, was instrumental to the
prescription and dissemination o f expectations o f female behaviour. Juan Luis
Vives’ Instruction of a Christian Woman advises on the ‘virtues o f a woman and
examples she should follow’, explaining that ‘[a] woman shall learn the virtues
o f her kind altogether out of books, which she shall either read herself, or else
hear read’. It is clearly Vives’ assumption that women will be read to, because,
as he goes on to recommend, to an implied male reader, ‘let her understand
that chastity is the principal virtue of a woman, and counterpoiseth with all the
rest: if she have that, no man will look for any other, and if she lack that no
man will regard any other’ (1540: 18r-22). The precepts extracted ‘out of
books’ formed part o f a wider discourse concerning women’s chastity and as
Vives’ text suggests, this discourse, although about women, was designed to
exclude their participation in the formulation of its meanings. The
2 The emblematic ‘Triumph o f  Chastity’ featured on the first page o f this chapter is derived from 
Petrarch’s Triumphs and is representative o f the prominence given to chastity.
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unremitting focus and insistence upon the chaste female body was, to use 
Mark Breitenberg’s phrase, the product o f an ‘anxious masculinity’ (1996), and 
the ideal o f chastity functioned predominantly as an indicator of male interests 
and concerns. The male-dominated ecclesiastical hierarchies o f the Reformed 
Church, and the gendered Christian values they promoted, as well as the ideas 
and approaches o f classical humanism contributed to the production o f a 
conception o f femininity which focused upon women’s bodies. Designed to 
preserve and protect patrilineal filiation, chastity was a social construct, 
produced discursively with the interchange of colluding and competing 
patriarchal ideologies.
The concept o f rape could not be extricated from the idea o f chastity and the 
clear but paradoxical implication o f this is that only ‘good’ women can be 
raped: only those who assiduously protected their female honour could be 
violated. As Blackstone in his survey of the laws relating to rape explains, the 
civil law ‘seems to suppose a prostitute or common harlot incapable o f any 
injuries o f this kind: not allowing any punishment for violating the chastity o f 
her, who hath indeed no chastity at all, or at least no regard to it’ (1979 Vol. 4: 
213). The threat o f rape provided a backdrop against which the significance o f 
chastity could be clarified and confirmed, and therefore rape was qualitatively 
aligned with unchastity to provide the conceptual and semantic opposition to 
the chief female virtue. As Ian Donaldson explains, ‘[n]o distinction was made 
between adultery and rape, for the polluting effect of both acts was thought to 
be the same’ (1982: 23). This is significant because such an understanding
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denies women’s agency: according to this conception, a woman’s chastity or 
unchastity does not ultimately depend on her. Women were always thought to 
be in some way culpable, purely by virtue of their femininity. It was rape, 
therefore, which hailed the female subject and as Althusser explains, ‘guilt 
feelings’ (1971: 163) are an element in the process o f interpellation.
Althusser asserts that the process o f interpellation is a fundamentally linguistic
one. The significance and fragility o f sexual purity and, more importantly, the
public perception o f a woman’s sexual purity, were embedded within the
linguistic practices of Renaissance culture. Patriarchal ideologies were
inscribed within the language used to describe women, and the vocabulary
available for the description o f female honour was bound by a restrictive
binary logic that would acknowledge women only as chaste or unchaste. In
order for a woman to be able to successfully prosecute a charge o f rape, she
must be unsullied by the vocabulary o f a patriarchal culture which was ‘fram’d
to make women false’ (Othello, I.iii.396). A dynamic language of insult
developed around the issue o f sexual morality, and as Gowing explains:
It was ... language that differentiated persistently and 
profoundly between the sexual morals and sexual honour of 
women and men, and ... in which gendered insults marked 
off the outlines of gender roles in sexual, marital and social 
relations ... The production o f language was a site of 
particular contest in the definition and prescription of 
womanhood with which so many writers and preachers were 
concerned (1996: 59-61).
Chastity, then, was a value produced and negated through language. Common 
insults directed at women -  for example, ‘whore’, ‘jade’, ‘quean’, ‘punk’, and
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‘strumpet’ — took women’s chastity, and therefore their social reputation, as 
their object. What is more, insults directed at men were also predicated upon 
women’s sexual conduct: terms such as ‘cuckold’, ‘bawd’, and ‘whoremaster’ 
were designed to denigrate men by virtue o f their association with licentious 
women. The steep increase in the cases o f libel and slander brought to the 
ecclesiastical courts, and the overwhelmingly sexual nature o f the specific 
insults registered, illustrates the prominence o f sexual reputation as a means o f 
defining women.3
In addition to the endemic exclusionary violence faced by women asserting 
their credibility as plaintiffs, when accusations o f rape were actually pursued, 
there were significant terminological difficulties describing the violence o f 
sexual assault. As Garthine Walker explains, ‘[tjhe language which signified 
sexual intercourse was itself one of female complicity ... Describing sexual 
intercourse necessarily depicted a woman’s submission, her succumbing or 
being persuaded to a man’s will’ (1998: 6). For women, finding a language with 
which to express sexual violence was complicated by the dominant patriarchal 
discourse which encoded an expectation o f a certain amount o f aggression in 
its descriptions o f sex, and which suggested that violence should be recognised 
and understood as an integral part o f intercourse.
Zizek identifies the way in which male violence is privileged whilst female 
experience is implicitly and actively repressed through the signifying process:
J For a detailed breakdown o f the use of various terms o f insult, see Gowing (1996: 64).
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Take the ambiguous status o f patriarchal violence against 
women: one could claim that this violence becomes actual 
violence only when it is experienced, — ‘registered’ — as snob by a 
woman. In a society in which the traditional patriarchal 
ideology exerts unquestionable hegemony — one which lacks 
even a minimal o f 'feminist awareness’ — a certain kind of 
'possessive’ attitude o f a man towards a woman is not only 
perceived by a woman as 'violent’, but even received with 
open arms as a sign o f authentic passionate devotion. The 
point here, o f course, is not to ‘soften’ this violence by 
reducing it to something merely imagined’: violence is ‘real’, 
yet its raw, indeterminate reality becomes the reality o f 
'unacceptable violence’ only via its 'registration’ in the 
symbolic order. (1996a: 222).
In the symbolic order, violence can be obscured or made meaningful in terms 
which shroud its full significance. That is to say, the import o f violence is 
figured at the level o f the signifier.
The representations o f rape in Shakespeare’s Titus Andronicus and The Tape of 
Lucrece rehearse and interrogate the meanings of sexual violence. Drawing 
upon classical paradigms from the work o f Ovid and Livy, and engaging with 
the ideals of female virtue fostered by the Church and consolidated by the 
leading patriarchal hierarchies, these texts explore the processes through which 
culture interprets and makes meaningful violence against women.4 In an 
economy of patriarchal violence, the female body is ascribed a symbolic 
significance and the female body-as-text functions as the site upon which, and 
indeed the means by which, male subjectivity is reproduced and reaffirmed.5
4 See Ovid (1955: 146-152) and Livy (1960: 97-101).
5 The equation o f the female body with text was a familiar one: Jocelyn Catty notes that ‘rape 
provided a powerful metaphor for illegitimate publication’ and that writers o f the period 
‘pervasively trope the text as a female body and publication as an exposure and invasion o f  that 
body akin to rape’ (1999: 1).
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In both Titus Andronicus and The Tape of Lucrece, the patriarchal discourse of 
rape is wrought around a system o f exchange based upon triangular desire. In 
an argument derived from the work o f Claude Levi-Strauss, Lacan asserts that 
‘women in the real order serve ... as objects for the exchanges required by the 
elementary structures of kinship’ (1977: 207). When women were 
conceptualised in this way, the violence o f rape amounted to theft, the wilful 
appropriation o f another man’s possession. Indeed, as Karen Bamford 
explains, during the Renaissance there was an inescapable ‘patriarchal structure 
in which women, defined as male property, act as tokens of exchange between 
men’ (2000: 7). The violence o f sexual assault was understood as violence 
directed at another man, but experienced by a woman.
The theoretical perspectives proposed by Alexandre Kojeve, Jacques Lacan 
and Rene Girard provide a critical apparatus for discussing the way in which 
women are posited as objects, as well as subjects, in the symbolic order. Their 
conceptions o f the desiring subject -  implicitly the male subject -  allow for an 
understanding of the way in which women are required to function in an 
economy driven by relationships between men. Kojeve argues that ‘[d]esire is 
human only if the one desires, not the body, but the Desire o f the other’ 
(1969: 6). Following on from this, Lacan later states that ‘it is qua O ther that 
he [the subject] desires’ (1977: 312), and goes on to explain that ‘Man’s desire 
is the desire o f the Other’ (1994: 235). Girard provides an extended discussion 
o f this idea, asserting that all desire is essentially mimetic functioning within a
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triangular model where subject A desires an object because it is desired by 
subject B (1988: 143-168). Women therefore function as objects o f exchange 
between men, and are desirable to men only as a consequence o f their 
desirability to other men. Violence arises when desires converge upon a single 
object, and rape is one form violence can take when male desires converge 
upon the objectified female body.
Shakespeare’s representations o f rape draw attention to the patriarchal 
economy in which a woman’s agency is circumscribed by her status as an 
object o f exchange between men. Girard’s theory of triangular desire provides 
a useful conceptual framework with which to elucidate the homosocial 
relationships in both Titus Andronicus and The Rape of Lucrece: throughout both 
o f these texts, the major relationships operate recognisably within this 
triangular structure. Recent critical discussions of these texts have identified 
the way in which the male characters’ subjectivities are constructed in and 
through the representation of the female body, and in particular, its violation. 
Nancy Vickers argues that the language of bla2on employed in The Rape of 
Lucrece is an intrinsically patriarchal one because it reflects and intervenes 
primarily, if not exclusively, within relationships between men (1985). 
Coppelia Khan suggests that the poem engages with ‘a struggle in which 
Lucrece figures not so much as Tarquin’s antagonist but rather as the telltale 
sign o f his subjectivity rather than her own’ (1991: 143). Mary Jacobus goes 
even further, asking £[i]s there a woman in this text?’ (1982). David Willbern 
has identified similar concerns surrounding the figure o f Lavinia in Titus
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Andronicus who proves to be the locus o f male-dominated social and political 
tensions (1995).
From the outset, in Titus Andronicus, the relationship between Saturninus and 
Bassianus affirms the structuring agency o f rivalry. The desires o f the two 
brothers converge in the political wrangling that surrounds the contest for the 
leadership o f Rome. Saturninus’ opening appeal to the assembled crowds — 
‘Noble patricians, patrons o f my right,/ Defend the justice o f my cause with 
arms’ (I.i.l) — is immediately challenged by Bassianus who calls upon ‘Romans, 
friends, followers, favourers o f my right’ (Li.9) and continues with a 
rhetorically dexterous verbal attack. The initial foregrounding o f fraternal 
differences sets in place the foundations for the subsequent events o f the play 
and highlights their emergence out o f political conflict, in particular, the 
tensions between monarchical and republican rule. Saturninus and Bassianus 
embody the ideological conflict between governments that appoint leaders 
based on birth as opposed to merit. When Titus arrives, bearing the coffins of 
twenty-five ‘valiant sons’, his plea that he be given ‘a staff o f honour ... But 
not a sceptre to control the world’ demonstrates the authority of his voice. As 
Foucault has suggested, ‘discourse is not simply that which manifests (or 
hides) deske -  it is also the object of desire ... discourse is the power which is 
to be seized’ (1989: 240). Following the conventions of primogeniture, Titus 
proclaims: ‘People of Rome ... I ask your voices ... that you create our 
emperor’s eldest son,/ Lord Saturnine’ (I.i.221-229). Once elected, Saturninus 
requires a consort and tells Titus o f his desire to marry Lavinia. She is
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desirable to him because of her relationships with other men: not only is she 
Titus’ daughter, but also she was betrothed to Saturninus’ brother, Bassianus. 
Here, power is asserted and inscribed upon the figure o f Lavinia as ‘text’, who 
functions as an object o f exchange within a politically driven economy.
Girard explains that one aggressive act begets another, engendering a violent 
cycle which can only be ended by cataclysm. Consequendy, the conflict 
between the brothers continues, and this struggle for power is enacted upon 
Lavinia. She functions as a metonymic representation o f the state, with her 
physical body being equated with the body politic. As Titus exclaims ‘Treason 
my lord — Lavinia is surprised’ (I.i.287), Bassianus explains that he is taking ‘his 
betrothed from all the world away’ [my emphasis] (I.i.290). Lavinia’s assault 
and abduction are understood as acts of treason that offend the political leader 
Saturninus, rather than as acts of violence against her as an individual. The 
broken marriage promise also implicates Titus, who afterwards says ‘Follow, 
my lord, and I’ll soon bring her back \Satuminus does notfollow, but exit at the other 
door with Tamora, her two sons and Aaron the moor\’ (I.i.293). Aggrieved, Saturninus 
rejects calls to find Lavinia, exclaiming ‘no, the emperor needs her no t,/ Nor 
her, nor thee, nor any o f thy stock’ (I.i.304-305) and instead, proposes 
marriage to Tamora. The significance o f this union may also be understood in 
terms o f Girard’s notion of triangular desire: because Tamora is the focus for 
Titus’ desire for revenge, she is an effective instrument o f retaliation against 
him.
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In a similar manner, the relationship between Tamora’s sons, Chiron and 
Demetrius, is constituted in the conflict of sibling rivalry and governed 
primarily by the conventions prescribed by patriarchy. In common with the 
relationship between Saturninus and Bassianus, the tensions within this 
relationship often converge upon the female body. Both brothers desire the 
maternal body and this desire is frequently exploited by Tamora. Their sexual 
desires, however, focus and converge upon Lavinia:
CHIRON I am as able and as fit as thou
To serve, and to deserve my mistress’ grace ...
I love Lavinia more than all the world.
DEMETRIUS Youngling, learn then to make some meaner choice; 
Lavinia is thine elder brother’s hope.
(I.i.533-564)
Ultimately, these desires are both sanctioned and subverted by Tamora, who
insists that her sons exact physical retribution upon Lavinia for allegedly
plotting against her life: ‘Revenge it as you love your mother’s life,/ Or be ye
not henceforth called my children’ (Il.ii.l 14-115). Lavinia’s attempts to
dissuade Tamora from this course of action are unsuccessful, primarily
because the arguments that she makes in her defence are precisely those that
have originally given rise to the desire for vengeance. Lavinia’s plea, ‘O, let me
teach thee for my father’s sake’, is countered by Tamora’s warning to her sons:
Remember, boys, I poured forth tears in vain 
To save your brother from the sacrifice,
But fierce Andronicus would not relent.
Therefore away with her and use her as you will:
The worse to her, the better loved o f me.
(Il.ii. 163-167)
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The attack upon Lavinia is figured in response to the ‘cruel, irreligious piety’ of 
the Roman rituals invoked by Titus, which required that Tamora’s eldest son 
must die ‘T ’appease their groaning shadows that are gone’ (Li.97). Girard 
asserts that ‘Violence is not to be denied, but can be diverted to another 
object’ (1988: 4). The lopping o f Alarbus’ limbs has not served to contain the 
outbreak o f violence but rather to inflame it and in an act o f vengeance, 
Tamora incites her sons to commit rape.
In The Rape of Lucrece, the female is always, and can only be, represented within 
the triangular structures o f relationships between men. This relatively simple 
dynamic provides the framework for the events before, during and after 
Lucrece’s rape. In common with Lavinia, Lucrece’s attempts to prevent rape 
are futile because she is only able to give voice to, and hence, to reaffirm, 
Tarquin’s motivations: Tarquin’s desire for her is brought about principally 
because she ‘belongs’ to Collatine. She argues, ‘My husband is thy friend; for his 
sake spare me’ (582) but he silences her, saying ‘Have done ... my uncontrolled 
tide/ Turns not, but swells the higher by this let’ (645). In accordance with 
Girard’s suppositions, the obstacles that ought to prevent the realisation o f 
one’s desires are the very same as those that initially gave rise to them.
The omniscient narrator who opens the poem describes Lucrece in a discourse 
o f inanimate value, possession and commodity. Her chastity is reduced to a 
material abstraction, realised in the metaphors o f property and commercial 
value. She is depicted as a ‘treasure’ (16), a ‘priceless wealth (17): she is
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Collatine’s ‘possession’ (18), his ‘fortune’ (19), and something to be 
appreciated by him as the ‘owner’ (27). The description of Lucrece as a ‘rich 
jewel’ (34) has a dual significance, however, suggesting the value of female 
chastity in marriage through a comparison with a gem of a high monetary 
value (Partridge 2001: 165). But money only has value when it forms part o f a 
system o f exchange, and the implication here is that Lucrece’s value is also 
produced in this way. Her character is objectified in a discourse o f male power 
where her worth is derived from her potential value in an exchange between 
men.
The double meanings o f ‘jewel’ are deployed in a similar way in Shakespeare’s 
Cjmbeline where, once again, a woman’s chastity is a critical issue among men. 
Posthumous, exiled and living in Rome, insists that in his absence, his wife 
Imogen ‘holds her virtue still’ (I.v.62). Challenged by the Italian, Iachimo, who 
claims that he ‘must not so far prefer her ‘fore ours o f Italy’ (I.v.63), 
Posthumous agrees to a wager in which a diamond ring, gifted to him by 
Imogen, will be won by Iachimo if he successfully seduces her. Iachimio 
reasons, ‘if I come off, and leave her in such honour as you have trust in, she 
your jewel, this your jewel, and my gold are yours’ (I.v.148-150). The way in 
which women are objectified as units of exchange is realised in a strikingly 
literal way here as the diamond functions as a reification of Imogen’s chastity, 
and is presented as its monetary equivalent.
Tarquin is implicitly aware of Lucrece’s ‘value’ and recognises that ‘she is not
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her own’ (241). He can only conceptualise the rape and the possible
repercussions as they figure for Colladne and his male counterparts, and as he
rehearses the potential consequences o f his actions, he asks,
If  Collatinus dream of my intent,
Will he not wake, and in a desp’rate rage 
Post hither, this vile purpose to prevent? - 
This siege that engirt his marriage
(218-221)
The primacy o f relations between men is so deeply ingrained in the social
structure that it is implicitly understood that Collatine will perceive the rape as
a ‘siege that engirt his marriage’. Tarquin thinks only about the way in which
the rape will affect Collatine, and indeed, how Collatine’s discovery will
subsequently affect him. The military metaphor of the siege affirms the often-
violent agency o f the patriarchal structures o f power within which the rape will
be understood. But even more unsettling than Tarquin’s disregard for Lucrece,
however, is his list o f the circumstances in which the rape would be
acceptable. He reasons:
Had Collatinus kill’d my son or sire,
O r lain in ambush to betray my life;
O r were he not my dear friend, this desire 
Might have excuse to work upon his wife,
As in revenge or quittal o f such strife;
But as he is my kinsman, my dear friend,
The shame and fault finds no excuse nor end.
(233-238)
Rape was considered an acceptable way for one man to exact vengeance on 
another. Indeed, Tarquin proves to be the embodiment of a male discourse 
which insisted that female experience must always be subordinate to the
I l l
interests o f men. Writing specifically about the Ovidian literary tradition, Lynn 
Enterline observes that ‘rape is the call that interpellates the female subject. 
The call o f rape requires ... female characters to recognize themselves as 
“female” in a peculiarly violent form of socially determined subjection’ (2000: 
158). Rape is the call that requires Lucrece to acknowledge, and to a certain 
extent accept, her subject position within the ideology that defines her. What 
is more, this position is produced in response to a latent but pervasive threat 
which, by virtue o f her sex, she is simultaneously subject to and culpable for.
In her influential reading o f the representation o f rape in the Philomela myth,
Patricia Klindienst Joplin pursues the implications o f Girard’s study for
women. In 'Violence and the Sacred., Girard examines the way in which culture
works to impose limits upon violence. Specifically, Joplin urges a
reconsideration o f the significance o f the mechanism of the surrogate victim.
Girard suggests that
Ritual is founded on a double substitution. The first, which 
passes unperceived, is the substitution o f one member o f the 
community for all, brought about through the operation o f 
the surrogate victim. The second, the only truly ‘ritualistic’ 
substitution, is superimposed on the first. It is the 
substitution o f a victim belonging to a predetermined 
sacrificial category for the original victim. The surrogate 
victim comes from inside the community and the ritual victim 
must come from outside; otherwise the community might 
find it difficult to unite against it (1988: 102).
Joplin argues that Girard, in common with Levi-Strauss, ‘tends to equate the 
male point o f view with culture, so that he does not pause to see how the 
woman, in exchange, becomes the surrogate victim for the group’ (1991: 43).
Through her violation, the woman’s position as ‘Other’ is both reaffirmed and 
negated; she functions as the surrogate victim, a focus for the violent energies 
which would otherwise spill out into relationships between men. The woman’s 
body is ascribed a symbolic function, as Joplin goes on to explain: ‘[t]he 
exchange o f women articulates the culture’s boundaries, the woman’s hymen 
serving as the physical or sexual sign for the limen or wall defining the city’s 
limits’ (1991: 43). Consequently, the woman is necessarily both within and out- 
with culture. In Rome, the bodies o f Lavinia and Lucrece fulfil a symbolic 
function, representing the totality o f relationships among men and as such, 
operating as metonymic representations o f the body politic. However, this 
representative agency denies women’s interaction in the very relationships they 
symbolise.
Rape constitutes an act of violence committed inside and against the body o f
Rome, requiring appeasement with an act o f violence directed against those
outside Rome. In this way, the community unites against an external enemy on
behalf o f a transgression against a symbolic representative o f Roman culture.
Girard explains that
The rite aims at the most profound state of peace known to 
any community: the peace that follows the sacrificial crisis 
and results from the unanimous accord generated by the 
surrogate victim. To banish the evil emanations that 
accumulate within the community and to recapture the 
freshness of this original experience are one and the same 
task. Whether order reigns supreme or whether its reign is 
already challenged, the same model, the same plan o f action is 
invariably proposed. It is the plan, associated with the 
victorious resolution o f all communal crises, that involves 
violence against the surrogate victim (1988: 103).
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In Titus Andronicus, the rape o f Lavinia not only leads to the death of her 
attackers, Chiron and Demetrius, but also to the deaths o f their mother 
Tamora, and Tamora’s husband, the emperor Saturninus. The threat Tamora 
posed to the patriarchal order as a licentious and unfaithful wife is removed, 
and with Titus’ death, the political struggles which have characterised the 
drama are put aside as Lucius assumes power with an aim to ‘govern so / To 
heal Rome’s harms and wipe away her woe’ (V.iii. 146-7). In a positive attempt 
to restore the violated metaphor o f the body politic, Marcus calls to the 
Romans, ‘O let me teach you how to knit again/ This scattered corn into one 
mutual sheaf,/ These broken limbs again into one body’ (V.iii.69-71). 
Similarly, in The Tape of Lucrece, the violence she experiences as the surrogate 
victim serves to bind the community together and helps to resolve the 
communal crisis. Shakespeare’s narrative poem does not close with Lucrece’s 
‘execution on herselF (Titus Andronicus, V.iii.75), but with the removal of the 
Tarquins and the change o f the state government from kings to consuls. And 
when the Romans ‘did bear dead Lucrece thence/ To show her bleeding body 
thorough Rome’ (1850-1851), parading her body as a symbol o f the offence 
done to the political body o f Rome, they restore the ‘profound state o f peace 
... that follows the sacrificial crisis’. As Derek Cohen explains, ‘[pjatriarchy 
renews itself -  with a self-conscious nod to heroic tragic necessity -  through 
the killing o f an innocent woman’ (1993: 80).
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For women, however, as Lacan observes, ‘there’s something insurmountable, 
let us say unacceptable, in the fact o f being placed in the position o f an object 
in the symbolic order, to which, on the other hand, she is entirely subjected no 
less than the man (1988: 262). In this symbolic order, women are reduced to 
sigmfiers, dependent upon differential relationships between men for their 
meaning, and conceptualised, like language itself, as radically ‘O ther’. As 
Girard asserts, ‘[t]o refer to the origin o f symbolic thought is to speak as well 
o f the origin of language’ (1988: 235). Elissa Marder suggests that c[t]he sexual 
violation o f the woman’s body is itself embedded in discursive and symbolic 
structures’ (1992: 158) and it is my contention that language, as the 
transcendent discursive and symbolic structure, is the collateral site of 
women’s violation. Entry into language is necessarily a violation o f sorts: as 
Derrida writes, ‘violence did not exist before the possibility o f speech’ (2001: 
146). Alexandre Kojeve postulated that ‘[m]an becomes conscious o f himself 
at the moment when -  for the ‘first’ time -  he says “I.” To understand man 
by understanding his “origin” is, therefore, to understand the origin of the I 
revealed by speech’ (1969: 3). Lacan pursues this idea in his work on the 
mirror stage, arguing that this moment of the assumption and recognition o f 
the subject position ‘I’ -  what Kojeve calls consciousness -  is also the genesis 
of the unconscious, and the genesis o f desire. When the subject enters into the 
symbolic order, which, as Zizek explains, is ‘a formal order which supplements 
and/ or disrupts the dual relationship o f ‘external’ factual reality and ‘internal’ 
subjective experience’ (1989: 19) they are subjected to an experience o f 
irreparable absence or lack. Zizek continues:
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The very existence of man qua being-of-language stands thus 
under the sign o f an irreducible and constitutive lack: we are 
submerged in the universe o f signs which forever present us 
from attaining the Thing; so-called ‘external reality’ itself is 
already ‘structured like a language’, that is, its meaning is 
always already overdetermined by the symbolic framework 
which structures our perception o f reality (1996a: 95).
In the patriarchal culture o f Renaissance England, the way in which external 
reality was structured like a language — that is to say, the way in which certain 
sign-systems were privileged as natural or necessary ways o f recognising 
meaning -  had insidious and inescapable realities for women: language, as 
Coward and Ellis remind us, is ‘the place in which the social individual is 
constructed’ (1977: 1).
Both Titus Andronicus and The Tape of Lucrece are thematically concerned with 
the language of violence. Violence cannot be dissociated from the language 
used to describe it and each text demonstrates an acute awareness o f the way 
in which language and rhetorical practices generate, transmit, represent and 
effect violence. The texts engage with the contestation of the meanings of 
violence, and the self-conscious attention to the language used reflects and 
effects ‘a struggle for meaning on the terrain o f the linguistic sign itselP 
(Drakakis 2001: 21). But at an even more basic level, the violence enacted 
against the women occurs in the ‘struggle between speech and the suppression 
o f speech’ (Kahn 1991: 143). The violated women are largely denied a public 
voice and rather than having the capacity for self-representation, Lucrece and
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Lavinia are constrained by their position as both subject and object o f the 
patriarchal discourse.
Titus Andronicus engages with the struggle between the imperative to speak and
the limits o f representation, interrogating the relationship between, and the
political implications of, the processes o f inscription and interpretation. The
rape o f Lavinia appears as the material reality of this conflict. During the
assault, Lavinia’s hands are cut off and her tongue is cut out. In an act of
violence instigated by Tamora and intended to be interpreted as a wrong
against Titus, a discourse of vengeance is forcibly inscribed upon her body.
Chiron and Demetrius revel in their offence, jeering at Lavinia:
DEMETRIUS So, now go tell, and if thy tongue can speak,
Who ’twas that cut thy tongue and ravished thee. 
CHIRON Write down thy mind, bewray thy meaning so,
And if thy stumps will let thee, play the scribe. 
DEMETRIUS See how with signs and tokens she can scrawl.
(II.iii.1-5)
The brothers are conscious of the difficulties that she will now face in any 
attempt to represent the events of her violation. The project is not impossible, 
however, and we are told she is still able to ‘scrawl’ and ‘play the scribe’; 
however, by hindering Lavinia’s ability to represent herself, and, by 
implication, her father’s ability to interpret her, Tamora and her sons have 
inflicted unthinkable cruelty upon their enemies. In Renaissance culture, the 
tongue was identified as the corporeal location o f language; consequently, the 
excision o f Lavinia’s tongue signifies more than the removal o f her physical 
ability to speak. The tongue symbolised the materiality of language and
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therefore, without her tongue, Lavinia is without agency. The Old Testament 
book of Proverbs asserts that ‘[djeath and life are in the power o f the tongue’ 
(18:21), and without her tongue, Lavinia quite literally has no power over her 
life. She dies at the hands o f her father who kills her to prevent the material 
realities o f the discourse o f shame to which she would inevitably be subject 
after her rape. Having been sexually violated and sullied by the vocabulary of 
unchastity, Lucrece is a debased signifier and no longer an acceptable unit o f 
currency for exchange between men.
Initially Lavinia is unintelligible. This is frustrating for Titus and Marcus whose 
preliminary attempts to understand her seem futile. Marcus is the first to 
discover Lavinia in her mutilated state and presses his niece for information, 
prompting her, ‘Speak, gentle niece ... Why dost not speak to me?’ (II.iii.21). 
She is unable to participate in his discourse and is similarly unable to be read 
as a signifier but Marcus’ willingness to ventriloquise her voice proves 
unsettling. He conjectures that ‘some Tereus hath deflowered thee/ And lest 
thou shouldst detect him, cut thy tongue’ (II.iii.26). In a peculiarly disturbing 
moment he asks, ‘Shall I speak for thee?’ (II.iii.33), thereby suggesting that a 
male discourse, as it is assimilated and reproduced by a female subject, is then 
articulated by a man. This breakdown in communication emphasises the 
inconsistencies inherent in the ruling, male-dominated discourse and 
demonstrates the ease with which its ability to signify may be disrupted. As 
Patricia Klindienst Joplin observes, ‘behind ... woman’s silence is the 
incomplete plot o f male dominance’ (1991: 39).
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Titus also maintains the pressure upon Lavinia, pleading ‘Speak Lavinia ... O r 
make some sign how I may do thee ease’ (III.i.122). His masculine desire to be 
able to  understand her in accordance with male systems of signification is 
thwarted as a result o f  male agency. Undeterred, he affirms:
I can interpret all her martyred signs —
... Thou shalt not sigh, nor hold thy stumps to heaven, 
N or wink, nor nod, nor kneel, nor make a sign,
But I o f these will wrest an alphabet
And by still practice learn to know thy meaning.
His ability to understand has been thwarted by his daughter’s rape and 
mutilation. By disrupting and thus drawing attention to the mechanisms 
normally used in the processes of interpretation, Tamora and her sons have 
violently exposed Titus’ subjection to the structures o f language. This radically 
overturns traditional notions o f gender and effectively emasculates Titus in a 
violation that parallels that o f his daughter.
Eventually, however, Titus goes some way to overcoming the crisis in 
signification through his desire to ‘wrest’ — to obtain forcefully and even to 
distort — the meanings o f her mutilated body. Lavinia partially manages to 
convey her literally unspeakable experiences only by making reference to 
another text:
(III.ii.36-45)
BOY
TITUS
TITUS
[Lavinia turns over the books]
Some book there is that she desires to see ... 
Come and take choice o f all my library ... 
Lucius, what book is that she tosseth so? 
Grandsire, ’tis Ovid’s Metamorphosis ...
Lavinia shall I read?
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This is the tragic tale of Philomel,
And treats of Tereus’ treason and his rape —
And rape, I fear, was root of thy annoy.
MARCUS See, brother, see: note how she quotes the leaves.
(IV.i.31 -50)
At the point at which language’s capacity to signify threatens to collapse, 
Ovid’s text, which recounts the rape o f Philomela, traverses the gap. Ovid’s 
Metamorphoses formed part of the grammar school curriculum and functioned 
not only as a source for much Renaissance literature, but also as a cultural 
cornerstone from which to situate the ‘unspeakable’ discourse o f rape. 
However, as Stephanie Jed explains, in the humanist tradition, ‘the narrative in 
which violence is figured is coded in such a way as to disguise the violence it 
exercises’ (1989: 29). Philomela is raped, mutilated and rendered mute by her 
brother-in-law Tereus. Unable to speak o f her violation, she weaves the details 
o f her assault into a tapestry, which she sends to her sister Procne, and 
together the women exact a violent revenge, murdering Itys, Procne’s and 
Tereus’ son, and feeding him to an unwitting Tereus. Lavinia’s attack is 
modelled on the account o f the rape in Ovid’s text: Chiron and Demetrius are 
clearly familiar with the myth of Philomela, and to ensure that Lavinia does 
not follow Philomela ‘and in a tedious sampler sew her mind’ (II.iii.50), 
thereby disclosing their identities, they cut off her hands. But the myth does 
not wholly explain or account for Lavinia’s experiences, providing at best an 
approximation o f her situation. The similarity of the attacks occurs only at the 
level of the violence inflicted by men, not in the reactions or agency o f the 
women. There is a marked disparity between the reaction of Philomela, who
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actively participates in a horrific act o f revenge that radically disturbs the
politico-sacrificial rituals o f classical Greece, and Lavinia, who is killed by her
father “Because the girl should not survive her shame’ (V.iii.40). As Jane
Newman suggests, Shakespeare’s text engages with can ideology o f gender that
represses traditions o f female political agency ... threatening to patriarchy’
(1994: 307). But more than this, the conspicuous mismatching, the lack of
complete correspondence calls attention to the inherent difficulties o f the
signifying process and highlights the impossibility o f Lavinia’s situation: there
can never be an exact correspondence between signifier and signified, and
there will never be a way for her to articulate her experience which is not
inflected by the dominant masculine ideology. Gillian Murray Kendall argues:
W hen the disfigured Lavinia enters, it is as if she were no 
longer simply a character in the play but an emblem ... o f the 
way in which, throughout the play, facts resist the violent 
manner in which characters define and transform their world 
through language (1989: 305-306).
Lavinia’s gesture towards the text o f the Metamorphoses is symptomatic o f the 
double-bind o f the female subject: the only way in which she can express 
herself is through a reference to a text which has shaped the physical realities 
o f her assault, and will inform the subsequent interpretation o f it. Lavinia is 
thoroughly subjected to physical and linguistic violence: she is raped, 
physically denied a voice, and symbolically excluded from the processes of 
inscribing and interpreting the meanings o f the violence committed against 
her. Ultimately, Lavinia’s rape is recuperated for political knowledge, and made 
culturally significant as the catalyst for the restitution of the patriarchal social
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order. As a result o f the violence she sustains, she fulfils the role o f Rome’s 
surrogate victim and allows the community to unite in avenging her attackers. 
By creating a focus for the aggressive energies inherent within the community, 
she prevents the inevitable outbreak o f violence from turning inwards upon 
the community itself. Through her actual physical violation she enables 
Rome’s metaphorically broken limbs to be re-membered in a reinvigorated 
body politic.
In The Rape of Lucrece, the violence Lucrece experiences is demonstrably bound 
up with language. Without the visual dimension o f Titus Andronicus, the poem 
relies solely upon words and the narrative form allows Lucrece’s voice to be 
clearly heard. But although Lucrece is given the space to speak she struggles to 
articulate her experience of violence, which is by its very nature unsharable. 
Elaine Scarry explains that ‘[a] great deal ... is at stake in the attempt to invent 
linguistic structures that will reach and accommodate this area o f experience 
normally so inaccessible to language’ (1985: 6) and when men inflict violence 
upon women, there is a great deal at stake for both parties. The linguistic 
structures employed by Lucrece are not ‘invented’ in isolation from the 
patriarchal imperatives which objectify women and encode the meanings o f 
the violence committed against them. However, the poem goes some way 
towards exposing the way in which the triangular structures of desire, which 
give rise to violence, are embedded within language and are replicated and 
developed within linguistic structures. In addition, it interrogates the violent 
effects o f a signifying system which largely excludes women from the process
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of contesting and prioritising its meanings and demonstrates that the 
difficulties o f articulating violence can profoundly amplify its effects.
In the poem, Shakespeare insists on a direct link between rhetoric and desire 
and foregrounds this relationship in the opening lines by making subtle but 
consequential alterations to the story o f Lucrece familiar to Renaissance 
readers o f Ovid’s Fasti. In contrast to Ovid’s narrative, which suggests that it is 
the sight o f Lucrece’s ‘figure’ (Shakespeare 1969: 199) that induces Tarquin’s 
desires, in the poem, his ‘keen appetite’ is stimulated verbally by ‘that “name” 
o f chaste’, that is to say, by Collatine’s rhetoric. The military context for this 
description highlights the primacy of relationships between men, and in this 
environment, the discourse o f chastity encodes the homosocial relationships 
functioning at interpersonal and more broadly political levels. Tarquin desires 
Lucrece before he sees her because ‘Haply that name of “chaste” unhapp’ly 
set/This bateless edge on his keen appetite’ (8-9). Collatine’s language o f 
blazon has a devastating perlocutionary effect and, as Nancy Vickers affirms, it 
is necessary to examine ‘the limits — indeed the dangers — of that inherited, 
insufficient, descriptive rhetoric’ (1985: 96).
One of the principal limitations o f Collatine’s descriptive rhetoric lies in its 
fundamental paradox: if Collatine kept Lucrece’s ‘value’ secret its discursive 
power would be negated. The language o f blazon, in which men praise women 
in an all male environment, is necessarily predicated upon a series o f male 
objectives and, as is frequently the case with an elegy, and consistent with an
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elegy’s origins in absence, these commendations tell us more about the speaker
than the subject. Blazon removes and denies female agency: as a discourse
implicidy predicated upon sexual chastity, a measure o f female virtue required
by men, measured by men and defined by men, it removes from women the
possibility o f self-definition and self-representation. Indeed, as Vickers
indicates, c[t]he canonical legacy of description in praise o f beauty is, after all, a
legacy shaped predominandy by the male imagination for the male
imagination; it is, in large part, the product o f men talking to men about
women’ (1985: 96). However, whilst male domination was certainly achieved
largely through the appropriation of the female voice, the status o f rhetoric
cannot be unequivocally aligned with the notion of male power. Wayne
Rebhorn explains:
For the Renaissance ... the orator was a potentially 
problematic figure because men were supposed to be 
warriors and knights, models o f the active life, doers rather 
than talkers; by contrast, words -  and hence rhetoric -  were 
associated with women. As a result, the man who played the 
orator ran the risk o f appearing effeminate so that the 
defenders o f rhetoric were led to emphasise his masculine 
power in order to protect him (2000: 10).
With a narrative predicated upon the idea of rape as unspeakable’, 
Shakespeare acknowledges this debate and participates in it, exploring the 
implications of rhetoric, for both men and women, throughout the poem.
The hyperbolic language o f blazon exemplified by the Petrarchan tradition 
figuratively disintegrated the female body in a poetic discourse, which, by 
praising the beauty o f individual body parts in isolation, did violence to the
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image and symbol o f the coherent female body. Taking a critique o f the
Petrarchan tradition as a starting point, The Rape of Lucrece continually seeks to
question the desires that it replicates and generates. The politics o f the
Petrarchan aesthetic are highlighted, not only because they inform the poetic
conventions o f the Renaissance, but also because they are informed by a
patriarchal discourse with potentially malevolent undercurrents. In her
discussion o f Petrarch’s legacy, Vickers states:
By situating blazon within a story, Shakespeare’s narrative 
provides a locus for reading this specific mode o f description 
not as isolated icon, but rather as motivated discourse 
positioned within a specific context that produces and 
consumes it. Lucrece thus reveals the rhetorical strategies that 
descriptive occasions generate, and underlines the potential 
consequences of being female matter for male oratory (1985:
96).
The choice o f the narrative poem format calls the fragmented Petrarchan 
discourse to account. The reader is encouraged to situate it within a wider 
political economy and to recognise that it operates within patriarchal 
structures that serve to reproduce the conditions of their production. 
Therefore, in a self-reflexive movement, this text provokes a questioning of 
the role o f literature, and indeed the reader, in the production and 
maintenance o f the values represented by the Petrarchan tradition.
The Petrarchan ‘celebration’ of the female body is instantly problematised. We 
are told that ‘Collatine unwisely did not let/To praise the clear unmatched red 
and white/W hich triumphed in that sky of his delight’ (10-12). His triumphant 
praise o f Lucrece directly compromises his authority and this tension is fore­
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grounded by the narrator who questions his actions calling his ‘shallow tongue’
a ‘niggard prodigal’ (179). We are told:
Beauty itself doth o f itself persuade 
The eyes o f men without an orator;
What needeth then apologies be made,
To set forth that which is so singular?
O r why is Collatine the publisher
O f that rich jewel he should keep unknown 
From thievish ears, because it is his own?
(29-35)
The idea that beauty persuades without need o f an orator suggests the 
redundancy o f rhetoric. However, the narrator simultaneously affirms its 
performativity, criticising the effects o f Collatine’s publication of the value of 
something which should remain hidden from public view. By openly extolling 
her virtues, Collatine has engaged in a discourse that he simultaneously 
constructs and is constructed by; in contrast, Lucrece remains able only to 
reify Collatine’s subject position within these structures. Collatine’s role as 
‘publisher’ of ‘that rich jewel’ of her chastity goes some way to imply the 
profound limitations of her agency. N ot only does her husband praise her 
chastity, a relative quality required and quantified principally by men, but he 
also circumscribes her agency, both wilfully and unwittingly.
Tarquin is able to exploit Lucrece’s vulnerable position within this signifying 
system by manipulating the structures that have enabled the subjugation o f 
women. His privileged relationship with male-dominated political and social 
institutions such as marriage, the military, and the bonds of male friendship, 
affords him considerable control over others. He is acutely aware o f the
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power that a discourse may exert, and warns Lucrece that if  she resists, CI
purpose to destroy thee’ (514). He intends to avoid discovery and punishment
through a displacement o f a crudely literal kind:
some worthless slave o f thine I’ll slay,
To kill thine honour with thy life’s decay;
And in thy dead arms do I mean to place him,
Swearing I slew, seeing thee embrace him.
(515)6
His main threat, however, is that he will re-write the actual events o f the rape, 
both literally and figuratively, and publish them to ensure her infamy. He 
claims her offspring will be ‘blurr’d with nameless bastardy’. Here o f course, 
the children would be ‘nameless’, in as much as they would have no known 
father: an indication of the power o f language and naming in a patrilineal 
system. He goes on:
And thou, the author o f their obloquy,
Shalt have thy trespass cited up in rhymes 
And sung by children in succeeding times.
(523)
Lucrece’s agency is restricted and appropriated by male censorship. Tarquin 
manipulates the relationship between language and memorialisatio.n, forcing 
her to ventriloquise his narrative. Lucrece is endangered by her own voice, 
which Tarquin threatens to appropriate and use as an instrument o f her 
physical and psychological subordination.
6 This same form o f  displacement is found later in Macbeth, where the protagonist murders 
Duncan and frames the King’s servants:
Those o f his chamber, as it seem’d had done’t:
Their hands and faces were all badg’d with blood;
So were their daggers, which, unwip’d, we found 
Upon their pillows
(II.iii.99-102)
In his prior contemplation o f the murder, Macbeth imagines how ‘wither d Murther ... with 
Tarquin’s ravishing strides, towards his design/ Moves like a ghost’ (II.i.52-56) and Kenneth Muir 
notes the parallels between Macbeth’s soliloquy and Lucrece (162-168).
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The narrative explores the materiality of language, and in particular, the 
mutually constitutive relationship between language and the body. Lucrece’s 
experience o f the effects o f rape serves to demonstrate their indivisibility; at 
critical moments in the text the distinction between the linguistic and the 
corporeal is difficult to determine. Chastity is a prime example o f a discourse 
made manifest on the body. Lucrece, first described to the reader as ‘chaste’, is 
its embodiment. As a paradigm of sexual purity, she occasions praise in the 
language o f blazon employed by her husband; however, this patriarchal 
language has been inscribed upon her to such an extent that she herself, as a 
text, is a language of blazon. Whilst she is figured in her husband’s 
approbation, her body acts as its own orator, ‘speaking’ through its beauty. 
Lynn Enterline argues that ‘Shakespeare’s narrator insists that the usually 
functional differences between language and the body, representations and 
event, verge on collapse’ (2000: 153). But the issue here is not the qualitative 
distinctions: bodies always have the power to signify, and representations 
never simply represent, but always constitute an event in their own right. The 
problem for Lucrece is that her capacity to generate meaning is wholly 
dependent upon the way in which she is interpreted. Lucrece is reduced to a 
signifier, meaningful only through interactions between men. The effects of 
these concurrent orations o f blazon and body language culminate during the 
rape o f Lucrece, effecting a simultaneous affirmation and negation o f the 
patriarchal system.
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The rhetoric Lucrece employs alters conspicuously after she is raped. A
different voice emerges out of the struggle to articulate the ‘unspeakable’
events o f her violation, and although she promises ‘my tongue shall utter all’
(1076), it is unclear whether her pledge constitutes an attempt to subvert the
structures to which she is subject, or whether it marks the point at which she
fully assumes the conditions of her subjectivity. Before the rape, Tarquin
threatens ‘Yield to my love: if not, enforced hate/ Instead o f love’s coy touch,
shall rudely tear thee’ (668-669). Lucrece’s abject fear is discernible in her
speech, which loses its grammatical coherence as she misplaces punctuation
and is arrested mid-sentence:
Her modest eloquence with sighs is mixed,
Which to her oratory adds more grace.
She puts the period often from his place,
And ’midst sentence so her accent breaks 
That twice she doth begin ere once she speaks.
(563-567)
The insufficiency of language is suggested by her sighs, which have the 
capacity to signify out-with the bonds o f language. In a continued effort to 
dissuade Tarquin, she challenges conventional distinctions between language 
and the body, exploiting the rhetorical potential o f a corporeal body language. 
She pleads, ‘If  ever man were moved with woman’s moans,/ Be moved with 
my tears, my sighs, my groans.’ (587-588). In contrast to this confused and 
disordered outcry, her use o f language after the rape displays a more 
sophisticated rhetoric.
The narrator depicts the rape itself, saying simply, The wolf has seiz d his
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prey, the poor lamb cries’ (677). But this moment of crisis where violence 
interpellates Lucrece as a female subject is described through the 
dehumanising metaphor of a wolf attacking a lamb. This choice o f metaphor 
encodes dangerous assumptions about gendered subjectivity because it 
suggests a troubling essentialism: the wolf is, by its very nature, programmed 
to act aggressively; the meek lamb, according to the laws of nature, is its prey. 
However, the human physicality o f the assault is exposed with the portrayal o f 
Tarquin ‘Cooling his hot face in the chastest tears’ (682). The heat o f his face 
betrays a combination of sexual excitement and aggression, the grotesque and 
ineffable realities o f the rape.
After the rape, Lucrece protests:
If it should be told,
The repetition cannot make it less;
For more it is than I can well express,
And that deep torture may be called a hell 
When more is felt than one hath power to tell.
(1284-1288)
Rape has continued to be recounted and reproduced in myths, rhymes, 
ballads, plays and poetry, but its continual reworking in various linguistic 
structures does not alter its fundamental ‘unrepresentability’. It does, however, 
facilitate the repetition of limited descriptions in a continuous attempt to 
harness and assimilate its disruptive potential. After the assault, Lucrece 
displays a profound understanding o f the implications of her situation, and the 
linguistic basis o f the difficulties she will soon face. She identifies the linguistic 
life o f communal rituals: the story telling, balladry, gossip-mongering and
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various other forces that shape the process of signification and produce a 
‘reputation’:
The nurse to still her child will tell my story,
And fright her crying babe with Tarquin’s name.
The orator to deck his oratory
Will couple my reproach to Tarquin’s shame.
Feast-finding minstrels tuning my defame,
Will tie the hearers to attend each line,
How Tarquin wronged me, I Collatine.
(813-819)
The simultaneous elevation to the status o f a myth and reduction to mere
ornamentation for the orator highlights the often conflicting tensions within
language. Whatever the conditions in which her story is told, she will have no
control over the way she will be represented. Indeed, the manner in which
Niccolo Machiavelli summarises the account o f the rape of Lucretia provided
in Livy’s history is symptomatic of the processes which generate such anxiety
for Lucrece. In the Discourses he provides an interpretation o f events which
carry explicit value judgements:
women have been the cause of many troubles, have done 
great harm to those who govern cities, and have caused in 
them many divisions ... we read in Livy’s history that the 
outrage done to Lucretia deprived the Tarquins of their 
power. Among the primary causes o f the downfall o f tyrants,
Aristotle puts the injuries they do on account of women, 
whether by rape, violation or the breaking up of marriages 
(1998: 477).
Despite his commitment to republican rule, Machiavelli holds Lucretia 
responsible for the ‘trouble’ of the Tarquins’ downfall. Shakespeare’s text 
works reflexively to explore the politics o f interpretation, questioning the role 
o f poetry and more specifically, the influence of the voice granted to Lucrece 
in her apostrophes.
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Aware o f her limited capacity for self-representation, Lucrece seeks to uphold 
the reputation o f her husband. Recognising that the image o f the female 
subject necessarily holds up a mirror to that o f the male, she asks, ‘Let my 
good name, that senseless reputation,/ For Collatine’s dear love be kept 
unspotted’ (820-821). Lucrece acknowledges that her body functions as the 
locus o f a number o f competing discourses and that the inscriptions upon her 
body constitute the materiality o f the conflict. She remarks that ‘The light will 
show character’d in my brow / The story o f sweet chastity’s decay (807-808). 
Indeed, Lucrece believes that her body has been transcribed into a signifier o f 
rape:
the illiterate that know not how 
To cipher what is writ in learned books,
Will quote my loathsome trespass in my looks.
(810-812)
Those excluded from learned literacy would, in English Renaissance culture, 
include the majority o f women, who were denied access to a grammar school 
education. The classical source materials for Shakepeare’s narrative were made 
familiar to schoolboys through humanist pedagogy. However, Lynn Enterline 
observes that
N ot only does the rape propel Lucrece from silence into the 
poem’s discursive orbit ... but her entry into the poem’s 
discourse follows the perverse logic of a violent pedagogical 
curriculum. Lucrece ... when chaste, could not decipher 
sexual double meanings. But the ravished Lucrece is 
retrospectively aware of the dangerous errancies of language 
that once eluded her (2000: 158).
This demonstrates her unprecedented understanding of the way in which she
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has been posited within a phallocentric system of signification. As a signifier 
o f both the chaste and the defiled, what she signifies and her capacity to 
signify are dependent upon male mediation.
With this increased rhetorical sophistication and understanding o f double
meanings comes a heightened apprehension o f the limitations of language.
Lucrece is faced with the necessary but impossible task of speaking the
unspeakable. N ot only must she represent the experience of rape but she must
also represent herself. She is called upon to represent a violation which
renders her defining characteristic fundamentally absent through an
insufficient system of signification that is itself predicated on absence. These
representational difficulties mean that, ‘Sometime her grief is dumb and hath
no w ords,/ Sometime ’tis mad and too much talk affords’ (1105-1106). She is
propelled into an experience of the abject, which, as Kristeva suggests ‘is a
wellspring o f sign for a non-object’, and is confronted by an impossibility, the
symptom o f which is ‘a language that gives up’ (1982: 11). In an effort to
articulate this, she exclaims:
O ut idle words, servants to shallow fools,
Unprofitable sounds, weak arbitrators! ...
This helpless smoke o f words doth me no right
(1016-1027)
Lucrece is sensible o f the inherent obstacles presented by a language that 
operates for and on behalf of what Lacan calls the Law of the Father. Words 
work to conceal and obscure her meaning.
Lynn Enterline has suggested that Shakespeare’s project in The Rape of Lucrece 
is to rise to the challenge posed by Ovid in the Metamorphoses (2000) and to 
give a voice to Lucrece. But, as Jonathan Goldberg asks, W ho or what speaks 
in the character we call Lucrece?’ (1985: 118). Her desire for revenge and her 
ultimate suicide may suggest that she has been thoroughly intersected by a 
patriarchal discourse to the extent that she reproduces it as her own. But her 
actions may also be understood as a testament to the fact that she is conscious
of the constraints placed upon women and is working within them. She asks
‘Revenge on him that made me stop my breath’ (1180) and,
prepares to write,
First hovering o’er the paper with her quill;
Conceit and grief an eager combat fight,
What wit sets down is blotted straight with will:
This is too curious-good, this blunt and ill.
Much like a press o f people at a door,
Throng her inventions, which shall go before.
(1296-1302)
The internal conflict between ‘conceit and grief, combined with her earlier
assertion that ‘Myself thy friend will kill myself thy foe’ (1196) may at first
suggest the subversive potential of Lucrece’s actions. However, this idea is
problematised in the light of Zizek’s statement that:
Ideological identification exerts a true hold on us precisely 
when we maintain an awareness that we are not fully identical 
to it, that there is a rich person beneath it. The position ‘not 
all is ideology, beneath the ideological mask, I am also a 
human person,’ is the very form of ideology, o f its ‘practical 
efficiency’ (1996b: 97).
So, when she asserts, ‘How Tarquin must be us’d, read it in me (1195), she is
writing from within the same structures that she wishes to denounce, calling
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upon the very discourse which she has tried to cast off. The signs that will be 
read in her corpse are those that have been produced and inscribed by the 
patriarchal discourse that has simultaneously enabled and condemned her 
rape. As Zizek observes,4 [e] very thing hinges on the crucial fact that the Law is 
already split in itself, which is why an all too direct identification with it 
cripples its functioning’ (1996: 99). Although patriarchy prioritises
relationships between men, producing a system in which women function as 
units o f exchange, its hierarchical organisation nevertheless allows for the 
possibility o f conflict between men. This conflict is necessarily enacted upon 
the bodies o f women, whose limited powers o f representation ensure that they 
reflect relationships with and between men. Ultimately, as Jane Newman 
suggests, the ‘script played out by the Lucretia story [is] a script that blames 
the victim, allows her to internalise guilt, and defines her as an agent o f 
political change solely in terms of a male’s ability to avenge her’ (1994: 304- 
305).
In the closing lines o f the narrative, Collatine struggles to interpret both the 
sexual assault and the violence Lucrece suffered at her own hands.7 The 
narrator describes how,
The deep vexation of his inward soul
Hath serv’d a dumb arrest upon his tongue;
7 Whilst the focus here is on sexual violence, important issues are raised by Lucrece’s suicide. The 
consternation o f Lucrece’s husband and family at her wilful self-harm demonstrates that her 
suicide was not considered to be inevitable. Augustine, in The City o f  God, asks ‘if she be an 
adulteresse, why is she commended? If shee bee chaste why did she kill her selfe?’ (1610: 31), and 
he argues that violence may be done to the body while the mind remains inviolate. This issue 
comes into play in the text and her suicide is, therefore, morally ambiguous. The black blood 
emitted by her corpse would suggest, however, that she is sullied by the rape and that her chastity 
has been violated.
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Who, mad that sorrow should his use control 
O r keep him from heart-easing words so long,
Begins to talk; but through his lips do throng
Weak words, so thick come in his poor heart’s aid 
That no man" could distinguish what he said.
(1779-1785)
Confounded by weak words and unable to be interpreted by his auditors, 
Collatine temporarily experiences something o f the difficulties faced by his 
wife. His impotent fury is later reified in the name o f ‘Tarquin’, which ‘was 
pronounced plain,/ But through his teeth, as if the name he tore’ (1786-1787). 
All Romans ultimately do violence to the name o f Tarquin as Brutus summons 
the performative power o f words to exact vengeance upon him. Urging the 
people o f the Capitol to ‘rouse our Roman gods with invocations’ (1831), 
Brutus vows to ‘revenge the death of this true wife’ (1841) and together ‘they 
swore’ (1848) to bring about ‘Tarquin’s everlasting banishment’ (1855). The 
violence experienced by Lucrece is recuperated and articulated in a political 
discourse which redefines the Romans. But, as Jacques Derrida writes, ‘[t]he 
distinction between discourse and violence always will be an inaccessible 
horizon’ (2001: 145).
Shakespeare’s Titus Andronicus and The Rape of Lucrece approach the issue o f 
sexual violence from different generic angles. Each incidence o f rape impacts 
upon the political body as well as the female body, and is therefore central to 
the tragic tenor of each work: each text maintains a teleological impetus, and 
rape becomes meaningful as the catalyst for major political change. In 
Shakespeare’s tragedy, Lavinia appears on stage as a powerful visible symbol
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of the violated body. Unable to speak, she physically represents the limitations 
tacitly imposed upon women in Rensaissance society. In contrast, a substantial 
proportion o f the narrative poem is devoted to Lucrece’s voice. In both 
instances, however, the women encounter severe representational difficulties.
Shakespeare’s representations o f rape call attention to, and contribute to the 
process o f prioritising and marginalising the various meanings o f sexual 
assault. In Renaissance England, rape constituted a threat against which the 
full significance o f the discursively produced values o f female conduct could 
be realised. The process o f ascribing meanings necessarily involves the 
dominant ideology’s active suppression and exclusion o f many other possible 
meanings. These texts explore the way in which violence is done to women by 
the signifying process itself and demonstrate the suffering caused by the 
operations o f language. Each text highlights the impossibility of ever providing 
an accurate representation o f events. Lavinia must represent herself through 
an inadequate but culturally familiar narrative and Lucrece finds that her 
meanings disappear in a ‘helpless smoke of words’. The full realities o f their 
experiences o f violence are not registered in the symbolic order because their 
bodies, which function as signifiers, are appropriated by the hegemonic 
patriarchal ideology and assigned a meaning through a process over which 
they have no control. But simultaneously, Lucrece and Lavinia are subject to 
the symbolic order in which the patriarchal interpretations o f their chaste and 
violated bodies assume a relational significance. Consequently, the language in 
which their experiences are articulated is, as Katherine Eisaman Maus suggests
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‘as much constitutive and symptomatic’ (1986: 72). Shakespeare’s
representations o f rape demonstrate that language and violence are 
inseparable: it is language which enables violence to assume a cultural 
currency, and to become something communicable. It is through language that 
meanings are ascribed to violent acts, but a violent act, like a linguistic 
signifier, does not have an innate and fixed correspondence with the meaning 
it assumes.
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Chapter Four 
‘Death made an end of them’1
I
In his study o f mortality and identity in the English Renaissance, Michael Neill 
argues that ‘tragedy ... was among the principal instruments by which the 
culture o f early modern England reinvented death" (1997: 3). It is my 
contention that the violent spectacle of public execution can be identified as 
another agent in this process of reinvention. The brutal realities o f state 
executions informed the experiences o f the early modern public, directly 
influencing the way in which death was represented and conceptualised. As J. 
A. Sharpe has noted, executions ‘took place at, or at least near, the grass roots 
of ... society’ (1985: 166), and it was the intention o f the state that these 
demonstrations o f power be highly visible and fulfil a didactic function, 
thereby contributing towards an exceptionally violent form of social 
subjection.
The spectacle o f execution involved violence on a level qualitatively and 
quantitatively unparalleled in Renaissance England. On average, more than 
375 people were executed each year during the reigns o f Elizabeth I and James 
I (Barker 1993: 173).2 Hanging was the most common form of capital 
punishment, and was, without exception, a horrific affair: it was unthinkably
1 A shorter version o f this chapter is published as “Death Made an End o f Them’: Narrative 
Representations o f  Executions in the English Renaissance’ in The Aesthetics and Pragmatics o f  
Violence, Hensen and Pankratz (eds.) (2001: 57-67).
2 Barker notes that this figure only represents a portion of the number o f people executed annually 
during the period. It does not take account o f the executions passed by the higher courts or those 
occasioned by the special sessions o f Oyer and Terminer (1993: 169-179). For a detailed 
breakdown o f  the assize records see Cockbum (1985).
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painful, intentionally degrading and physical shame and lasting infamy were
explicit aims of the punishment The classical treatise on rhetoric A d  Herenium
advises on the art o f memory explaining that ‘[w]e ought ... to set up images
o f a kind that can adhere longest in memory. And we shall do so ... if we
somehow disfigure them, as by introducing one stained with blood’ (cited in
Yates 1966: 25-26). The physical realities o f an execution were undoubtedly
rendered memorable with the stain o f blood, as Francis Barker describes:
Men, women and children in ‘Shakespeare’s England’ were 
strung up on permanent or makeshift gallows by a hempen 
noose. Sometimes the spinal chord was snapped at once; or 
they hung by their necks until they suffocated or drowned;
until their brains died o f hypoxeia, or until the shock killed
them. Pissing and shitting themselves. Bleeding from their 
eyes (1993: 190).
People regularly gathered in large numbers to watch public executions. Such 
displays o f the state’s authority were indeed highly memorable. For the most 
serious offences, however, the violence of the punishment was further 
intensified.3
On 20 and 21 September 1586, fourteen men were executed for their 
involvement in the Babington conspiracy. Sir Francis Walsingham’s extensive 
intelligence network had discovered a plot to assassinate Elizabeth I and install 
the Roman Catholic Mary Stuart on the throne. In August the conspirators
3 Julius Ruff notes that ‘[i]n print materials describing executions, the vast majority o f the 
condemned die for homicide. But murder was not the most frequent capital offence, at least in 
England where statistics from court records have been compared to the numbers o f murderers in 
popular literature. Indeed, three-quarters o f sixteenth- and seventeenth-century executions in some 
English jurisdictions were for mundane crimes against property, not murder (2001: 30).
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were tried and convicted, before being condemned to death with the 
customary death sentence for high treason:
You are to be drawn upon a hurdle to the place of execution, 
and there you are to be hanged by the neck, and being alive 
cut down, and your privy-members to be cut off, and your 
bowels to be taken out o f your belly and there burned, you 
being alive; and your head to be cut off, and your body to be 
divided into four quarters, and that your head and quarters be 
disposed o f where his majesty shall think fit (Baker 1977: 42).
On the day o f their execution, the men were taken from the Tower through
London to Holborne, and in accordance with convention, would probably
have stopped en route for a last drink. After a lengthy procession, the men
amved at an area near St. Giles where an unusually high scaffold had been
erected in anticipation o f a massive crowd.
The dramatic discovery o f the conspiracy and the severe punishment meted 
out to the conspirators gave rise to a number of ballads, pamphlets and 
broadsides. Here, the focus will be on one account o f the executions, written 
by George Whetsone. His narrative describes the events from a Protestant 
viewpoint, and is dedicated to William Cecil, Lord Burleigh, the chief advisor 
to Elizabeth I. Whetstone’s ‘Censure of a loyall Subject’ is written in the form 
of a dialogue between three men; Walker, ‘a godlie devine , Weston a discreet 
Gentleman’, and Wilcocks, ‘a substantial Clothier’ (1587: A3r). The dialogue 
opens with Wilcocks’s news that:
fourteene o f those ranke traitors that sought to bereave the 
Queenes most excellent Maiestie of her life ... have made 
their confession at the gallowes: for my eies saw their 
traiterous harts burned, and bodilesse heads advanced to the 
view and comfort of manye thousands of people (1587. A3r).
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The subsequent description o f the hangings and disembowellings as ‘a happie 
sight’ makes it clear that the spectators were encouraged to share a common 
gratification in the administration o f justice. Despite the horrific nature o f  the 
punishments, spectators were, as Foucault claims, required to be "witnesses, 
the guarantors o f the punishment, and ... they must to a certain extent take 
partin  it’ (1979: 58).
By representing the events o f the executions in narrative form, Whetstone
contributed to a broadening cultural network that enabled public participation.
Those who read about the fate o f Babington and his confederates also had
access to the spectacle and, to a certain extent, were implicated in its effects.
Participation at every level was instrumental in structuring the systems of
belief that became central to people’s lived experience. Zizek explains that,
An individual experiences his society not as a mere collection 
o f individuals but as an order which transcends these 
individuals and forms the substance of their lives — and i t ... is 
purely virtual, a symbolic fiction, since it exists merely as the 
presupposition, by each of the individuals, of the already- 
existing co-ordination of all other individuals (1996a: 139- 
140).
Elizabeth’s government sought to exploit this mutual presupposition in an 
attempt to shape the dominant "symbolic fiction. Indeed, Whetstone s 
decision to seek patronage from Lord Burleigh was predicated upon a specific 
set o f  "presuppositions’. The application was made in an attempt to elicit 
personal support from an authoritative figure; however, in making such an
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appeal he was simultaneously producing this same authority. Although public 
displays o f state power were employed to signify a transcendent order, they 
were not the products o f a monolithic authority. As Peter Lake and Michael 
Questier argue, ‘the English Protestant state was forced to enter a religious 
and ideological arena that no one group could entirely hope to dominate or 
control’ (1996: 73). Therefore, rather than being static and uniform, the 
‘symbolic fictions’ operating in Elizabethan society were constituted in conflict 
and were continually evolving.
The presuppositions that constitute ‘symbolic fictions’ thrive within linguistic
structures, but are also structured by the potentially violent operations of
language. As Lecercle argues, ‘violence in language ... must be taken literally —
not the violence o f the symbol, but the violence o f intervention, o f an event
the immateriality o f which does not prevent it from having material effects’
(1990: 227). When the death sentence was issued, extreme violence was
enacted upon the bodies o f the traitors:
The first day the Traitors were all placed upon the scaffolde, 
that the one might beholde the reward of his fellowes 
treason. Ballard the Priest, who was the first broacher o f this 
treason: was the first that was executed, and after that his 
bowels and traiterous heart were thrown into the fire, (his 
head severed from his shoulders,) was set upon the toppe of 
the Gallowes (1587: B lr).
The teleological thrust of the day’s ceremony culminated in a tangible 
demonstration o f the authority of the state. The triumphant publication o f the
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traitors3 bodies provided a memorable climax to an ideological drama o f the 
highest order.
The first group o f seven had been executed ‘with lesse favour, then the latter
seven ... somewhat neere the severity of their judgement’ (1587: A4V).
Wilcocks remarked that, ‘there appeared no sadnesse or alteration among the
people at the mangling and quartering o f their bodies: yea, the whole
multitude, without any signe o f lamentation greedylye behelde the spectacle
from the first to the last’ (1587: B lv). Yet, in response to public reaction, the
second seven were treated less severely and were hanged until they were dead
before the full extent o f the sentence was enforced. Public discomfort with the
extraordinarily severe, but less frequent violence of a hanging, drawing and
quartering was not uncommon. In his essay ‘On Cruelty’, Michel de
Monataigne writes o f his experience in Italy:
I found myself in Rome at the very moment when they were 
dispatching a notorious thief called Catena. The crowd 
showed no emotion when he was strangled, but when they 
proceeded to quarter him the executioner never struck a blow 
without the people accompanying it with a plaintive cry and 
exclamation, as if each person had transferred his own 
feelings to that carcass ... My advice would be that exemplary 
severity intended to keep the populace to their duty should be 
practiced not on criminals but on their corpses: for to see 
their corpses deprived of burial, boiled or quartered would 
strike the common people virtually as much as pains inflicted 
on the living, though in reality they amount to little or 
nothing ... Such inhuman excess should be directed against 
the dead bark not the living tree (1991: 180-181).
Despite the undoubted affective power of witnessing an execution of this
kind, in W hetstone’s account, it seems to have been thought necessary that the
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narrative provide a representation o f events that implied people’s full support 
for the actions o f the state. This conception is dependent upon the idea that 
structures o f power must be fully internalised in order to function. However, 
Zizek suggests that ‘this “internalisation”, by structural necessity, never fully 
succeeds ... there is always a residue, a leftover ... this leftover, fa r from hindering the 
fu ll submission of the subject to the ideological command, is the very condition of it (1989: 
43). Therefore, a sense o f gratification was not fostered solely by the horrific 
spectacle o f violence.
Accounts paired detailed descriptions o f the physical realities o f the executions
with protracted reflections upon the nature of sovereign authority and civil
obedience. Sharpe observes that ‘public executions were not merely displays o f
brutality, but rather attempts by the authorities to exert ideological control, to
reassert certain values o f obedience and conformity’ (1985: 158). Within the
dialogue, the attempt on the Queen’s life is represented as a threat, not only to
her, but also to her subjects. Walker maintains that,
the kind affection and motherly love that her Majestie 
published by her gratious letters, unto the L. Mayor and state 
o f London ... are causes strong enough to commaunde the 
multitude to rejoice in nothing more, then in the destruction 
o f those that pretend any hurte unto her Majesties person 
(1587: B lr).
One o f the ‘gratious letters’ referred to here is Elizabeth s letter of 18 August 
1586, which was addressed to the Lord Mayor and citizens o f London. In this 
text, she thanks her subjects for their loyalty and communicates her sense of 
their shared pleasure in the apprehension of Babington and the other
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conspirators. She begins by asserting that we did not so much rejoice at the 
escape of the intended attempt against our person, as to see the great joy our 
most loving subjects took at the apprehension of the contrivers thereof (2000: 
285). In doing so, she provides a representation of her subjects specifically 
intended for their consumption, in which their affection and loyalty are said to 
be integral to her sovereignty. This idea is developed with her assurance that 
‘we desire no longer to live than while we may in the whole course of our 
government carry ourself in such sort as may not only nourish and continue 
their love and goodwill towards us, but also increase the same’ (2000: 285). 
The reciprocal nature o f the relationship between the sovereign and her 
subjects is affirmed by the idea that as a ‘power exerted on a subject, subjection 
is nevertheless a power assumed by the subject’ (Buder 1997: 11). This 
relationship was, therefore, central to the way in which the values o f obedience 
and conformity were promoted.
Whetstone’s account o f events was not only engaged in promoting obedience 
and conformity, but also formed part of larger attempt to record the 
importance o f the case for posterity. Throughout the text, however, we are 
confronted with conflicting ways of understanding the historical significance 
of the events. This conflict is most strongly expressed in the tension between a 
providentialist account, notably argued by Calvin who believed that, the order, 
method, end and necessity of events are, for the most part, hidden in the 
counsel o f G od’ (1949: I.xvi.9) and a burgeoning secular philosophy, derived 
from humanist teaching. Machiavelli’s renowned exposition of statecraft, The
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Prince, exemplifies the humanist tradition, detailing the importance of human 
agency. He remarks that,
Many have held and hold the opinion that events are 
controlled by fortune and by God in such a way that the 
prudence o f men cannot modify them ... I believe that it is 
probably true that fortune is the arbiter of half the things we 
do, leaving the other half or so to be controlled by ourselves.
I compare fortune to one of those violent rivers which, when 
they are enraged, flood the plains, tear down trees and 
buildings, wash soil from one place to deposit it in another. 
Everyone flees before them, everybody yields to their 
impetus, there is no possibility o f resistance. Yet although 
such is their nature, it does not follow that when they are 
flowing quietly one cannot take precautions, constructing 
dykes and embankments so that when the river is in flood 
they would keep to one channel or their impetus will be less 
wild and dangerous. So it is with fortune (1981: 130).
The providentialist and humanist approaches to the notion o f causality are 
very different, but they share an uncertainty as to whether history followed a 
linear or cyclical pattern.
Ronald Knowles suggests that ‘Renaissance historiography largely secularised 
history by limiting the focus to secondary causes; that is, causation was seen in 
human terms’ (Shakespeare 1999: 76). Indeed, the Reformation had many 
secularising contingencies and a consequence of Reformed theology s 
insistence on the distance between man and God was an abandonment o f the 
belief that the material world was suffused with a divine essence. The 
dynamics o f worldly affairs were, therefore, increasingly understood in human 
terms. However, in Whetstone’s documentation of contemporary events there 
are very real tensions between the humanist ideal of personal accountability
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and the Christian doctrine o f divine providence. Not only did each system o f 
belief offer a conceptual framework to enable individuals to make sense o f 
their own mortality, but also, they each provided the state with an effective 
means o f ensuring social order. The texts that emerge as the articulation o f 
this conflict are indissoluble from the development o f the Renaissance 
subject's sense o f self.
In her study o f providence in Early Modern England, Alexandra Walsham 
explains that ‘providentialism played a pivotal role in forging a collective 
Protestant consciousness, a sense o f confessional national identity which fused 
anti-Catholic feeling and patriotic feeling and which united the elite with their 
social inferiors’ (1999: 5). By insisting upon the divine right of kings, Elizabeth 
I used the providentialist doctrine to perpetuate the mystification o f her 
power, with a view to maintaining her subjects’ reverence. She made deliberate 
and repeated reference to the unknowable powers of god in an attempt to 
emphasise her indefeasible authority over her subjects. Stephen Greenblatt 
asserts:
The providentialist doctrine that provided the interpretive 
framework for a central strain o f Tudor historiography was 
also the basis for both the political discourse that legitimated 
the Elizabethan state and the personality cult that exalted the 
Queen (1980: 166).
However, this was not the only means by which Elizabeth sought to 
consolidate her authority. It was also politically expedient to stress the role of 
the individual in maintaining social order. The “Homily on O bedience, which
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was reprinted several times during Elizabeth’s reign, expounded the 
importance o f personal responsibility, advising that T o r as much as G O D  
hath created and disposed all/ things in a comely order ... we also ought ... to 
observe and keepe a due order, and bee obedient to the powers’ (1563: II. 1-5). 
Whilst this text was firmly rooted in religious discourse, Elizabeth’s own 
letters and speeches encouraged an order based around a finely balanced 
combination o f humanist and providentialist ideologies.
Elizabeth’s response to the discovery o f the Babington plot and the 
confirmation that Mary, Queen o f Scots had been plotting against her required 
a careful negotiation o f this fragile balance. The government were eager that 
Mary should be executed but Elizabeth did not agree to this immediately, 
characteristically prolonging her decision. Responding to parliamentary 
petitions calling for Mary’s execution, Elizabeth played for time and 
formulated a measured reply. Her speech, delivered to the committees o f both 
houses, provided an explanation for the delay, demonstrating her attempts to 
achieve a politically useful balance between the providential and humanist 
discourses:
Considering the manifold dangers intended and practised 
against me, which through the goodness of almighty God I 
have always escaped, I must needs say it is admirable and 
miraculous (if that be a miracle which is beyond and above 
the reason of man) that now I live. Yet do I not thank God 
for that nor for all the rest so much as for this: that for after 
twenty-eight years’ reign I do not perceive any diminition of 
my subjects good love and affection towards me. This is the 
thing I most joy in and that wherein I take my greatest 
comfort (2000: 186).
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Her appeals to the love and affection of her subjects were intended to 
establish a dynamic interaction between sovereignty and subjection. By 
asserting that the actions o f her subjects had a direct impact on her 
effectiveness as a leader, she was explicitly advocating the importance of 
human agency. Simultaneously, she was keen to stress that God’s protection 
against the attempts on her life was nothing short o f miraculous. She was 
reluctant, however, to mention her indebtedness to the government’s 
extensive intelligence network, arguably one of the most sophisticated in 
Europe.
An integral aspect o f her leadership, therefore, was providing a successful and
visible negotiation o f the political challenges o f Renaissance England. Stephen
Greenblatt argues that,
[s]he was a living representation of the immutable within 
time, a fiction of permanence. Through her, society achieved 
symbolic immortality and acted out the myth of a perfectly 
stable world, a world which replaces the flux of history.
(1980: 167)
In high profile incidents like the Babington plot, the spectacular deaths o f the 
traitors provided a shocking contrast to the perceived immortality o f the 
queen. Elowever, one o f the ways in which the Elizabethan state retained a 
‘fiction o f permanence’ was in its treatment of those who tried to overthrow 
the established order.
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Engaging with the production of this ‘fiction o f permanence’ Whetstone’s
dialogic treatment o f these events was part of a body o f texts that contributed
to the conceptual framework from within which the agency of an Elizabethan
subject was circumscribed. Julius Ruff notes that ‘[publishers o f pamphlets
and litde books, like those of broadsheets ... realized that tales o f the
monstrous, supernatural, catastrophic, criminal, and violent always yielded
many sales’ (2001: 25). By purchasing and reading this account the individual
became a consumer, literally buying into a set of state-sponsored ideologies.
Therefore, acts o f narrative production and consumption influenced the
continuously changing conditions upon which subjectivity was predicated.
Zizek explains that,
‘Subjectivization’ ... consists in the purely formal gesture o f 
symbolic conversion by means of which the subject integrates 
into this symbolic universe — turns into part and parcel of his 
life-narrative, provides with meaning — the meaningless 
contingency o f his destiny (1996a: 94).
By aligning themselves with the agency of sovereign authority, and taking 
pleasure in the successes o f the legal system, Elizabethan subjects integrated 
their ‘meaningless contingency’ into the ‘symbolic universe of the state.
The process o f integration was not only for those who bore dutifull hearts, 
however. At the scaffold, the guilty were provided with an opportunity to 
demonstrate an acceptance o f their subjection to the very same authority that 
had condemned them to death. Sharpe states that, in most cases for which 
we have evidence, the convicted persons seemed perfectly happy to accept the
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role allotted to them in public executions’ (1985: 156). This would suggest 
that subjection is not simply, or even predominantly, a process comparable to 
subjugation. Rather, it is a process that is both required and desired by the 
subject. This is indicated by the importance attached to the traitors’ final 
speeches, which were a crucial component o f the execution ceremony, not 
only for the authorities but also for the individual. As well as their didactic 
function, speeches afforded the traitors a chance to display their contrition 
and ultimate conformity, thereby ensuring that they ‘died well’. On occasions, 
the condemned were unable to fulfil this role, either due to nerves or extreme 
drunkenness. More commonly, however, when facing death, they were so 
conscientious in their efforts to confess all their wrongdoings that their 
speeches became extremely lengthy affairs.
This was not the case with the confessions of two of the Babington 
conspirators, John Ballard and Robert Barnwell. The priest Ballard, ‘to declare 
(at full) his traiterous mind ... said, I am sory I have bin so scandalous, but 
most sorry I have bin so remis in my delings’ (1587: B2V). Barnwell s 
statement, in which he made ‘conscience his best excuse, was similarly
unsatisfactory. Walker explains:
He had had but a rotten conscience that was infected with the 
murther o f a vertuous Queene: and since his conscience was 
so bad, I hope but a fewe that heard him, but forbad their 
conscience to pitty him, other than charitably to be sorrowful 
for his error, which was damnable (1587: Cv).
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Nevertheless, their confederate, Chediok Tichburn, did conform to expiatory
protocols. Shortly before his execution, he demonstrated an acceptance o f his
impending death in verse form and on the day o f his execution, his final
speech publicized his contrition and, consequently, was received more
favourably than those o f his fellow conspirators.4 Before the crowds that had
gathered, he exclaimed:
alas for my offence I have brought my self unto this miserie, 
by which my good mother, my loving wife, my four brethren, 
and six sisters, yea our whole house, never before attainted, is 
infamed, and our posterity ever like to be undone (1587: C lr).
The anxieties that Tichburn revealed in his confession are symptomatic o f the 
Renaissance preoccupation with mortality. He was concerned about the way 
in which he would be remembered after his death, and sought to die 
memorably rather than notoriously. However, the possibility o f this was 
conditional upon his acknowledgement that his formation as a subject was 
dependent upon the same structures of power that threatened to annihilate
4 Tichburn wrote his own epigraph shortly before his death:
My prime o f youth is but a froste o f cares:
My feaste o f joy, is but a dishe of payne:
My cropp o f come, is but a field of tares:
And all my good is but vaine hope o f gaine: 
The daye is gone, and yet I sawe no sonn:
And no we I live, and no we my life is donn
The spring is paste, and yet it hath not sprong 
The fruit is deade, and yet the leaves are greene 
My youth is gone, and yet I am but yonge 
I saw the world, and yet I was not seene 
My threed I cutt, and yet it was not sponn 
And now I lyve, and now my life is donn.
I saught my death, and found it in my wombe 
I lookte for life, and sawe it was a shade.
I trode the earth and knewe it was my Tombe 
And nowe I die, and nowe I am but made 
The glasse is full, and nowe the glass is rune 
And nowe 1 live, and now my life is donn.
(Norbrook 1993: 630)
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him. Therefore, he chose to accept the allotted role because it appeared to 
confer a coherent and enduring identity upon him. As Karl Marx has 
suggested, ‘[m]en make their own history, but they do not make it just as they 
please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves’ (1963: 
15).
The mutually constitutive relationship between the state and its subjects was
fundamental to the way in which death was understood. Moreover, the
identity that it conferred upon social subjects was an indispensable factor in
maintaining obedience to the sovereign. Robert Watson argues that:
It must have required a very precise calibration for 
Renaissance Christians ... to sustain a recognition of death 
without entertaining a suspicion of mere oblivion; yet on the 
distinction they had rested the entire moral order o f their 
society (1999: 16).
Whetstone’s account is an example of the literature that evolved out o f an 
intense and pervasive fear of mortality. By making a spectacle out of the 
deaths o f a few, the Tudor state encouraged the obedience of the multitude. 
Therefore, rather than being a peripheral concern, people’s perception o f 
death was central to the way they lived.
A radical restructuring o f the culturally constructed fictions of death became 
necessary in this society, which was confronting a number of unprecedented 
challenges. The latent but pervasive threat of the plague was a major factor in 
changing attitudes to death. Established burial rites temporarily became
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impracticable by virtue o f the large numbers of people affected during an 
outbreak.5 Because rituals attached a series of culturally coded meanings to 
the void left by a death, working retrospectively to confer a coherent identity 
upon the dead, they fundamentally shaped people’s experience of loss. Ritual 
practice was unavoidably suspended, however, at the very times when it was 
most needed to make sense of the overwhelming loss o f life. Literature, art 
and other aspects o f popular culture therefore assumed an even greater role in 
the process o f reconciling people’s heightened consciousness of mortality with 
their own conditions o f existence. Representing the events o f death on the 
stage, in texts, or in balladry, went some way to alleviate the tangible fear of 
death as complete annihilation. This was effected by offering the possibility o f 
memorialisation, o f a distinct identity enduring after death. Indeed, as Neill 
explains, all cultural products of this kind must be considered ‘in terms o f a 
wider preoccupation with the importance of remembrance in a culture forced 
to devise new ways o f accommodating itself to the experience o f mortality’ 
(1997: 38). Moreover, the process whereby a culture represents its 
understanding o f mortality to itself can be regarded as fundamental to the way 
in which its social subjects are constituted.
Frederic Jameson reminds us that reading texts from a political perspective is 
not a supplementary consideration ‘but rather ... the absolute hori2on of all 
reading and all interpretation’ (1981: 17). Execution narratives are overtly
5 An outbreak o f plague closed the London theatres in the summer of 1592, when Henry VI Part 
One, the focus o f the later half o f this chapter, was first performed.
political texts, invariably communicating a clear sense o f their intended or 
implied reader. For this reason, the accounts are of interest not only for their 
engagement with descriptions of violent punishment, but because these texts, 
as narrative representations, may be identified as the sites o f violence. It is my 
contention that these narratives, as intrinsically political products, cannot be 
dissociated from their implications for the social subject. That is to say, they 
cannot be considered in isolation from their involvement with the violent 
process o f social subjection. By their very nature, they are bound up with the 
exploration and exploitation of the ‘essential affinity between death ... and the 
self-representation o f language’ (Foucault, 1977: 55). Indeed, as Foucault 
suggests, ‘the approach of death -  its sovereign gesture, its prominence within 
human memory -  hollows out in the present and in existence the void toward 
which and from which we speak’ (1977: 53). The ‘intimate link between 
language and death is ... a philosophical commonplace with a long and 
venerable pedigree’ (Foucault 1977: 151); however, the formulation of this link 
is continually changing as the structures of language work to formulate identity 
in the face of absence and annihilation. Whilst the tragic drama of the theatre 
worked to establish the aesthetic ideal of a noble death, the legal system 
worked concurrently to produce a tangible fear of an infamous death. In a 
complex mediation of cultural anxieties, the spectacle of execution was used as 
a means of promoting civil obedience. Hanging, drawing and quartering 
physically and symbolically inscribed the markers of treason, whilst the custom 
of the last dying speech was an expedient method of demonstrating the 
benefits of dutiful subjectivity as well as the consequences of nonconformity.
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The Elizabethan administration used various forms of violence as political 
tools, in a complicated process o f differentiation. Sovereign authority was 
carefully and continually crafted, made manifest in constantly evolving 
representations. Popular perceptions o f death were manipulated during public 
executions, as the agonistic authority o f the state was violently inscribed upon 
the bodies o f the traitors, literally transfiguring them. The subsequent 
narratives not only served to replicate this, but also to sustain, mediate and 
augment both the violence and its effects. Therefore, as well as effecting 
further violence, Whetstone’s account, as the locus of competing discourses, 
was constituted in and through the violent process o f subjection.
II
Wilcocks’ cautionary invective warns that ‘the general reward of treason is the 
destruction of traitors: and for that, shame and perpetual infamie lead them to 
the Gallowes’ (1587: B2r). Whetstone’s dialogue is one o f a number o f texts 
that perpetuates the infamy, if not the shame o f the Babington conspirators. 
Leonard Tennenhouse suggests, however, that ‘[t]he strategies of the theatre 
resembled those o f the scaffold’ (1986: 163) and indeed the theatre was 
similarly engaged with the processes of commemoration and memorialisation. 
Thomas Nashe argued that ‘there is no immortalitie can be given a man on 
earth like unto Playes’ (1958 Vol.I: 213) and the singular influence that he 
attributes to the theatre is based upon an understanding of drama as an 
especially pervasive aspect o f Renaissance popular culture. As Louis Montrose
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suggests, both c[t]hose who attacked the theatre and those who defended it 
were agreed upon its compelling affective powers.’ (1996: 49). Nashe, writing 
in 1592, referring to Shakespeare’s play, I  Heniy VI, which had recently been 
performed, wrote,
the subject o f them ... is borrowed out o f our English 
Chronicles, wherein our forefathers valiant acts (that have 
line long buried in rustie brasse and worme-eaten bookes) are 
revived, and they themselves raised from the Grave o f 
Oblivion (1958: 212).
However, the process o f ‘building representations with past materials’ (de 
Certeau 1988: 6), o f representing one’s ‘forefathers valiant acts’, is always 
culturally sensitive. Invariably, the production of history not only 
communicates a society’s sense o f its past, but also of its present; 
consequently, the dramatic revivals proposed by Nashe were inescapably 
structured by the conditions under which they were produced.
During the 1580s Catholic threats to Elizabeth I, both at home and abroad, 
had a profound effect upon cultural consciousness. The implicit tolerance o f 
religious differences which had characterised the first two decades o f 
Elizabeth’s reign was abandoned and anti-Catholic sentiment prevailed. In 
addition to the Babington conspiracy in 1586, King Philip II s Armada 
threatened to invade England in 1588. Recusancy was no longer managed by 
the collection o f fines, but was aggressively pursued through legal channels, 
and Catholic priests were tried and executed for high treason. An account o f 
the execution o f John Weldon details this transgression.
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John Weldon Priest ... was indited ... for that he being bom  
within her Majesties dominions, was not onely made Priest at 
Parris, by authoritye derived from the sea o f Rome, contrarie 
to the lawes of this realme, but had also traiterouslie 
afterwards entred into this lande, sent by the Pope or his 
Substitutes, to execute the office of a Seminarie Priest here, 
contrary to an estatute in that behalf provided: by vertue 
whereof, he was indicted of high treason (1588: A4V).
The traitorous body became the focus for intense cultural scrutiny. Displayed 
publicly to largely enthusiastic crowds in attendance at executions and 
depicted in written accounts of their deaths that were circulated soon after, it 
became a signifier o f the effectiveness of divine and political agency. The 
history plays, which proved extremely popular in the 1590s, were written and 
performed in this politico-religious climate. The events they depicted were 
subject to a process o f reinterpretation and re-evaluation, which served to 
explore their significance as a means of understanding, representing and 
articulating contemporary concerns. But, as Stephen Greenblatt reminds us, 
‘Shakespeare’s theatre was not ... merely the passive reflector of social and 
ideological forces that lay entirely outside of it’ (1985: 32), and the history 
plays do not provide an uncritical reflection of the state s ideological position. 
In the theatre, the meanings ascribed to the traitorous body were subject to 
contestation.
In addition to the political and religious threats posed by Catholicism, periodic 
outbreaks o f the plague weighed heavily on people s minds. During the 
Renaissance, whole communities struggled to come to terms with the
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increasing and overwhelming mortality rate that inevitably accompanied the
outbreaks, and religious rites were frequently suspended out o f practical
necessity. However, there was an increasing movement towards a secular
understanding o f the world. Our understanding of death, as I have argued,
informs the way we live and because popular conceptions o f death were
necessarily implicated in this changing attitude, new forms of collective social
experience were required to accommodate the transition. Neill explains:
Eloquent testimony to the progressive secularization of death 
can be found in the complaints levelled by contemporary 
commentators at the increasing worldliness of funeral rites 
and mortuary art, in which they themselves diagnosed a 
culpable weakening of confidence in Christian prescriptions 
for the taming of death. Tragedy itself is among the most 
important cultural expressions of this secularization process: 
to understand the nature of the crisis which it addressed, and 
to appreciated the power of the representations through 
which it helped to reinvent the experience of death, we need 
to look not at the mechanisms that were designed to keep 
death in its place, but at those which attempted to assign it a 
new one (Neill 1997: 48).
The violence o f execution, which was instrumental to the process o f assigning 
new meanings to death, figures in many of Shakespeare’s plays.6 However, 
following on from the discussion of Whetstone’s Censure of a Coy all Subject, the 
focus here will be on the reading of history, and more specifically, the 
treatment o f the link between violence, death, memorialisation and infamy, in I  
Herny 1/7, which culminates in the execution of a Catholic. Through its 
representations o f violence, and specifically, the violent deaths o f traitors,
See, for example, the execution o f the Clown in Titus Andronicus (for a discussion of this 
specific incident, see Francis Barker [1993: 165-206]); Measure for Measure, where the dramatic 
action is played out under the shadow o f Claudio’s impending execution, King Lear where 
Cordelia is hanged, and Cymbeline, where Posthumous escapes the gallows.
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enemies and worthy subjects, this play provides a distinctive interrogation o f 
the way in which death and the manner of dying are made socially and 
politically meaningful. What is more, it brings about a confrontation between 
divergent and often conflicting conceptual systems, which combined to form a 
historical narrative in which power is shown to be operating in an often- 
fragmentary and uncoordinated fashion. In doing so, the play exposes the way 
in which the production of history is structured by violent contestation. This is 
not only a profoundly political process, which strives to confer meaning 
retrospectively upon violent acts and systemic practices of violence, but also 
these narratives, as they are used contemporaneously, effect a form o f violence 
as they work to sustain the interests o f the dominant ideology by legitimising 
and reaffirming the subordination o f the marginalized.
The social and political anxieties o f Renaissance England not only affected 
Shakespeare’s representations of the War o f the Roses but also the ways in 
which his representations were used. The dramatisations o f the conflicts 
between the houses o f York and Lancaster were included in the First Folio as 
history plays. However, in that edition, not all plays retained the classification 
they had borne in the quartos. Many plays previously purported to be 
histories, such as the True Chronicle Historie of the LJfe and Death of King Tear and 
his three Daughters, were included as tragedies, and conversely, titles such as The 
True Tragedie of Tichard Duke of Yorke, were subsequently put forward as 
histories (Campbell 1947: 8). Neill suggests that ‘tragedy realises itself as a 
genre devoted to fantasies of moral transcendence (1997: 48), a concept
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intimately bound up with the idea o f immortality. Nevertheless, whilst the 
notion o f memorialisation is common to both genres, Neill’s formulation does 
not account for the dynamics of the history or chronicle play. Rather than 
pursuing ‘a powerful aesthetic of closure’ (1997: 48), the history plays engage 
with the process o f memorialisation.
Shakespeare’s first tetralogy opens with the funeral of Henry V. The Duke o f
Bedford, Regent o f France, mourns his loss:
Hung be the heavens with black. Yield day to night.
Comets, importing change o f times and states,
Brandish your crystal tresses in the sky 
And with them scourge the bad revolting stars 
That have consented unto Henry’s death —
King Henry the Fifth, too famous to live long.
England’s ne’er lost a king o f so much worth.
(I.i.1-7)
The imposing visual presence o f Henry’s coffin is accompanied by the 
rhetorical invocation o f the signs of death. Comets, known to signal the death 
of a great man, menacingly ‘brandish’ their markers of mortality in a poignant 
testimonial to Henry, who once with ‘His brandished sword did blind men 
with his beams’ (Li. 10). Henry, ‘too famous to live long’, would nevertheless 
be immortalised on the stage and become ‘That ever-living man of 
memory,/Henry the Fifth’ (IV.iii.51-52).
Only a few lines later, however, Exeter questions the efficacy of the death 
march with which Henry’s coffin is brought on stage and the ceremony with 
which he is commemorated. Exeter remarks simply, ‘Henry is dead, and never
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shall revive’ (I.i. 18) and claims that death has won a ‘dishonourable victory’ 
(I.i.20). Henry represents a heroic ideal that was underpinned by a composite 
structure o f humanist and providentialist values, but whose fragility is 
immediately exposed in the wrangling which erupts between the Duke o f 
Gloucester and the Bishop of Winchester. Remembering Henry’s life, 
Gloucester stresses his personal achievements and the ‘Virtue he had, 
deserving to command’ (Li.9), whilst Winchester identifies God’s hand, 
asserting ‘He was a king, blest o f the King of kings’ (I.i.28). The conflict 
escalates with Winchester’s assertion that ‘The Church’s prayers made him so 
prosperous’ (I.i.32). Gloucester vehemently rejects this claim, countering ‘The 
Church? Where is it? Had not churchmen prayed,/ His thread of life had not 
so soon decayed’ (I.i.33-34). Within moments, the King ‘o f so much worth’, 
whose corpse remains onstage in full view, is in danger o f being obscured by 
the very discourse that purportedly describes him.7
The mourners struggle to understand Henry’s premature death, and 
searchingly invoke a higher power, symbolised variously by the ‘bad revolting 
stars’ and ‘planets of mishap’, or the ‘subtle-witted French/ Conjurers and 
sorcerers, that, afraid of him ,/ By magic verses have contrived his end (I.i.25-
7 Ulysses in Shakespeare’s Troilus and Cressida describes this process. 
Time hath ... a wallet at his back 
Wherein he puts alms for oblivion,
A great-siz’d monster o f  ingratitudes. ^
Those scraps are good deeds past, which are devour d 
As fast as they are made, forgot as soon 
As done.
(III.iii.145-150)
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27). Even Joan Puzel -  the subtie-witted French conjurer fighting for the
French - concedes his greatness, reasoning,
Glory is like a circle in the water,
Which never ceaseth to enlarge itself 
Till by broad spreading it disperse to nought.
With Henry’s death the English circle ends:
Dispersed are the glories it included.
(I.ii. 133-137)
She interprets the significance of Henry’s death within a cyclical pattern o f 
events. However, the metaphor of the circle in water, which expands outwards 
until it disappears altogether, undermines conventional conceptions of 
masculine agency. Henry’s glory has increased, we are told, not as the result of 
his own actions or o f the unseen influence of a higher power, but rather, it has 
enlarged itself. Moreover, the glory is represented by a circle which forms an 
‘O ’, and therefore always already signifies the ‘nought’ to which it tends. Joan’s 
statement makes a troubling comment upon the nature o f glory and reputation 
in patriarchal culture: the distinguishing markers o f Henry’s glory are the 
ripples in the water, but the ripples are themselves made of water. According 
to her metaphor, the distinctions conferred by glory, reputation and memory 
are fundamentally absent: identity is temporal, generated and dispelled by a 
continual motion o f displacement and dispersal.
From his funeral, which opens the play, the process of remembering Henry is 
vexed on many levels, and almost immediately we see the way in which he 
functions posthumously as a sign, whose meanings are ascribed (and 
contested) for political expediency by those that survive him. Soon after the
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funeral, Gloucester goes to the Tower and finds the guards under instruction 
from Winchester to prohibit his entry. In the heated exchange which follows, 
Gloucester denounces ‘Arrogant Winchester, that haughty prelate/ Whom 
Henry, our late sovereign, ne’er could brook’ (I.iii.23-24). Gloucester recalls 
isolated aspects of Henry’s life in order to legitimise his own use of violence in 
a manner that is symptomatic o f the politics of memorialisation. Indeed, 
Henry, the ‘ever living man o f memory’, who is only physically present in the 
play as a corpse, is dismembered rather than remembered by the way in which 
he is spoken o f after his death: as Alexander Leggatt suggests, ‘Shakespeare 
takes unusual care in Henry VJ to baffle and mock any expectation of 
completeness’ (1988: 11).
Sir John Talbot appears as one of the last representatives of the chivalric, but
somewhat outmoded ideals of Henry V. His identity is derived from his ability
to inflict violence on the batdefield, and his reputation is such that in battle
with the French his soldiers need ‘no other weapon but his name’ (II.i.81).
Talbot’s oratory upon the death o f the Earl of Salisbury, the mirror o f all
martial men’, exemplifies the military tradition that both he and Salisbury had
come to represent and demonstrates the way in which violence, in a military
context, is retrospectively encoded in a nationalistic discourse of Englishness .
Bring forth the body of old Salisbury,
And here advance it in the market-place,
The middle centre of this cursed town ...
And that hereafter ages may behold 
What ruin happened in revenge of him,
Within their chiefest temple I’ll erect 
A tomb wherein his corpse shall be interred,
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Upon the which, that everyone may read,
Shall be engraved the sack o f Orleans,
The treacherous manner of his mournful death,
And what a terror he had been to France.
(II.ii.4-17)
The French killed Salisbury, but Talbot’s speech constituted an attempt to 
efface the fatal batde wounds and to re-inscribe the corpse with the markings 
of a heroic ‘Englishness’. Talbot’s insistence that he be remembered for the 
‘terror he had been to France’ and not as their casualty, led to the call for a 
concrete reminder o f his life. By erecting a tomb and engraving the details o f 
the battle upon it, Talbot worked to ensure that his colleague remain as 
distinguished in death as he had been in life. However, this was not an entirely 
selfless action, since Salisbury’s identity was derived in part from a collective 
ideal o f nationhood shared by Talbot.
The importance o f collective identity is dramatically fore-grounded when
Talbot is invited to the Countess of Auvergne’s castle. The Countess, hoping
to circumvent the patriarchal structures, which recognise fame as an almost
exclusively masculine virtue, intends to capture the renowned Talbot in the
expectation that ‘If  all things fall out tigh t/I shall as famous be by this exploit
(II.iii.4-5). Her ambitious plan initially seems to be given credibility by the
disparity between Talbot’s reputation and his physical appearance. O n his
entrance the Countess mocks him, asking
What? Is this the man? ...
Is this the scourge o f France?
Is this the Talbot, so much feared abroad 
That with his name the mothers still their babes?
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I see report is fabulous and false.
I thought I should have seen some Hercules, 
A second Hector for his grim aspect 
And large proportion of his strong-knit limbs. 
Alas, this is a silly child, a silly dwarf:
It cannot be this weak and writhled shrimp 
Should strike such terror to his enemies.
(ILiii. 12-23)
The name ‘Talbot’ is a signifier o f violence, encoding the political meanings o f 
martial violence within wider patriarchal and nationalistic structures. However, 
the meanings attached to his name seem at odds with his physical body: the 
Countess jeeringly draws attention to his diminutive stature, describing him as 
a ‘child’, a ‘dw arf and a ‘writhled shrimp’ who falls considerably short of the 
image his name connotes. She argues that he is not the ‘scourge’ o f the French 
and, therefore, cannot be considered as the avenging agent of a higher power. 
Moreover, she claims that he cannot be compared with the Greek heroes he 
has been equated with, whose superhuman strength is assisted by the 
mediation o f the gods. She dismisses his prowess, focusing instead on a base 
physicality which, she is at pains to suggest, does not correspond to the 
language with which he has been described.
In her bid to imprison Talbot, however, the Countess foregoes the dismissive
rhetoric with which she greeted him and concedes the injuries done to France:
COUNTESS Long time thy shadow hath been thrall to me;
For in my gallery thy picture hangs.
But now the substance shall endure the like,
And I will chain these legs and arms of thine,
That hast by tyranny these many years 
Wasted our country, slain our citizens 
And sent our sons and husbands captivate...
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I laugh to see your ladyship so fond 
To think that you have aught but Talbot’s shadow 
Whereon to practice your severity.
Why? Art thou not the man?
I am indeed.
Then I have substance too.
No, no, I am but shadow of myself:
You are deceived, my substance is not here;
For what you see is but the smallest part 
And least portion o f humanity ...
Enter Soldiers 
Are you now persuaded 
That Talbot is but shadow of himself?
These are his substance, sinews, arms and strength
(II.iii.35-63)
Here, the metaphors of shadow and substance, representation and reality, are 
strained to their limits. The Countess intends to take Talbot’s physical body, 
(‘these legs and arms o f thine’) and enact the punishment that could not be 
meted out to his pictorial representation. However, upon encountering his 
actual body, she finds that this too is but a representation of a still greater 
physical body. This disruption of the distinction between the literal and the 
figurative is both symbolised and actualised in the ‘sinews, arms and strength’ 
o f the corporate military body, as Talbot demonstrates that his ability is, 
practically as well as symbolically, dependent upon others. Ultimately, the 
countess must ask his pardon, admitting, ‘I find thou art not less than fame 
hath bruited,/ And more than may be gathered by thy shape’ (II.iv.67-68). 
Despite his fame, she did in fact ‘mistake the outward composition o f his 
body’.
Ta l b o t
C o u n t e s s
T a l b o t
C o u n t e s s
T a l b o t
T a l b o t
Talbot’s fame had an additional incarnation. The patrilineal structures o f 
memorialisation are demonstrated in his exchange with his son John on the
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battlefield. Facing death, Talbot invokes a providentialist order and laments 
the influence of the ‘malignant and ill-boding stars’, warning his son, ‘thou art 
come unto a feast o f death,/ A terrible and unavoided danger’ (IV.iv.7-8). We 
are aware, however, that danger is unavoidable because, as a result o f internal 
conflict in England, Talbot does not have enough men. In a protracted 
discussion o f ways in which to surmount the insurmountable, Talbot urges 
John to escape from imminent death. Although young Talbot argues for 
‘mortality,/ Rather than life preserved with infamy’ (IV.iv.32-33), he is told, 
‘Part o f thy father may be saved in thee’ (IV.iv.38). In accordance with a 
heroic ideal, however, both men remain together in an aestheticised portrayal 
of death. Memorialisation always requires a careful balancing act between the 
values of the individual and the community that they represent, and in the 
figure o f Talbot we get a sense o f the difficulties inherent in this process. Until 
his death, he maintains his belief in a preordained order and resigns himself to 
his responsibilities to the divinely appointed sovereign, the state and his son. 
However, the providentialist rhetoric used by Talbot, and by others in their 
descriptions o f him, contrasts sharply with Joan’s remarks after his death: 
‘Him that thou magnifiest with all these titles/ Stinking and fly-blown lies here 
at our feet’ (IV.iv.187-188). Death is the only true constant and Joan’s 
penetrating comments are a reminder that Talbot s tides — the sigmfiers 
privileged by the English — are not a universally acceptable way o f recognising 
the meanings o f his death, and cannot obscure the realities of physical decay. 
She refuses to accept the linguistic encoding of Talbot s life, and instead reads 
his rotting body as a sigmfier of the levelling effects of death.
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Thomas Nashe, after watching a performance o f the play, enthused:
How it would have joyed brave Talbot (the terror o f the 
French) to thinke that after he had lyne two hundred yeares 
in his Tombe, hee should triumphe againe of the Stage, and 
have his bones newe embalmed with the teares o f ten 
thousand spectators at least ... who ... imagine they behold 
him fresh bleeding’ (1958 Vol. I: 212).
Nashe asserts that the purifying ‘fresh bleeding’ allows Talbot to resume a
prominent and memorable position in the cultural consciousness. But
memory, as Francis Barker explains, is
a set o f cultural practices which are coded as essential, but 
which in the event are either absent or crucially 
compromised. The damage done to those practices, to their 
representation and their ability to be represented can be read as 
crisis in politically effective, symbolically sanctioned discourse 
(1993: 32-33).
Shakespeare’s play exposes the ways in which the cultural practices of 
memorialisation and commemoration are indeed fundamentally compromised: 
neither the providentialist schema nor the humanist heroic ideals can 
adequately recover meaning from Talbot’s death in battle. Somehow, in the 
production o f historical narrative, as Alexander Leggatt notes, ‘Talbot, whose 
name was on every tongue while he lived, is forgotten (Leggatt 1989: 5).
In Julius Caesar,; Mark Antony observes that ‘The evil that men do lives after 
them:/ The good is oft interred with their bones’ (III.ii.76-77). Whilst Talbot s 
achievements appear to have been interred with his bones, Richard 
Plantagenet struggles to overcome the tarnished memory of his father.
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Patrilineal structures work to Richard’s disadvantage and he experiences the
material consequences o f his father’s infamy. The antithesis of noble memory,
infamy attaints Richard as a result o f his father’s political actions. Accused of
treason, the Earl o f Cambridge was denied a hand in shaping the
circumstances o f his death. Unable to manipulate his representation in the
annals o f history, the state inscribed his body and his memory with the marks
of a traitor. The material privations experienced by his progeny were a
deterrent against disobedience to the sovereign. Somerset taunts him:
Was not thy father Richard, Earl of Cambridge,
For treason executed in our late king’s days?
And by his treason stand’st not thou attainted,
Corrupted, and exempt from ancient gentry?
His trespass yet lives guilty in thy blood,
And till thou be restored thou art a yeoman
(II.iv.90-95)
Again, however, memorable events are recalled to fulfil a political function. 
Somerset invokes the infamous death of the Earl of Cambridge in support o f 
his dispute with Richard. In order to denigrate his opponent he works to 
foreground the signs o f Richard’s disgrace.
Rather than accepting the position ascribed to him, Richard seeks to fashion
his position anew. In response to Somerset’s reproach, he vows:
My father was attached, not attainted,
Condemned to die for treason, but no traitor,
And that I’ll prove on better men than Som erset...
I’ll note you in my book of memory,
To scourge you for this apprehension
(II.iv.96-101)
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In many ways, his perspective is demonstrably humanist: whilst he can do 
nothing to alter his father s legacy, he works to reduce its negative impact 
upon his life. His attitude is reminiscent o f Machiavelli’s assertion that ‘fortune 
is the arbiter o f half the things we do, leaving the other half or so to be 
controlled by ourselves’. The metaphor of the book of memory, a familiar 
image in the Renaissance concerned with spatialisation as a memory technique, 
is derived from the classical sources o f humanism, and emphasises the 
growing link between memory and textuality.8 Here, it demonstrates that 
Richard, although affected by the memory of his father, is still engaged in the 
process o f prioritising the images and meanings by which others will be 
remembered. Taking matters into his own hands, he petitions Henry VI to 
restore his titles and is later created Duke of York.
Joan Puzel, Talbot’s archrival, consistently problematises conventional notions
of memorialisation, however. From the outset she confounds all available sign
systems, continually resisting categorisation. Her first encounter with Charles
and Reignier provides a multi-layered challenge to stereotypes of femininity as
she offers herself as a soldier for the French and provides an eloquent account
of her desire to fight:
Dolphin, I am by birth a shepherd’s daughter,
My wit untrained in any kind of art...
God’s mother deigned to appear to me 
And, in a vision full o f majesty,
Willed me to leave my base vocation 
And free my country from calamity...
My courage try by combat, if thou dar st,
8 For a detailed discussion o f the memory techniques in the Renaissance see Frances E. Yates The 
Art o f  Memory (1966, London: Pimlico).
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And thou shalt find that I exceed my sex.
(I.ii.8-90)
Joan’s paternity is portrayed as a negative aspect of her past that she wishes to 
distance herself from, and in her struggle to create a new identity for herself, 
she wishes to rely upon female aid: ‘Christ’s mother helps me, else I were too 
weak’ (Lii.106). From the opening display of Flenry’s coffin, the audience 
have, as Burns suggests, been encouraged to view the ‘male body as the 
primary witness o f historical narrative’ (Shakespeare 2000: 39), but Joan’s 
insistence on her ability to pursue a traditionally masculine vocation is in itself 
subversive and her radical stance is compounded by her claims to have been 
urged to engage in violent combat by the Virgin Mary. Whilst the Countess of 
Auvergne sought fame on behalf of the ‘sons and husbands’, Joan’s dedication 
to ideals normally undertaken in the name of the father (God) is further 
complicated by her desire to fulfil her role in the name of the mother (the 
Virgin Mary). What is more, in the socio-political climate in which the play was 
written and performed, her confident commitment to the Catholic faith was 
suggestive of the motivation and potential to subvert. Her reliance upon the 
feminine and supernatural, and her unswerving belief in her own abilities, not 
only disturbs established ideas o f femininity, but o f the nature o f historical 
narrative.
The radical destabilisation Joan Puzel effects occurs at the level o f the 
signifying process itself. She exposes and manipulates the unstable but 
constitutive qualities of language, endlessly frustrating the binary logic upon
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which patriarchy is founded. She continually elides and deconstructs the 
distinctions between male and female, virgin and whore, saint and witch, 
somehow managing to keep both meanings simultaneously in play. This is 
exemplified in her name ‘Pucelle’ or ‘Puzel’, as it is given in Edward Burns’ 
edition o f the play: ‘pucelle’ means virgin, but indicates a temporary state of 
virginity, whilst ‘puzel’, means whore. In addition, as Burns suggests, the name 
carries the trace o f the phonetically similar term ‘pizzle’, meaning penis (2000: 
26). As Partridge explains, ‘the implication is probably of “penal” largeness’ 
(2001: 209) and this indicates the threat posed by her usurpation of phallic 
power. Despite Joan’s assertion that the titles given to Talbot ultimately signify 
nothing, her name is fundamental to the way she is and will be conceived. 
Indeed, in performance on the Renaissance stage, the language she uses and 
the language used by others to describe her is, not least because o f the 
convention o f using boy actors to play female parts, fundamentally 
constitutive o f her character’s physical presence.
Joan’s enemies seize upon the linguistic ambiguities that are an integral aspect 
of her character and we see their systematic attempts to do her violence 
through language. The English make concerted efforts to demonise her by 
prioritising the negative connotations, suggesting that she is unequivocally a 
whore and witch and often combining these images. During their 
confrontation in Rouen, Talbot deems her a ‘witch and a damned sorceress , 
a ‘Foul fiend of France and hag of all despite,/ Encompassed with thy lustful 
paramours’ (III.ii.37-52), and Burgundy dubs her a Vile fiend and shameless
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courtesan’ (III.ii.44). In common with the rhetoric found in texts such as 
Whetstone s, where Weston wonders ‘that men are bewitched with the 
enticements o f ... Jesuits (1587: B2r) her association with witchcraft is 
explicitly linked to Catholicism and would therefore have considerable 
currency with the play’s audience. However, it proves difficult to stabilise 
meaning in this way and Joan’s undoubted physical strength is matched by her 
capacity to appropriate the derogatory terms used to describe her and invest 
them with new value.
Joan repeatedly affirms the efficacy o f her language, and when the French win 
Orleans, she proclaims that she ‘hath performed her word’ (I.v.42). Charles is 
convinced by this, and later, in their encounter with Burgundy, calls upon her 
to ‘Speak ... and enchant him with thy words’ (III.iii.40). She is successful, and 
Burgundy remarks that he feels he has been ‘bewitched ... with her words’ 
(III.iii.58), and compares the violent effects o f her language to being battered 
by a ‘roaring cannon-shot’ (III.iii.79). Paradoxically, the English attempts to 
demonise her as a witch serve to consolidate her strong position, because the 
spells, incantations and conjurations accredited to her suggest that her words 
are truly powerful. Similarly, their portrayal of her as a whore betrays deep- 
seated masculine anxieties which often equated female language, as embodied 
by the tongue, with a threatening licentiousness. Throughout the play, Joan is 
intimidating because she appears to have a unique relationship with the 
language she uses, but it is not until the final act, when we hear Joan 
summoning demons, that the nature of this relationship is disclosed. Calling
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for signs o f future accidents (V.ii.25), she radically problematises the 
conventional relationship between signifier and signified: in her previous 
cornmunications with the demons she has eliminated the gap between signifier 
and signified so that meaning, for her, is not deferred but is instead uncannily 
present. O n this occasion, no signs are forthcoming, however, and without the 
aid o f supernatural forces, she is captured by York.
Paradoxically, the point at which it is confirmed that Joan is connected with a 
supernatural agency is the very point at which she appears most ‘human’. 
Facing execution, she tells a series of contradictory lies in a desperate attempt 
to evade death. When she is admitted into the French force and the patriarchal 
order which structures it, she is asked by Reignier to ‘do what thou canst to 
save our honours,/ Drive them from Orlean and be immortalized’ (I.ii.147- 
148). After her capture however, the English attempt to immortalize her as 
one who ‘hath lived too long,/ To fill the world with vicious qualities’ 
(V.iii.34-35) and the grotesque details o f her execution are indicative o f the 
English desire to tarnish her memory with a shameful death. Despite insisting 
that she was pregnant and renouncing the virtues that she claimed to have 
prioritised throughout her life, she is burned at the stake. In Shakespeare s 
drama there is an attempt to immortalise her as a sorceress condemned to 
burn’ (V.iii.l), but this historiographical process of memorialisation never fully 
succeeds. Instead, the figure of Joan Puzel ‘wilst be so obstacle (V.iii.17), and 
remains the site o f competing historical discourses and ultimately, a site of 
resistance.
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Shakespeare’s representation of the War of the Roses is, as Edward Burns
argues ‘an ironic meditation on what history is, and as such it constantly
exposes the gratuitous signs and symbols which allow us to think we know
history’ (Shakespeare 2000: 6). Historical events are often shaped by violence,
but the process through which these events are recorded historically is also
structured by violence. The production of what Catherine Belsey calls ‘history
at the level o f the signifier’ (1999: 13), involves the exclusion of certain
signifiers and the prioritising of others as the way o f taking meaning from
violence, and fore-grounding these meanings in the production of historical
narratives. In Shakespeare’s representation of the violence o f execution and
interstate war, this process is continually frustrated and the inadequacies o f the
state’s (often-violent) strategies for making violence meaningful are exposed.
Zizek explains that
The supreme violence resides in this vicious circle of an act 
that establishes the order which retroactively renders invisible 
this very act in its dimension of constitutive violence. In 
other words, the supreme violence consists o f the 
obliterations o f the double inscription of one and the same act o f 
the act that founds, brings about, the symbolic Order and 
(re)appears within this Order as one of its elements, 
legitimised, founded by it. The questions of origins is 
therefore the traumatic point of every legal order: it is what 
this Order has to ‘repress primordially’ if it is to maintain the 
character o f an Order. In this precise sense dialectics 
designates the effort to unearth, to render visible again, this 
constitutive violence whose ‘repression is coextensive with 
the very existence of the Order’ (1994: 204-205).
The violent punishments employed by the Elizabethan state produce the 
symbolic order and return within it; however, in a significant way,
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Shakespeare s drama works to partially unearth and render more visible this 
constitutive violence. Shapiro argues that c[t]he representation o f state violence 
undermines the authority o f the state, since the symbolic meaning of a public 
execution, that which gives it sufficient integrity to reinscribe and reactivate 
the power o f the sovereign, never occurs’ (Armstrong and Tennenhouse 1989: 
103).9 But more than this, in the history play, these representations call into 
question the state’s ability to authorise and stabilise the meanings which 
produce and are produced by the symbolic order.
Throughout Whetstone’s narrative and Shakespeare’s play, neither a belief in a 
pre-existing order, nor a faith in human capabilities can provide an adequate 
explanation for the way in which individuals are remembered after death, yet 
the tensions between these two forces shape the way people live their lives. As 
communities were forced into an intimate and cataclysmic relationship with 
mortality, people strove for ways to play a part in shaping their own death. 
The plague made no distinction between its victims and the mass deaths in the 
midst o f life threatened to plunge the established social order into disarray. 
Attitudes were radically transforming in reaction to this, to the extent that 
death was no longer perceived as an intrinsic part of life, but rather as its 
opposite. This view of mortality emphasised the temporal gap, heightening the 
sense o f death as complete extinction. Greenblatt notes that [s]elf-fashioning
9 I disagree, however, with Shapiro’s earlier assertion that ‘to permit the theatre to imitate state 
spectacle could undermine the terrible power o f officially sanctioned violence by showing it often 
enough to make it familiar’ (Armstrong and Tennenhouse 1989: 100). Francis Barker has 
demonstrated that executions were carried out on such a scale that it is unlikely that theatrical 
representations would render them over-familiar.
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is achieved in relation to something perceived as alien, strange or hostile. This 
threatening O ther ... must be discovered or invented in order to be attacked 
or destroyed’ (1980: 9). Death was now conceptualised as this O ther and 
memorialisation became a crucial instrument in the fight against it.
Renaissance historiography was concerned with differentiating a certain
discourse, or set o f discourses, recording and therefore immortalising
significant lives and events. As Greenblatt asserts:
The chief intellectual and linguistic tool (in this creation) was 
rhetoric, which held the central place in the humanist education ... 
Rhetoric was the common ground of poetry, history, and oratory; it 
could mediate both between the past and the present and between 
the imagination and the realm of public affairs ... It offered men 
the power to change their worlds, calculate the probabilities, and 
master the contingent, and it implied that human character itself 
could be similarly fashioned, with an eye to audience and effect. 
(Greenblatt 1980: 162)
In addition to the problems outlined above, the aims of historiography were 
rendered problematic by a paradoxical commitment to both the individual and 
the communal. In a simultaneous movement, it sought to effect the violent 
process o f differentiation and to follow the ‘erotic’ impulse towards the 
establishment o f a collective identity. Bataille insists that [cjontinuity is what 
we are after, but generally only if that continuity which the death o f 
discontinuous beings alone can establish is not the victor in the long run. 
What we desire is to bring into a world founded on discontinuity all the 
continuity such a world can sustain.’ (Bataille 1962. 18-19). The tensions
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inherent in W hestone’s and Shakespeare’s accounts of history are a reflection 
upon the extent o f the continuity that the Elizabethan world could sustain.
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Chapter Five
‘All the world is but a bearbaiting’: Why stay we to be baited?’ 1
1 Hotson, (1928: 59), and Coriolanus, (IV.ii.42). world is but a bear-baiting”:
A condensed version o f this chapter was Publ'sh®d 0f  Discourse: Public and Private
Violence and Popular Culture in the Renaissance , in J
Spheres, Boker and Hibbard (eds.) (2002: 67-77). n oon
The illustration is taken from the title page of  Shakespeare Quar
181
In 1616 Christopher Beeston, the business manager of Queen Anne’s Men, 
rebuilt the Cockpit theatre and installed his players there. On the Shrove 
Tuesday holiday o f the following year, a group of playgoers from the Red Bull 
theatre stormed the Cockpit. An account written only days after the event 
records that:
The Prentizes on Shrove Tewsday last, to the number o f 3. or 
4000 comitted extreme insolencies; part of this number, 
taking their course for Wapping, did there pull downe to the 
grownd 4 houses, spoiled all the goods therein, defaced many 
others, & a Justice o f the Peace coming to appease them, 
while he was reading a Proclamation, had his head broken 
with a brick batt. Th’other part, making for Drury Lane, 
where lately a newe playhouse is erected, they beset the house 
round, broke in, wounded divers of the players, broke open 
their trunckes, & what apparrell, bookes, or other things they 
found, they burnt & cutt in peeces; & not content herewith, 
gott on top o f the house, & untiled it, & had not the Justices 
o f Peace & Sherife levied an aide & hindred their purpose, 
they would have laid that house likewise even with the 
grownd. In this skirmishe one prentise was slaine, being shott 
throughe the head with a pistol, & many other of their 
fellows were sore hurt (Bentley VI, 1941-68: 54).
In London, the brothels and playhouses were traditionally sacked at 
Shrovetide, and although rioting by apprentices was not uncommon, the 
events o f 1617 were exceptional. Various explanations have been put forward, 
but it seems most likely that the violence was precipitated by arguments about 
money. Beeston had taken his players and their repertoire of plays from the 
Red Bull, a ‘citizen’ theatre or penny playhouse, to the Cockpit, an indoor 
theatre where the minimum entry charge was sixpence.2
2 C. J. Sisson has argued that it was ‘extremely likely that the riot at the Cockpit, which damaged it 
upon its opening, was a gesture o f resentment ...for the desertion of the Red Bull (1954. 68)
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The apprentices’ excessive display of violence led to calls for the execution of 
the offenders. John Chamberlain, in his letter to Sir Dudley Carleton, 
conjectures that [t]here be divers of them taken since and clapt up, and I 
make no question but we shall see some of them hang’d this next weeke, as it 
is more then time they were’ (Bendey Vol. VI, 1941-68: 55). This expectation 
was shared by Edward Sherburne, who reported that ‘such of them as are 
taken his Majestie hath commanded shal be executed for example sake’ 
(Bentley vol. VI: 54). At a Middlesex Special Session of Oyer and Terminer the 
following month, rioters were charged with causing damage to Christopher 
Beeston’s house but no mention was made of the Cockpit.3 A number o f the 
offenders were committed to Newgate prison but the anticipated executions 
did not transpire. Although great hostility remained and similar revenge attacks 
were planned for the following year, the preventative measures implemented 
by the Privy Council appear to have been successful and there is no record of 
the raids having gone ahead. On this occasion, there was no definitive act of 
violence.
The events at the Cockpit locate the theatre as the site of violently contested 
physical and ideological struggles. Debates upon issues central to the 
Renaissance subject were carried out within and frequently on behalf o f the 
theatre. From the petty theft, cozenage, prostitution and brawling that were in 
evidence in and round the theatres to the dramatic representations of treason, 
tyranny and assassination performed upon its stages, the theatre was intimately
3 A Special Session  o f  O yer and Terminer was a court held by a Royal Com m issioner who
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bound up with notions of law and order. Supporters o f the Renaissance 
theatre affirmed its importance as a means of educating and entertaining the 
public and it was variously presented as an institution committed to providing 
moral instruction and encouraging civil obedience. In his treatise o f 1612, A n  
Apology for Actors, Thomas Heywood attempted to provide a systematic 
account of the positive influence of stage plays. He suggested that their
purpose was:
to teach the subjects obedience to their King, to shew the 
people the untimely ends of such as have moved tumults, 
commotions, and insurrections, to present them with the 
flourishing estate of such as live in obedience, exhorting them 
to alegeance, dehorting them from all trayterous and 
fellonious stratagems (1612: F4V).
Arguments such as this were often backed up with ‘domesticke’ or ‘home-
borne’ examples o f the theatre’s contribution to the maintenance of civil
order, and there are accounts of stage plays prompting spontaneous 
confessions by members of the audience for crimes as serious as murder.4 
However, attempts to align the theatre with the established authorities were by
travelled around the country and was empowered to hear and determine all criminal matters.
4 Heywood gives one such example o f ‘A Strange accident happening at a play in An Apology fo r  
Actors: ‘To omit all farre-fetcht instances, we will prove it by a domesticke, and home-borne truth 
which within these few yeares happened. At Lin in Norfolke, the then Earle o f  Sussex players 
acting the old History o f Fryer Francis, & presenting a woman, who insatiately doting on a yong 
gentleman, had (the more securely to enjoy his affection) mischievously and secretly murdered her 
husband, whose ghost haunted her, and at all divers times in her most solitary and private 
contemplations, in most horrid and fearfiill shapes, appeared, and stood before her. As this was 
acted, a townes-woman (till then of good estimation and report) finding her conscience (at this 
presentment) extremely troubled; suddenly skritched and cryd out Oh my husband, my husband! I 
see the ghost o f my husband fiercely threatening and menacing me. At which shrill and uexpected 
fire] out-cry, the people about her moov’d to a strange amazement, inquired the reason o f her 
clamour, when she presently un-urged, she told them that seven yeares ago, she, to be possessed of  
such a Gentleman (meaning him) had poisoned her husband, whose fearfiill image personated it 
selfe in the shape o f  that ghost: whereupon the murdresse was apprehended (1612. G2 ).
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no means straightforward. These examples were countered by suggestions that 
plays actually incited criminal activity, and that by their involvement, certain 
spectators had learned the cleanely conveyance of their trechery, and how, in 
what sort, with what secrecy, and by what means to effect their treason’ 
(Greene 1615: D 2r).
In contrast to those such as Heywood, there were some groups in society who
believed the theatre to be the cause o f public disorder. Henry Crosse believed
that the theatre inevitably attracted
[t]he leaudest persons in the land, apt of pilferie, perjurie, 
forgerie, or any rogories, the very scum, rascallitie, and 
baggage o f the people, thieves, cut-purses, shifters, 
cousoners; briefly an uncleane generation, and spaune of 
vipers: must not here be good rule, where is such a broode of 
Hell-bred creatures? for a Play is like a sincke in Towne, 
whereunto all the filth doth runne: or byle in the body, that 
draweth all the ill humours unto it (1603: Q lr)-
He insists upon a link between the theatre and the devilish, and in particular, 
relates ideas o f corporeal contamination from filth and disease with the 
representations o f stage plays, implicitly questioning the distinction between 
mimesis and Teal life’.5 Michael Neill explains that, ‘P]ike the plague, the 
theatre was a phenomenon of the urban crowd; and their histories are 
entangled in a complex fashion’ (1997: 24). Both the theatre and the plague 
became powerful symbols o f city life; the theatre specifically came to represent 
ambivalent attitudes to social conditions in the emerging metropolis.
' For a detailed discussion of the link between the theatre and the devil, see Stephen Greenblatt
(1988: 94 -128).
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Not only was the theatre believed to be instrumental to the spread o f disease,
and in particular the plague, but it was also conceptually linked to Protestant
theological concerns. Louis Montrose explains that,
the religious opposition to players and to the newly 
established public playhouses included not only radical 
Puritan preachers but also orthodox Protestant clerics, who 
viewed the theatre as sharing the vanity and worldliness of 
the Roman Church and as replicating its heathenish rites 
(1996: 58).
Anti-theatrical sentiment was reified in a Puritanical discourse that linked the
perceived psychological dangers of the theatre with the substantive dangers of
the plague. As well as being an all-too-real physical threat, the idea of the
plague was developed metaphorically to suggest an equally disastrous
contagion o f doctrinally unsound beliefs and practices. This view was
frequently reproduced in contemporary anti-theatrical literature, such as
Green’s treatise, A  Refutation of the Apology for Actors. In his response to
Heywood’s work, Greene asserts that the devil:
knowing ... that the plague should once have an end ... 
tooke occasion to thrust a worse plague, not into their bodies, 
but into their manners ... And surely the Devill would never 
have instituted Playes, but that he knew they were, and would 
be beneficial to his Kingdome (1615: C4r).
These anxieties were predicated upon a belief that dramatic representation was
linked to idolatry, and therefore to Catholicism, and there was consequendy a
deep suspicion o f the affective power of such representations. The theatre was
commonly credited with the potential to corrupt the spectator, as Greene
argues:
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For they are full o f filthy words and gestures, such as would 
not become very lacques and Courtezans: and have sundry 
inventions which infect the spirit, and replenish it with 
unchaste, whoorish, cozening, deceitfull, wanton and 
mischievous passions: besides which inconveniences Stage 
Players doe oftentimes envy, and gnaw at the honor o f the an 
other, and to please the vulgar people, set before them lyes, 
and teach much dissolution and deceitfulness: by this meanes 
turning upside downe all discipline and good manners (1615*
F i r ) .
The anti-theatricals’ fear o f the ‘wanton and mischievous passions’ aroused by 
stage plays and players, and particularly by the affective power o f ‘filthy 
words’, was articulated in the language of the plague. The spectators’ 
potentially anarchic desires were envisaged as a psychological malady with a 
pathology capable o f replicating that of its biological counterpart.
Although there was extensive and continued debate surrounding the legal and 
moral authority o f playhouses, they were an undoubted attraction for a great 
number o f people. As a result o f its popularity, the theatre became the socio­
cultural space in which old and new conceptions of authority were contested 
and reformulated. In a parallel movement, demonstrations of state power 
became increasingly ‘theatrical’. It has been widely noted that, from its outset, 
the Elizabethan state initiated a process of exploiting and appropriating 
existing dramatic forms and revising their cultural significance for its own 
political ends. Indeed, one sanctioned account of Elizabeth s coronation 
progress states that one ‘could not better tearme the citie of London that time, 
than a stage wherin was shewed the wonderful spectacle, o f a noble hearted 
princesse toward her most loving people, and the people s exceding comfort
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in beholding so worth a sovereign, and hearing so princelike a voice’ 
(Montrose 1996: 26). Elizabeth I, and later, James I, carefully and consciously 
‘dramatised’ their power in order to maximise their political capital.
The playhouse was a unique, communal space and as a secular institution, the 
theatre was frequently charged with offering explanations for aspects o f 
human experience that were not explicitly addressed by the church. As Louis 
Montrose notes, ‘[t]he drama performed in the professional playhouses 
provided its audiences with a distinctive source of affective and intellectual 
stimulus and satisfaction, an experience that was collective and commercial, 
public and profane’ (1996: 32). The aesthetics of Renaissance tragedy 
developed in a society that was at times devastated by the plague and at others, 
terrified by its dormant threat; the austere Protestant theology o f the period 
was accompanied by an acknowledged tendency towards religious despair. The 
tragic aesthetic cultivated a sense of human agency that was often obfuscated 
in the strict Calvinist doctrine o f double-predestination, and which was 
effectively removed in the plague-induced moments of cultural crisis. A focus 
for cultural anxieties, the theatre offered a generic cultural template, whereby 
patterns o f societal violence and an unusually fraught understanding of 
mortality were ostensibly circumscribed by the evolving notion of a tragic 
ideal.
In many ways, the theatre was entangled with notions of violence. O f course, 
tragedies reproduced violence on the stage, but plays were also thought to
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incite individuals to violence, or conversely, to reconcile them with the 
habitual and discomfiting violence of lived experience. As Drakakis notes, ‘the 
staging o f violence in the public theatre is both a displacement and a 
transference o f a violence which existed not very far beneath the surface o f 
Elizabethan society itself (1992b: 15). Furthermore, tragedy explored 
paradigms o f violence and was involved in the complexities of their cultural 
codification. Discussions of the nature of tragedy have traditionally focused 
upon its agonistic form, that is to say, upon the way in which it negotiates 
conflicting explanations o f human experience. On the one hand, it engages 
with an understanding o f human suffering as the result of a transcendent order 
which the individual is powerless to counter; on the other, with a conception 
of individual autonomy and ultimate, personal responsibilities. Neill argues 
that English Renaissance tragedy ‘catered for a culture that was in the throes 
of a peculiar crisis in the accommodation of death -  one that reflected the 
strain o f adjusting the psychic economy of an increasingly individualistic 
society to the stubborn facts of mortality’ (1997: 30). As a direct result o f the 
plague, the nature o f any such transcendent order was increasingly thought o f 
in secular terms. Indeed, in many ways, the plague itself was a destructive and 
anarchic but nevertheless transcendent order. Tragedy, as Neill observes, 
coffered to contain the fear of death by staging fantasies of ending in which 
the moment o f dying was transformed, by the arts of performance, to a 
supreme demonstration of distinction’ (1997: 32). Undoubtedly indicating a 
widespread cultural desire for a secular rationale, the Renaissance saw an 
unprecedented development in tragic drama, as the concerns of the individual
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became focused upon notions of personal identity and on the importance of 
being remembered after death. By ‘aestheticising’ death in this way, the theatre 
became involved in the dramatisation o f human agency, and consequently, 
with a reworking of perceptions of ‘reality’, which, as Greenblatt reminds us, 
‘for each society is constructed to a significant degree out of specific qualities of 
its language and symbols’ (1990: 32). Therefore, if, as Sidney Lee asserts, 
‘promoters o f public amusement seem to have placed the attractions of 
bullbaiting and bearbaiting on much the same level as dramatic performances’ 
(1950: 429) it is only to be expected that the contiguous, and equally 
prominent spectacle o f bearbaiting was also an important factor in the 
codification and dissemination o f paradigms of violence. As Greenblatt 
observes, ‘[tjheatrical values do not exist in a realm of privileged literariness, of 
textual or even institutional self-referentiality ... Collective actions, ritual 
gestures, paradigms of relationship ... penetrate the work of art’ (1985: 32-33).
The theatre was a singularly significant cultural space, but the reproduction
and reformulation of cultural meanings was not confined to its domain. A
parallel form o f popular entertainment provided a challenge to this stylised
aesthetic ideal o f supreme violence. A Jacobean advert notifies the public that.
Tomorrowe beinge Thursdaie shal be seen at the Beargardin 
on the banckside a greate Mach plaid by the gamstirs of 
Essex who hath chalenged all comers what soever to plaie v 
dogges at the single beare for v pounds and also to wearie a 
bull dead at the stake and for your better content shall have 
plasant sport with the horse and ape and whipping of the 
blind beare (Foakes 1977 Vol. 2: 106).
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Both the general public and royalty enjoyed bearbaiting and bullbaiting, as well 
as horse and monkey baiting: both Elizabeth I and James I displayed a 
particularly keen interest in the sport. Early in her reign, Elizabeth staged a 
bullbaiting for a visiting French ambassador who was so impressed by the 
spectacle that he took a number of English mastiffs back to France 
(Macdonogh 1999: 212).6
As its name suggests, the Cockpit had previously been an arena for various 
animal entertainments, and particularly for cock-fighting. Despite its 
transformation into a private indoor theatre, such amusements remained 
extremely popular. The arena in the Bear garden, or Paris garden in Southwark 
was the sight o f regular bear, bull and horsebaitings before its collapse in 1583. 
It was later rebuilt as the Hope theatre, which was designed to be suitable 
‘bothe for players to playe In, And for the game of Beares and Bulls to be 
bayted in the same’ (Greg 1907: 20). This dual function is alluded to in a 
number o f contemporary plays, perhaps most notably with the self-reflexive 
questioning o f the chorus in Henry V: ‘Can this Cockpit hold/The vasty fields 
of France?’ (Prologue 11-12).
The Venetian sailor and merchant, Alessandro Magno, gives a detailed 
description o f London baiting matches in the records o f his voyage to 
England:
6 At the court o f  James I there was a great appetite for pitting various combinations o f exotic 
animals against one another. An account o f Prince Ulric’s visit to the Tower in 1610 tells ot his
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First ... they bring in ... a worthless horse with all its 
trappings, and a monkey in the saddle, then four to six o f the 
younger dogs, with which they make an attack. Then these 
are replaced by leading in more experienced ones, in which 
baiting it is a fine sight to see the horse run, kicking and 
biting, and the monkey grip the saddle tighdy and scream, 
many times being bitten, in which baiting, after the attendants 
have intervened for a while, with frequently the death of the 
horse, and it is removed from the scene, they bring in some 
bears, either one by one or several together, but this baiting is 
not very fine to see. Finally they bring in a wild bull, and they 
tie it with a rope about two paces long to a stake that is fixed 
in the middle o f the enclosure. The baiting is finer to see than 
the others and is more dangerous for the dogs than the 
others, many o f which are wounded and die, and it lasts until 
evening (cited in Dawson 1964: 98-99).
As well as being the finest of these entertainments, in Magno’s view,
bullbaiting was said to add to the flavour of the bull’s meat, which would be
eaten after the match. Stephen Dickey notes that ‘[i]n an efficient symbiosis of
sport and sustenance, bulls were obliged to be baited prior to being butchered.
The more valuable bears, if they survived, were headed no place other than
future bouts in the ring’ (1991: 256). Although Magno complains that the
bearbaiting ‘is not very fine to see’, Lee affirms that it was ‘pursued in England
with an earnestness which was hardly known elsewhere’ (1950: 426). Robert
Langham’s account o f a match at Kenilworth testifies to the great enjoyment
derived from these spectacles. He enthuses:
It waz a sport very pleazaunt of theez beastz: to see the bear 
with hiz pink nyez leering after hiz enmyez approcj, the 
nimblness and wayt of the dog too take hiz avauntage, and 
the fors and experiens of the bear again to avoyd the assauts. 
if he wear bitten in one place, hoow he woold pynch in an 
oother too get free: that if he wear taken onez, then what 
shyft with byting with clawing, with roring tossing and 
tumbling he woold work too wynde hym self from them, and
visit with his cousin Prince Henry to watch such a match involving several dogs, lions and
lionesses (Nichols 1967: 307-308).
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when he waz lose, to shake hiz earz twyse or thryse with the 
blud and the slaver about hiz fiznamy, waz a matter o f goodly 
relief (Langham 1983: 48).
His account foregrounds the intense and relentless violence which 
characterised such events. In contrast to the teleological thrust o f tragic drama, 
the violence o f a bearbaiting operated without a demonstrable sense of 
progression towards an ending. After the death of a ‘worthless horse’, and the 
baiting o f a bull for food, the action continued with bears as more and more 
animals were introduced into the ring. ‘Slaughter in the pit’, Dickey 
conjectures, ‘was either rarer than one might imagine or routinely 
unremarkable, simply beside the point’ (1991: 259). The main casualties were 
the mastiff dogs, many of which were killed by the bear within moments. 
Members o f the public would bring their own dogs to be pitted against the 
bears, often wagering large sums of money. Indeed, the bear-pit’s undeniable 
popularity with gamblers is testimony to the indeterminacy o f the matches. 
Therefore, despite the inevitable casualties, the outcome of a baiting was 
always uncertain. Moreover, death, in this context was not an end to the 
violence.
Bearbaiting therefore offers an alternative framework from within which to 
understand violence in the Renaissance. In contrast with the tragic model, 
which, as Neill asserts, is ‘a profoundly teleological form whose full meaning 
will be uncovered in the revelation of its end (1997: 45), the trajectory 
described by the baiting of a bear was markedly different. Dickey notes that,
193
the effective outcome o f a bearbaiting match was something best expressed as 
a stalemate (1991. 259). Rather than codifying violence in determinable and 
purposeful (crudely positive humanist) terms, bearbaiting presented an 
inescapable dxpBTisncB of violence that could be cjualitatively aligned with an 
unalterable (crudely negative providential) outlook. The suffering o f a bear -  
tied to the stake and forced to endure continual and unremitting violence -  
offered the audience an alternative representation of the conditions o f their 
own subjectivity. As George Lakoff and Mark Johnson argue, '[o]ur ordinary 
conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is fundamentally 
metaphorical in nature’ (1980: 3), and the bear-pit provided a metaphor and a 
vocabulary with which to conceptualise and articulate this experience of 
violence and suffering. In contrast to the tragic aesthetic of Cleopatra’s 
'immortal longings’, and heroic challenge, 'Where art thou, Death?/ Come 
hither, come!’, bearbaiting exemplified an understanding of human suffering 
more akin to Macbeth’s conception of his own situation: 'They have tied me 
to a stake: I cannot fly,/ But, bear-like, I must fight the course (V.vii.1-2). For 
Macbeth, 'baited by the rabble’s curse’ (V.viii.29), the suffering is 
overwhelming and cannot be rationalised in terms of the postponement o f a 
positive personal outcome which would ultimately give meaning to the 
violence.
The figure o f the bear was of considerable symbolic importance during the 
Renaissance. In addition to the celebrated role of figures such as Harry Hunks, 
Sackerson, Tom of Lincoln, Moll Cutpurse, Mad Bess and George Stone, the
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bear made a number o f significant symbolic appearances at particular events in 
the Renaissance calendar. Principally, the bear was linked to the Candlemas 
celebrations, as Francois Laroque details in his discussion o f Shakespeare’s 
festive world:
There was a direct link, in popular belief, between the 
beginning of carnival and the end of the bear’s hibernation 
which was liable to take place on Candlemas Day (February 
2). As the beast emerged from its lair, it was thought to look 
around to see what the weather was like. If it was fine, it went 
back in, which was a sign that winter would continue for 
another forty days, that is to say until about 10 March; if, on 
the other hand, the weather was overcast, the bear emerged 
for good, thereby marking an early end to winter. Candlemas 
fell on the day before Saint Blaise’s Day, 3 February, which 
was traditionally the earliest possible day for Shrove Tuesday 
(1991:48).
Signifying an end to the period of carnivalesque excess, Candlemas marked the 
beginning o f the agricultural year, and therefore, the point at which people 
were required to return to work. The recurrent image of the Candlemas bear 
emphasises what was an essentially cyclical conception of temporality. Indeed, 
the infamous cameo appearance o f the bear in The Winters Tale plays upon this 
association.
In addition to its renowned stage direction, one of the most frequently 
discussed aspects of The Winter's Tale is the striking temporal gap o f a vast 
sixteen years, and its relation to the play’s overall tragic-comic structure. After 
Antigonus deposits Perdita in a remote location in Bohemia, a bear appears 
onstage and promptly kills him. However, the bear does not function solely as 
a sigmfier o f violence here. Shortly before his demise, Antigonus comments, I
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never saw/ the heavens so dim by day’ (III.iii.56-57), a sign which, in 
conjunction with the emergence of the bear, would herald the end o f winter. 
Here, the bear mediates between the play’s initial tragic form and the 
forthcoming comic conclusion.7 This peculiar ambivalence is characteristic o f 
the way in which bears were perceived in the Renaissance popular imagination: 
it is interesting to note Thomas Dekker’s playful description of bears used for 
entertainment as a ‘company of ... Beares’ who ‘play their Tragiecomedies’ 
(cited in Skura 1993: 204). Their natural fierceness and aggression was thought 
to run parallel to their strong nurturing instincts. In Edward Topsell’s 
comprehensive study, The Historie of Foure-Footed Beastes (1607), he relates the 
following story in order to illustrate their ‘most venerous and lustfull 
disposition’:
a Beare carried a young maide into his denne by violence, 
where in venerous manner he had the carnal use of her body, 
and while he kept her in his denne, he dailye went foorth and 
brought her home the best Apples and other fruites he could 
get, presenting them unto her in very amorous sort; but 
always when hee went to forage, he rouled a huge great stone 
upon the mouth of his denne, that the Virgin shoulde not 
escape away (1607: E lr).
This combination o f violence and attentiveness illustrates the profound 
uncertainty with which these creatures were viewed. On the one hand, they 
were powerful symbols of the end of winter and the beginning of spring, and 
therefore, o f fertility and rejuvenation. But on the other, their renowned 
aggression signalled their capacity for great destruction. It is possible to 
suggest then, that people’s reactions to the figure of the bear in the baiting
7 See Judie Newman (1988: 484) and Michael Bristol (1991: 145-167).
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arena were informed by the ambivalent cultural meanings ascribed to them in 
the seasonal calendar and popular folklore.
The idea o f bearbaiting was often developed metaphorically to suggest 
suffering and punishment and in a number of early modern discourses, these 
ideas are inextricably linked to the condition of selfhood. Various 
permutations o f the metaphor of bearbaiting are explored in a series o f early 
seventeenth century pamphlets that comprise a debate upon the nature o f 
women. Joseph Swetnam uses this metaphor in his controversial misogynist 
pamphlet, The Arraignment of Lewde, Idle, Froward, and Unconstant women (1615). 
He announces in his opening pages, c[i]f thou mean to see the Bear-bayting of 
women, then trudge to this beare-garden apace’. He likens his dogged and 
lengthy rebuke of women to a bearbaiting, and throughout the tract relies 
heavily upon ambivalent cultural conceptions of the bear; in particular the 
perceived contrast between their fierceness and their ‘femininity’. He 
compares the temperament of woman, unfavourably, with the aggression of 
the bear, asserting that ‘the Beare being robbed of her young ones ... [is] 
nothing so terrible as the fury of a woman.’ (1615: 2). Indeed, he makes 
explicit reference to the similarities o f an angered woman and a bear at the 
stake, stating that ‘a froward woman in hir frantick mood will pull haule, 
swerve, scratch & teare all that stands in her way.’ (1615: 12) Here, although 
seeming to link women firmly with their ursine counterparts, he develops the 
metaphor o f baiting to suggest an experience of acute but continual violence
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akin to men s experience of marriage. In doing so, he implicitly allies men too 
with the figure o f the bear.
In a lively response, Constantia Munda proposes that Swetnam’s objections
are a strange blasphemy. Dismissing his argument, and his choice o f
metaphor, she counters:
You promise your spectators the Beare-baiting o f women, 
and yet you think it not amisse to drive all women out o f your 
hearing; for that none but your selfe the ill-favoured Hunckes 
is left in the Beare-garden to make your invited guests merry: 
whereupon it may very likely be, the eager young men ... set 
their doges at you (1617: 25).
Overturning his initial formulation, Munda aligns Swetnam himself with a 
well-known stage bear, the ‘ill-favoured Hunkes’, thereby suggesting that he is 
the figure upon whom the reader’s or spectator’s desires will converge. She 
claims that his attempts to articulate his own position have merely worked to 
single him out for the ridicule he intended for women. ‘[Y]ou beginne’ she 
mocks ‘as if you were wont to runne up and downe the Countrey with Beares 
at your taile’ (1617: 24). As Munda conceives it, then, the bear symbolises a 
pitiful, ill-tempered and humiliated figure, akin to the dejected image of 
Macbeth in the final scenes of the play.
In her contribution to the debate, Rachel Speght provides an intelligent and 
patient response to Swetnam’s text, focusing upon his lack of rhetorical 
sophistication in addition to the flaws in his argument. She declares that [i]n 
■■■the Beare-bayting of Women, you have plainely displayed your owne disposition to be
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Cynicall, in that there appears no other Dogge or Bull, to bayte them, but your 
selfe’ (1617: 3). In contrast to Munda’s treatment of Swetnam’s metaphor, 
Speght retains the bear-like image of women, figuratively tied to the stake. 
However, she locates the significance of such a restraint within a theological 
context, arguing that God created women ‘for mans sake ... as a good 
yokefellow’. W omen’s subjugation is understood as a necessary condition of 
their relationship with God, and therefore to be assumed positively.
Speght goes on to criticise Swetnam’s ‘roaring cogitations’, equating his poor 
grammar with an animalistic sense of disorder: ‘you’ she accuses, ‘being 
greedie to botch up your mingle mangle invective against Women; have not 
therein observed, in many places, so much as Grammar sense’ (1617: 3). By 
labelling Swetnam ‘Melastomus’, (from ‘melas’, meaning black, and ‘stoma’, 
meaning mouth) she conflates the tearing and biting that characterise a baiting, 
and the equally destructive operations of language itself, into the idea o f an 
‘evil-mouth’. Consequently, language itself may ‘oftentimes setteth a rankling 
tooth into the sides of truth’ (1617: 4), and can be identified not only as an 
instrument o f baiting but also as that which is baited.
The trope o f bearbaiting is implicated in all of these texts, but the figure o f the 
bear functions as an ambivalent and unstable sigmfier, unable to be 
categorically aligned with either the persecuted or persecuting subject. 
However, this ambiguity increases baiting’s metaphorical currency, particularly 
in its relation to the prevailing Protestant theology of the time. At the level of
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the corporeal, it is not difficult to identify a certain paradigm of violence and 
draw plausible links between the experience of the bear, bound to the stake, 
and the image o f Christ on the cross. Arguing that the representations of 
sacrificial violence contained in the mystery plays, popular at the beginning of 
Elizabeth’s reign, remained influential, Meredith Anne Skura identifies this 
link, situating it within a dramatic tradition. She observes that with ‘bearbaiting 
and the Christian mystery plays ... [p]art of the fascination was that the 
performance was deadly to the performer and that the audience was itself 
implicated in the violence’ (1993: 203). Many scholars have suggested that the 
figure o f Jesus crucified was marginalised in Reformation theology, but as 
Adrian Streete affirms, ‘the doctrine of election and reprobation, as it was 
most commonly understood in early modern England, was a deeply 
Christological doctrine’ (2001: 146). Christians were exhorted to identify with 
Christ, and devotional rhetoric forged express corollaries between the 
suffering o f Jesus and the suffering of the elect. Concentrated upon the 
crucifixion, this reciprocal relationship reached its crisis as the process of 
assimilation invoked a dual identification. Not only was the individual 
encouraged to empathise with the figure o f Christ, but also, more radically, 
with his tormentors. Highlighting the Renaissance fascination with cruelty, 
Debora Kuller Shuger makes specific reference to Calvinist passion narratives, 
which she observes, ‘while less absorbed by the techniques o f cruelty, fix 
compulsively on its psychology’ (1994: 91). In these texts, the unusually 
detailed descriptions of Christ’s sufferings take on overtly sadistic and erotic 
overtones. Indeed, in the vivid portrayal of Christ, his face blue and black
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with buffeting, his eyes swoln, his cheeks beslavered with spittle’ (Hall 1863, 
Vol. 2: 654), the graphic focus upon his tortured body is redolent o f the 
enthusiastically grotesque descriptions o f the ‘blud and the slaver’ o f the baited 
bear.8
The listener or reader o f the passions is positioned so that they too are
implicated in the acts o f physical and mental violence. Shuger explains:
The notion that since Christ died for our sins we are all 
responsible for the Crucifixion originates early in Christian 
thought, but the Calvinist passion narratives intensify this 
complicity by merging the position of the reader with that of 
the torturer. Our sins become not simply the antecedent 
cause o f Christ’s sacrifice; rather we find ourselves sucked 
into the scene as participants in the act of cruelty (1994: 92- 
93).
Like the complexities o f the baiting metaphor in the pamphlets of Swetnam,
Speght and Munda, where the bear’s ambiguous position problematised any
attempts to consistently align one party with the baited bear and the other with
the dogs, the passion narratives hinder the reader’s ability to identify him or
herself exclusively with Christ. Maus explores this duality:
The Calvinist passion narratives ... present the Crucifixion as 
an allegory o f subjectivity. By forcing the reader to identify 
with all the dramatis personae, good and evil, involved in the 
Crucifixion, these texts attempt to produce a specific version 
o f Christian selfhood — a divided selfhood gripped by intense, 
contradictory emotions and an ineradicable tension between 
its natural inclinations and religious obligations (1995: 7).
The literary treatment of the Crucifixion exposes this aporia: subjectivity is 
constituted in conflict, experienced by the individual as a continual torment.
8 Artaud rem inds us that k[t]here can be no spectacle without an elem ent o f  cruelty at the basis o f
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Many scholars have focused critical attention on the centrality of 
Protestantism for the development of the Renaissance subject.9 However, the 
notion o f tormented subjectivity may also be understood in wider, and 
increasingly secular terms. The metaphor of bearbaiting shares with Protestant 
Christology a concern for the process of externalising the inward experiences 
o f the individual, and rendering them visible to the outside world. Maus 
explains that ‘in late sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century England the 
sense o f discrepancy between “inward disposition” and “outward appearance” 
seems unusually urgent and consequential for a very large number of people, 
who occupy virtually every position on the ideological spectrum’ (1995: 13). 
Just as the rhetoric of popular piety urged Christians to emulate Christ, and in 
doing so, to make their outward actions the signifiers of their inward thoughts, 
the rhetoric o f the bear-pit was concerned, in a similar manner, with the 
reification o f internal conflict.
In an evolving taxonomy of violence, the codification of various forms of 
‘internal’ violence are complicated by their unrepresentability. Notions of 
internal violence are, by implication, linked to suffering, and in her important 
study, The Body in Pain, Elaine Scarry postulates that ‘[wjhatever pain achieves, 
it achieves it in part through its unsharability, and it ensures this unsharability 
through its resistance to language’ (1985: 4). Bearbaiting is utilised as a
every show ... metaphysics must]fee m a d e  to enter the Smete (2001), and
See, for instance, Maus (1995), bnuger ),
Walsham (1999).
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metaphor for the inherent violence of human experience, precisely because the 
experience cannot be represented in any other way. Scarry goes on to explain 
that pain — unlike any other state of consciousness — has no referential 
content’ (1985: 5). Nevertheless, the experiences realised by the metaphor are 
structured by and simultaneously serve to structure the habits o f a number of 
conflicting discourses.
In his study o f Protestantism and early modern subjectivity, The Persecutory
Imagination, John Stachniewski identifies the way in which language functions
constitutively rather than purely descriptively. He asserts that
The task o f dismantling the Calvinist-puritan vocabulary and 
replacing it with another proves unachievable, even 
systematically unthinkable, partly because the authority of the 
first discourse maintains its status as an accurate description, 
but more fundamentally because the experience is generated 
by the words themselves, inheres in them, and is not a 
detachable entity receptive to alternative explanation (1991:
8).
The metaphors o f the bear pit are always already infused with previous modes 
of understanding, and therefore, ‘[ejven where ... linguistic reinforcement of 
negative intuitions is finally overcome, or converted into the positive terms, 
the trace o f the former experience and its linguistic encoding remains 
influential’ (1991: 5). Indeed, the dynamics of the Renaissance tragic aesthetic 
were as much concerned with habits of discourse as with patterns o f actual 
physical violence. Tragedy’s involvement with the dramatisation of human 
agency was complicated by the burgeoning vocabulary of ongoing internal
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violence that the metaphors of the bear pit addressed. Language itself, 
however, is similarly unstable, and also subject to continued internal violence.
Shakespeare’s Coriolanus reflects the proximity of these physically and 
psychologically contiguous spheres, fusing the tragic aesthetic o f the theatre 
with the corporeal logic o f the bear-pit. Functioning at the intersection 
between these domains, the play derives palpable force from the instability of 
their material and linguistic incarnations. The result, which does not ultimately 
effect the restoration of balance associated with tragedy, is the combination of 
continuous violence and an intense focus on the body. Inevitably, tensions are 
generated because the intractable language of the body must operate in 
conjunction with the metaphysical dimensions of tragedy.
Critics concur that Coriolanus is, for a number of reasons, a problematic 
tragedy. The Aristotelian model of tragedy provides a useful framework in 
which to outline some of the idiosyncrasies of the play s structure. In the 
Poetics, Aristotle asserts that ‘[tjragedy is an imitation of an action that is 
admirable, complete and possesses magnitude’ (1996: 10). From this 
perspective, the play lacks many of the elements thought to underpin the 
genre of tragedy. In the first instance, the plot traces a trajectory in which the 
actions leading to the protagonist’s death cannot be considered unequivocally 
admirable: Coriolanus is banished after losing the support of the plebeians he 
disdains, and subsequently decides to fight with the Volscians against the 
Romans. His decision to do so does not appear to be in keeping with th
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values o f noble suffering in adversity traditionally associated with the tragic 
hero. Aristotle goes on to state that a tragedy must be complete, with a 
beginning that ‘does not follow necessarily from anything else’ (1996: 13). But 
the play opens in the midst of a mutiny, signifying a moment of crisis within 
an ongoing conflict that predates the opening of the play. Similarly, the death 
of Coriolanus in the final act does not signal an end to conflict, as there is still 
enmity between the Romans and the Volscians. In structural terms, it may be 
argued that the play is a flawed tragedy. However, recent critical discussions of 
Elizabethan and Jacobean drama have suggested that during the period, the 
formal constituents o f tragedy were being continually contested and 
reformulated. Central to this process was a re-evaluation of the nature of 
subjectivity. Susan Zimmerman argues that ‘Shakespeare’s tragedies ... explore 
... how and according to what dictates the human subject is constituted’ 
(1998: 1), and in this way offer us a knowledge of ourselves. This process is 
always violent, although in Coriolanus the orientation of the violence 
complicates the purposeful design of tragedy.
The play opens with the stage direction, ‘Enter a company of mutinous 
Citizens, with staves, clubs, and other weapons’, confronting the audience with 
a scene o f violence unprecedented in Renaissance tragedy.10 The play begins in 
the midst o f a conflict arising from a series of complex political precedents. 
The First Citizen explains the plebeians’ grievances:
10 Philip Brockbank notes that it ‘is unique among plays o f the period in opening with a scene o f  
public violence’ (Shakespeare 1976: 95).
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We are accounted poor citizens, the patricians good. What 
authority surfeits on would relieve us. If they would yield us 
but the superfluity while it were wholesome, we might guess 
they relieved us humanely; but they think we are too dear ... 
Let us revenge this with our pikes, ere we become rakes 
(Li. 14-22).
Caius Martius is imputed to be the driving force behind the poor treatment o f 
the starving plebeians and is described as ‘a very dog to the commonalty’ 
(I.i.27). The starving masses are metaphorically tied to the stake, physically 
restricted by poverty, and physically tormented by an authority which baits 
them by withholding food. The conditions of open rebellion that form the 
setting o f the opening scene, and the likening of Martius to a combative dog 
immediately foregrounds the pivotal metaphor of the bear pit which is 
developed throughout the play.
The opening scenes resemble the chaotic environment that the bear garden 
has come to epitomise. Moreover, the nature of the violence throughout the 
play sustains this parallel. Robert Langham’s light-hearted account o f the 
bearbaiting at Kenilworth describes the events in terms of a long-standing 
disagreement between bears and dogs. He explains that the auncient quarell is 
caused by
controversy that hath long depended, been obstinately full 
often debated with sharp and byting arguments a both sides, 
and coold never be decyded: grown noow too so marvayloos 
a mallys, that with spiteful obrays and unchantabl chaffyngs 
allweyz they freat, az far az any whear the ton can eer, see o 
smell the toother: and indeed at utter deadly fohod (Langham 
1983: 47-48).
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Departing from the conventions of tragedy, Coriolanus shares with bearbaiting 
the condition o f dispute without end. It combines this with a similarly 
unremitting focus upon the body, and explores the implications of continual 
conflict for the individual. James Holston argues that in Coriolanus, 
‘Shakespeare satirizes those generic aspects of tragedy that depend on 
unquestioning faith in the ... political analogy of the body politic’ (1983: 486). 
The metaphor o f the bear pit provides an apposite challenge: whilst drawing 
attention to a base physicality, and therefore, to the material conditions o f 
existence, it simultaneously permits a questioning of the metaphors that 
propagate and sustain the ideological apparatus of authority.
Menenius’ celebrated fable of the body pointedly exposes the flaws inherent in 
the metaphors used by the patricians in their attempts to subdue the plebeians. 
From the outset, Rome is deeply divided by famine and civil unrest, and as a 
political body, is structured by sustained infighting. Throughout, violence is 
inflicted upon and at the hands of this corpus: hunger has exposed the 
corporeal vulnerability, not only of the starving plebeians, but also of the 
metaphorical body politic. Menenius tells of a time, when all the body s 
members/ Rebell’d against the belly’ (I.i.95-96), but rather than ameliorating 
the strained relationship between the patricians and plebeians, he reinforces it. 
Quite apart from the legitimacy of either side s claim, in a newly established 
republican state, there is something strikingly inappropriate about the use o f a 
metaphor whose reasoning is dependant upon a belief in the sanctioned 
authority o f ‘[t]he kingly crown’d head’ of the fabulous body. Indeed, his fable
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fails to maintain an internal logic. He uses the tale in a bid to foster a sense of 
cohesiveness, arguing that the belly, which he equates with the senators of 
Rome, sustains and nourishes all parts of the body: ‘through the rivers o f ... 
blood ... The strongest nerves and small inferior veins ... receive that natural 
competency/ Whereby they live’ (I.i.134-139). Yet only a few lines later, this 
image o f a single unified body has broken down and the language o f bodily 
difference infiltrates his rhetoric. Menenius taunts the First Citizen, calling him 
‘one o’th’lowest, basest and poorest’ of the plebeians, a ‘rascal, that art worst 
in blood to run’ (I.i.l 58). Here, he distances himself from the First Citizen on 
precisely the same grounds — those of ‘blood’ — that he has just used to argue 
for their unity within the body politic. From the very first scene, the notion of 
the body politic has been exposed as an unworkable metaphor, unable to unify 
or contain the factions within Rome. The analogy of the bear pit offers an 
alternative which recognises the possibility of irreconcilable conflict.
Although the trope of bearbaiting is repeated throughout the play, the figures 
of the bear and the dogs are employed ambiguously. Caius Martius is initially 
aligned with the mastiffs which were bred to fight and were unable to act 
contrary to their nature. Indeed, one Roman citizen complains that W hat he 
cannot help in his nature, you account a vice in him’ (I.i.40). This idea is 
repeated, with considerably less sympathy, by Sicmius, who claims that it is as 
easy to provoke him as ‘to set dogs on sheep’ (IU255). But although his ‘true- 
bred’ (Li.242) tenacity and love o f war are likened to the inherent traits of a 
thoroughbred, an argument is made for nurture rather than nature. When
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Richard III complains ‘Love foreswore me in my mother’s womb’, he holds
his mother accountable for his deformity, and likens himself to an ‘unlick’d
bear-whelp’. By making reference to the popular belief that the female bear
physically licked her cub into shape he suggests that it is his mother who is
responsible for his ‘disproportion ... in every part’ (King Henry IV , Part 3,
IH-ii-160). Here, Volumnia recounts with pride:
When he was but tender-bodied, and the only son of my 
womb; when youth with comeliness plucked all gaze his way; 
when for a day o f entreaties, a mother should not sell him an 
hour from her beholding; I considering how honour would 
become such a person ... was pleased to let him seek danger 
where he was like to find fame. To cruel war I sent him 
(I.iii.5-13).
Thrust into a hostile environment, Coriolanus is shaped and bound by a 
number o f political constraints and he, too, is subject to physical harm.
His renown as a warrior binds him to the political centre of Rome and dictates 
that he must endure the wounds of the battlefield on behalf of its citizens. In 
Rome, political authority is derived from the emblematic markers o f 
engagement in physical combat. After the batde at Corioles, Menenius declares 
that:
Men en iu s  Martius is coming home: he has more cause to be
proud. [To Volumnia] Where is he wounded? 
VOLUMNIA I’the’shoulder, and i’th’left arm: there will be large
cicatrices to show the people when he shall stand 
for his place. He received in the repulse of 
Tarquin seven hurts i’th’body.
Men en iu s  One ith’neck, and two i’th’thigh -  there’s nine that
I know.
VOLUMNIA He had, before this last expedition, twenty-five
wounds upon him.
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MENENIUS N o w  it’s twenty-seven: every gash was an enem y’s 
grave. A  shout and flourish.
(ILi. 143-155)
Like the infamous bears that were regularly baited, the signs of previous 
violent encounters are inscribed upon his body. But in order to cash in on the 
political currency o f his actions, the newly named Coriolanus is expected to 
participate in a ritual that requires him to display his body, and make a 
spectacle o f his wounds. He is reluctant to follow protocol and asks Menenius, 
‘Let me o’erleap that custom; for I cannot/ Put on the gown, stand naked, and 
entreat them / For my wounds’ sake to give their suffrage’ (II.ii.136-138). His 
wounds yet again become the subject of public scrutiny and amusement, and, 
bear-like, he is tethered by his obligations to a public who will not ‘bate/ One 
jot o f ceremony’ (II.ii.140).
The plebeians are also restrained against their will. Angry at their enforced 
privation, they agree that Caius Martius is the chief enemy to the people 
(Li.6) and, in their descriptions of him they draw parallels with the mastiff 
dogs. What is more, they suggest that he and the patricians have moved to 
‘chain up and restrain the poor’ (I.i.83), implicitly aligning themselves, as a 
collective body o f oppressed people, with the figure of the baited bear. 
Martius, they argue, continually torments the commonality with non-fatal 
blows, but blows which they are nevertheless powerless to escape. By virtue o f 
their corporeity, the plebeians are figuratively tied to the stake by famine and 
are therefore unable to evade physical harm.
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In common with the dual identification evoked by the rebarbative Protestant 
discourses o f the Renaissance, the metaphor of the bear pit allows for 
recognition o f the intense suffering that structures and sustains the subject 
Moreover, it paves the way for an articulation of the painful but creative 
process o f identifying with one’s tormentor. In the polemical pamphlets o f the 
period, the metaphor is employed with considerable and unsettling ambiguity 
and in Coriolanus, its valency is dependent upon its ability to capture something 
of this dilemma. The language of the play draws unflinchingly upon images o f 
dismembered bodies and riven flesh, but through these images we are 
encouraged to identify both with the experience of pain and with its inflictor 
and throughout the play we see the characters engaged in a similar interior 
battle.
Menenius inhabits an ambivalent position throughout the play, appearing to 
sympathise with the starving masses as well as the governing authority. This is 
manifest in the manner in which he seeks to deflect the animosity o f the 
plebeians who complain openly against the patricians:
I tell you, friends, most charitable care 
Have the patricians of you. For your wants,
Your suffering in this dearth, you may as well 
Strike at the heaven with your staves, as lift them 
Against the Roman state, whose course will on 
The way it takes, cracking ten thousand curbs 
O f more strong link asunder than can ever 
Appear in your impediment.
(1.164-71)
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Suggesting that the might of the Roman state dominates them to such an 
extent that they are like animals, kept in check by ‘curbs’, his rhetoric 
reinforces the plebeians’ perception of their oppressed position. He attempts 
to mollify the citizens by echoing their sentiments, playing upon their 
grievances and implying that because their situation is indeed as severe as they 
say, it is unable to be challenged.
However, Rome’s internal dissension cannot be conceived in terms of clearly 
polarised political agendas. To broach the gap between the opposing positions, 
tribunes were appointed to act as intermediaries. Although elected 
representatives o f the people, appointed to voice popular concerns and to 
redress the imbalances o f authority, Martius describes their office as having 
been ‘granted’ by the patricians in order that the plebeians might ‘defend their 
vulgar wisdoms’ (I.i.214). But by virtue of their position as elected members o f 
the governing patrician authority, they too are implicated in the poor 
treatment o f the commoners. Sicinius and Brutus are keenly aware of their 
onerous position and make their concerns explicit during Coriolanus 
candidacy for consulship. The First Senator s oration in support o f his 
application defers to the tribunes, asking, ‘Masters o th people,/ We do 
request your kindest ears, and after/ Your loving motion toward the common 
body/ To yield what passes here’ (II.ii.51-54). Endeavouring to resurrect the 
moribund metaphor o f the body politic, he provisionally includes the tribunes 
and asks them to empathise with the very figure they have previously 
identified as their tormentor. As the Third Citizen claims, ‘if he show us his
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wounds and tell us his deeds, we are to put our tongues into those wounds 
and speak for them’ (II.iii.5-7). However, this is no more comfortable for 
Coriolanus than for the plebeians. The process of dual identification threatens 
to render the differences between the two factions imperceptible, and as 
Girard has argued, it is not differences but the lack of them which gives rise to 
violence.
The tribunes also symbolise the way in which Coriolanus is encouraged to 
identify with the commoners he disdains. Requiring the people’s voices in 
order to validate his wounds, he must establish a connection with those he is 
at pains to differentiate himself from. Bitterly condemned by the tribunes for 
his excoriating treatment of the plebeians, they argue that, ‘They have chose a 
consul that will from them take/ Their liberties, make them of no more voice/ 
Than dogs that are as often beat for barking/ As therefore kept to do so’ 
(II.iii.212-214). As public feeling mounts against Coriolanus, he remains 
unable to disguise his hostility towards the very people who can secure his 
position. In a vituperative reproof he asks the tribunes:
Are these your herd?
Must these have voices, that can yield them now
And straight disclaim their tongues? What are your offices?
You being their mouths, why rule not their teeth?
Have you not set them on?
(III.i.32-35)
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As Brockbank notes, ‘[a] grim joke about the function of mouths and teeth in 
the body politic is transposed into a covert allusion to dogs’ (1976: 196), and 
as he goes on to observe, this is marked by particular reference to their use in 
bearbaiting. Increasingly envisaging his own position as a solitary one, 
Coriolanus perceives the plebeians as a rabble of dogs in pursuit o f a singular 
destructive aim, but with multitudinous ways of pursuing this aim. In the 
chaotic political arena, as in the bear pit, there are casualties.
In the wider political context, Rome’s relationship with the Volscians also 
resists categorisation as one of direct antipathy. In the first instance, the 
enmity Coriolanus openly bears against his own people dulls the impact o f any 
hostility he displays toward his adversaries. In fact, there is an unlikely bond 
between the two leaders. Coriolanus describes Aufldius as the man o f my 
soul’s hate’ (I.v.10) and in an exchange he declares:
CORIOLANUS I’ll fight with none but thee, for I do hate thee 
W orse than a promise-breaker.
AUFIDIUS W e hate alike:
N ot Afric owns a serpent I abhor 
More than thy fame and envy.
(I.viii.1-4)
Despite the rhetorical bravado, both leaders demonstrate a reluctant reverence 
for each other. In battle, each man reflects a favourable image of the other in a 
mutually constitutive relationship that derives its life force from violent 
combat. The relationship offers Coriolanus the possibility of identifying with 
his opponent in a way that he has previously been unable to do. Volumnia 
urges Virgilia, ‘See him pluck Aufidius down by th’hair, /  As children from a
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bear (I.iii.30-31). Her affirmation of Aufidius’ bear-like qualities proposes an 
image o f her son’s courage and fierceness, which, similarly bear-like, must 
necessarily exceed this. On no other occasion in the play is an antagonistic 
relationship presented in terms of a conflict between opponents o f (quite 
literally) equal standing. Aufidius himself asserts, ‘I would I were a Roman, for 
I cannot,/ Being a Volsce, be that I am’ (I.x.4-5).
There is not room on the political stage, however, for more than one ursine 
figure. Their relationship, which had previously been founded upon 
unrestrained antipathy, is transposed into one of uncanny resemblance. After 
his expulsion from Rome, Coriolanus promptly switches allegiance and makes 
his way to Antium to meet peaceably with Aufidius. The erotic charge o f the 
resulting exchange problematises each leader’s sense o f self. Immediately 
Coriolanus has affirmed that his dove’s upon/ This enemy town’ (IV.iv.23-24), 
Aufidius declares:
Know thou first,
I lov’d the maid I married; never man 
Sigh’d truer breath; but that I see thee here, 
Thou noble thing, more dances my rapt heart 
Than when I first my wedded mistress saw 
Bestride my threshold .. .Thou hast beat me out 
Twelve several times, and I have nightly since 
Dream t o f encounters ’twixt thyself and me — 
We have been down together in my sleep
(IV.v.l 14-125)
Their new-found union is described in overtly sexual terms, signalling the 
dissolution o f their separate identities in favour of a radical communion. Each
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figure previously crafted an image of himself in direct response to his political 
other. But once the formative tension generated by their fierce contrariety is 
abrogated, nothing remains to differentiate one from the other. In 
concordance, Coriolanus and Aufidius come closer to annihilating each other 
than they were ever able to in war.
Their alliance is short-lived, however. In Act V, scene three, Aufidius is in a 
position to reassert his enmity when Coriolanus reneges on his commitment to 
the Volscians. Volumnia appeals to her recreant son not to destroy Rome, 
pleading:
I f  it were so that our request did tend 
To save the Romans, thereby to destroy 
The Volsces whom you serve, you might condemn us 
As poisonous o f your honour. No, our suit 
Is that you reconcile them
(V.iii. 132-136)
But reconciliation would be fatal to both Coriolanus and Aufidius: neither
would have a political other against which to formulate their identity.
Although Coriolanus concedes to his mother’s request, he understands that in
doing so he has dismantled the architecture of his own subjectivity: he has
acceded to demands which remove the very conflict which has provided his
raison d’etre. In recognition o f this, he cries out:
O my mother, mother! O!
You have won a happy victory to Rome,
But for you son, believe it, O, believe it,
Most dangerously you have with him prevail d,
If  not most mortal to him. But let it come.
(V.iii.185-189)
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Aufidius too identifies the need for a restitution of their differences, remarking 
in an aside, ‘I am glad thou hast set thy mercy and thy honour/ At difference 
in thee. O ut o f that I’ll work/ Myself a former fortune’ (V.iii.199-201). The 
coalition endangered both men, but Aufidius can reclaim authority by 
vigorously advertising these differences.
Coriolanus, however, is ultimately overwhelmed and his attempt to reconcile 
the Romans and the Volscians does indeed prove fatal. In his brief experiment 
with peace he finally develops the capacity to identify, not only with the 
inflictors o f his pain, but also with the pain itself. Previously, he had 
acknowledged neither in full. In Act II, scene two he explains, W hen blows 
have made me stay, I fled from words’ (72), but in the final act, it is his 
mother’s persuasive speech that holds him. On his return to the Volscians he 
is declared a traitor and publicly gives himself up to be baited, asking, Cut me 
to pieces ... stain all your edges on me’ (111-112). Moments later, the people 
echo this, shouting ‘Tear him to pieces!’ (120): his desires and those of his 
enemies are conflated and given voice in the unanimous cries of, Kill, kill, kill, 
kill’ (128). He can no longer live under the illusion that man is ‘author of 
himself (V.iii.35) and succumbs to a knowledge that hitherto, he had only 
transiendy grasped. Formerly he remarked, ‘my soul aches/ To know, when 
two authorities are up,/ Neither supreme, how soon confiision/ May enter 
twixt the gap o f both (IILi. 107-110). In the end, forced to recognise his place
within the symbolic order, he finally acknowledges the inexorable conflicts 
upon which his subjectivity is founded.
It is Coriolanus’ relationship with language, therefore, which effects the most 
intense and unbearable violence. Throughout the play, his rigidity o f mind 
leads him to insist upon a ‘bolted language’ (III.i.319), but language, by its 
nature, is flexible and robust, and subject to continual flux. Moreover, 
subjectivity is dependant upon entry into its evolving symbolic system. 
Coriolanus, however, is ‘too absolute’ (III.ii.39) and as James L. Calderwood 
argues:
If  for him language is not subject to modification by the 
requirements o f different social situations, not flexible enough to 
respond in tone and style to the demands of decorum -  if it is not a 
social instrument, neither is it an instrument with which to probe 
and express the workings of the unconscious (1966: 216).
His lack o f eloquence is well documented and as a dramatic figure he has been 
compared unfavourably with Shakespeare’s other tragic protagonists. 
Volumnia taught him that ‘action is eloquence (III.i.76) but his 
uncompromising adherence to this belief results in a failure to fully engage 
with a linguistic system that connects him to all sections of the body politic. 
His desire to distance himself from the plebeians motivates him to restrict 
himself to a private, static language. Consequently, he lacks the symbolic 
apparatus necessary to understand the ambivalent feelings he comes to 
experience. Coriolanus is afforded a transitory glimpse of what Lacan terms 
the ‘real’ -  that which cannot be symbolised -  and whilst this would normally 
guarantee the subject’s full integration into the symbolic order, his relationship
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with language is not robust enough to assimilate, or reintegrate, an encounter 
with the traumatic kernel around which subjectivity his structured.
His failure to achieve such integration is best demonstrated by his relationship 
to the name Coriolanus . Lacan asserts that man defies his very destiny when 
he derides the signifier’ (1977: 158), and as Zizek explains,
the Word, the contraction of the Self outside the Self, 
involves an irretrievable externalisation-alienation ... by 
means of the Word, the subject finally finds himself, comes 
to himself: he is no longer a mere obscure longing for himself 
since, in the Word, he directly attains himself, posits himself 
as such. The price however, is the irretrievable loss of the 
subject’s self identity: the verbal sign that stands for the 
subject -  in which the subject posits himself as self-identical 
— bears the mark of irreducible dissonance; it never fits the 
subject (1996a: 46-47).
His commitment to maintaining a private meaning binds him to a futile 
struggle to make his name ‘fit’. But in order to truly ‘attain himself through his 
name, he must acknowledge the inherently social processes which allow it to 
have meaning. The rigidity o f his language does not allow him to incorporate 
this new-found knowledge; he is eventually destroyed by the discovery that his 
private identity is structured through and through by the social conditions he 
has worked to isolate himself from.
His death does not effect any wholesale restoration of balance, but instead 
signals a return to conflict: the only true constant. As the play ends with 
Aufidius’ artless eulogy, we know that his quarrel with the Romans will be
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resurrected. Just as it is in the bear pit, another figure will supersede 
Coriolanus: fatalities do not signal and end to the violence, because the 
individuals are simply replaced and the fighting continues. Towards the end of 
the play, the insurrections at Rome are discussed in a brief exchange between 
Roman and a Volsce. When the Yolsce asks, ‘Is it ended then?’, he is told that 
‘The main blaze o f it is past, but a small thing would make it flame again ... 
This lies glowing, I can tell you, and is almost mature for the violent breaking 
out’ (IV.iii. 15-26). The play opens with fighting and ends with the promise of 
more to come. The tragedy for Coriolanus, if indeed there is one, lies in the 
extent to which he gives way to the fractured sense of self that the fighting 
engenders. He identifies too readily with the agents of his suffering and is 
rendered incapable o f maintaining the necessary illusion of a coherent self- 
identity.
Much has been made o f the way in which theatrical discourses informed the 
lived experiences o f the Renaissance subject. In contrast to the model o f 
tragedy, bearbaiting, as I have shown, offers a model o f protracted violence 
which functions without a sense o f progression towards a meaningful end 
Rather, this violence is a structuring agent, integral to the conditions o f 
subjectivity. The analogy of the bear pit offers a radical understanding of what 
it means to be a subject, presenting a paradigm that explicidy addresses the 
notions o f ‘internal’ conflict that were focused on persistently during the 
Renaissance. Moreover, it explores the often-contradictory identifications 
made by the subject. The need for such a metaphor derives from the fact that
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cruelty is not a representation. It is life itself, in the extent to which life is 
unrepresentable’ (Derrida 2001: 294). However, it is conceptually impossible 
to completely dissociate the two discourses of tragedy and bear baiting, as I 
have tried to show in a reading of Coriolanus. As Girard states, c[t]he tragic 
dialogue is a debate without resolution’ (1988: 45), and it is a debate which 
takes place at the level o f language.
The Shrovetide violence at the Cockpit belongs to the paradigm of violence 
suggested by spectacle o f bearbaiting. Derived from a cyclical tradition of 
carnivalesque violence, which by its nature is endlessly repeated, the sacking of 
brothels and theatres signified the temporary cessation of a period o f violent 
excess. The approach o f Lent, a widely-observed season of fasting and 
penitence, exposed the common experience of prolonged internal conflict by 
highlighting the need for repeated demonstrable and outward signs of guilt 
and repentance. The antecedent violence signals an attempt to symbolically 
dismantle the signifiers of a baited subjectivity. In a contemporary account of 
this tradition of violence, Edmund Gayton observes that once the apprentices 
had plundered the theatres, ‘then to the Bawdy houses and reforme them, and 
instantly to the Banks side, where the poor Beares must conclude the riot 
(1654: 271).
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Chapter Six
“The surest way to charme a womans tongue is break her neck”1: 
Representing Domestic Violence
PETRUCHIO
KATHERINE
PETRUCHIO
KATHERINE
PETRUCHIO
KATHERINE
PETRUCHIO
KATHERINE
PETRUCHIO
KATHERINE
Good Lord, how bright and goodly shines the moon! 
The moon? The sun! It is not moonlight now.
I say it is the moon that shines so bright.
I know it is the sun that shines so bright.
... It shall be moon, or star, or what I list 
O r e’er I journey to your father’s house ...
Forward, I pray, since we have come so far,
And be it moon or sun, or what you please.
And if you please to call it a rush-candle,
Henceforth I vow it shall be so for me.
I say it is the moon.
I know it is the moon.
Nay, then you lie. It is the blessed sun.
Then God be blest, it is the blessed sun.
But sun it is not, when you say it is not,
And the moon changes even as your mind.
What you will have it nam’d, even that it is,
And so it shall be for Katherine.
(IV.v.2-20)
Arguably one o f the most violent episodes in The Taming of the Shrew, this 
exchange between the newly-weds reveals the intensity o f the violence which 
can be imposed at the level of language. As part of his ‘taming’ strategy, 
Petruchio systematically undermines the referential value of Katharine’s 
words, ensuring that her engagement with language is contingent upon his will. 
His arbitrary equivocation violently circumscribes her agency by determining 
the limits o f her ability to make meaning and to interpret the meanings o f 
others. The full force o f the violence is brought into relief by Kate’s prior 
insistence upon her right to speak:
' A Yorkshire Tragedy, (V.13), in Tucker Brooke (1967:251-261). All references to the play are 
from this edition unless otherwise stated.
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Why, sir, I trust I may have leave to speak,
And speak I will. I am no child, no babe.
Your betters have endur’d me say my mind,
And if you cannot, best stop your ears.
My tongue will tell the anger of my heart,
O r else my heart concealing it will break,
And rather than it shall, I will be free 
Even to the uttermost, as I please, in words.
(IV.iii.73-80)
Here, she makes an explicit connection between the possibility o f autonomy 
and linguistic freedom. By emphasising her status as ‘no child, no babe’ she 
aims to validate her right to such freedom, but her assertion -  CI will be free ... 
in words’ -  stands in opposition to the reality o f her situation, revealing 
instead the profound violence of Petruchio’s policy.
Lacan states that ‘no meaning is sustained by anything other than reference to
other meaning’ (1966: 478). Petruchio understands this implicitly, and exploits
the feelings o f  isolation engendered by his contrariety to alter Katherine’s
patterns o f behaviour. As Greenblatt explains,
[o]ur belief in language’s capacity for reference is part o f our 
contract with the world; the contract may be playfully 
suspended or broken altogether, but no abrogation is without 
consequences, and there are circumstances where the 
abrogation is unacceptable (1990: 15).
Positing himself as the sole arbiter o f meaning, Petruchio effectively curtails
Katherine’s involvement in the signifying process, severely delimiting her
agency. But the equivocal style that he employs to establish dominance seems
at odds with traditional assumptions about the differing ways in which men
and women use language.
In the words o f an anonymous sixteenth-century poet ‘Women are words,
Men deeds (Howells Devises 1906: 31). Ideas about language were certainly
heavily gendered, but the prominence o f rhetoric in Renaissance culture
rendered any neat polarisation unsustainable. As men were associated
primarily with action, those who advocated rhetorical training stressed its value
for those in positions o f authority, emphasising its power to rouse m d
motivate. In other words, they were at pains to highlight the performafivlty o f
language. For women, however, thek association with words was based upon
assumptions o f inaction or maleficence and those with rhetorical skill were
often viewed with suspicion.2 Gail Kern Paster explains that there was
a culturally familiar discourse about the female body, an 
anxious symptomatological discourse to be found in a variety 
o f  ... Renaissance ... texts, iconography, and the proverbs o f  
oral culture. This discourse inscribes women as leaky vessels 
by isolating one element of the female body’s material 
expressiveness — its production o f fluids -  as excessive, hence 
either disturbing or shameful- It also characteristically links 
this liquid expressiveness to excessive verbal fluency. In both 
formations, the issue is women’s bodily self-control or, more 
precisely, the representation o f a particular kind o f uncontrol 
as a function o f gender (1993: 25).3
Arguments opposing the use of rhetorical speech were often predicated upon 
a fear o f appearing too ‘feminine’ or garrulous and challenges to its morality 
were frequently based upon concerns about a lack o f control- Put simply, men 
were credited with an unaffected use of language, thought to amount to  a  
relatively exact correspondence between word and thing; women were seen as
One notable exception to this is, of course, Queen Elizabeth J, whose self-promotion as the 
"Virgin Queen’ was both an effect and a defence against the attacks made upon her powers as 
rhetorician.
' See for example The Tempest, in the opening scene the ship is described as being as leaky as an 
unstanched wench’ (I.i.47).
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equivocators, either unable, or unwilling to make meanings explicit, or as being 
verbally incontinent.
In her study o f women, words and sex in early modern London, Gowing 
discusses the dynamics of violence within marriage. She explains that ‘[mjen’s 
blows were figured as, most justifiably, a response to women’s words, and this 
equation featured not only in the popular literature o f marriage, but in the 
relations o f real marriages’ (1996: 208). However, in The Taming of the Shrew, 
words are Petruchio’s means o f countering the physical and verbal aggression 
o f his wife. His method o f asserting his patriarchal authority marks a 
deviation from the conventional wisdom o f ‘shrew-taming’ which accepted 
physical violence as the husband’s prevailing method o f disciplining an errant 
spouse. Emily Detm er contends that ‘[t]he same culture that still ‘felt good’ 
about dunking scolds, whipping whores, or burning witches was, during this 
period, becoming increasingly sensitive about husbands beating their wives’ 
(1997: 273). Indeed, ‘An Homily of the State of Matrimony’ states that wife 
beating ‘is the greatest shame that can be, not so much to her that is beaten, as 
to him that doth the deed’ (1562: 263v). This manifest movement away from 
the use o f physical force led to a preference for verbal coercion, and 
consequently to an increasing complication of the gendered differential 
between words and action. Petruchio’s deliberate disturbance o f the 
correlation between word and thing is an integral aspect o f his attempts to 
discipline his wife, but paradoxically, his use o f what was understood to be a
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female (lack of) logic constitutes his most dogmatic assertion o f male 
authority.
Responding to Lacan’s account o f the patriarchal structures implicit within the 
signifying process, Zizek comments:
W hat differentiates language from a natural entity or system is 
the presence in it o f the element designated by Levi-Strauss 
the mana-sigmfier: the ‘reflective’ signifier that holds the 
place within the system, o f what eludes the system, o f its not- 
yet-signified. The ‘openness’ o f a symbolic system has 
nothing whatsoever to do with the pressure o f the ever- 
changing external circumstances that compel the system to 
transform; in the case o f a symbolic system proper, this 
openness has to be inscribed into the ‘closed’ system itself in 
the guise o f a paradoxical signifier that represents non-sense 
within the field o f Sense -  what Lacan calls the phallic 
signifier (1994: 201).
Petruchio speaks non-sense with specific, culturally sanctioned aims. 
Moreover, he derives the authority to do so from a patriarchal order that 
actively encouraged husbands’ domination o f their wives. This same culture 
was organised around the production of meaning guaranteed by the 
paradoxical ‘reflective’ signifier, known in the work of Lacan as the phallic 
signifier. By enabling the possibility of future meaning, the patriarchal signifier 
asserts authority over absence -  the ‘not-yet-signified’ -  as well as over what is 
demonstrably present. In fact, as Zizek observes, ‘the phallic signifier is none 
other than ... a ‘signifier without signified’ (1994: 201). In The Taming of the 
Shrew, the drama o f this process is played out in a very literal sense. Petruchio 
relies heavily upon a practice of exposing gaps in meaning in order to assert 
his status as patriarch. As Dale Spender notes, ‘people affect others through
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the means o f organizing and structuring the world, through symbolizing and 
representing experience, through the construction o f reality’ (1984: 195). For 
Katherine, the implications o f the phallo-centric signifying system are far- 
reaching. Petruchio attempts to reproduce the ideals outlined in works such as 
William Whadey’s Bride Bash, where Whadey explains to women that Thy desire 
shall be subject to him, and he shall rule over thee. His will is the tie and tedder even 
o f my desires and wishes’ (1617: 36). Therefore, when she ultimately defers to 
her husband, saying, ‘What you will have it nam’d, even that it is ,/ And so it 
shall be for Katherine’ she is taking up the subject position dictated by this 
order.4
The growing distaste for acts o f physical violence used to discipline women 
does not, therefore, mark a movement away from the use o f violence. As 
Detm er suggests, ‘[t]he vigor o f public discourse on wife-beating exemplifies a 
culture at work reformulating permissible and impermissible means for 
husbands to maintain control over the politics of the family without, however, 
questioning that goal’ (1997: 273-274). Moreover, the motivation behind this 
departure was one o f promoting male interests rather than those o f women. 
That Petruchio achieves dominion over Katharine, not by physical force or 
verbal reprimands, but by exercising profound control over her ability to 
communicate with him and therefore, to formulate her position within society 
at large, is indicative o f an enduring and effective form o f subjection.
4 For further discussion o f  The Taming o f  the Shrew see also Deer (1991), Korda (1996) and 
Moisan (1991).
The various ways in which Renaissance culture represented domestic violence 
will be explored through an examination of A  Yorkshire Tragedy. Terence 
Hawkes suggests that ‘[a] good play ‘utters5, (or ‘outers’) the inward and 
formative presuppositions o f its audience, confronts it with, and so potentially 
resolves, its own essential and defining tensions’ (1973: 2). The Taming of the 
Shrew represents both physical and verbal abuse within the context o f 
marriage. But whilst it engages with the concerns of generic conduct literature, 
and in the style o f comedy, ostensibly reaffirms explicit gender hierarchies 
uncritically, A  Yorkshire Tragedy, like Arden of Favers ham, simply by dramatising 
real events, is already involved with the mediation o f the audience’s 
presuppositions, and therefore, with the circulation o f cultural meanings.5 
Based upon widely circulated accounts of actual domestic crime, domestic 
tragedies such A  Yorkshire Tragedy, Arden of Faversham, The Miseries of Enforced 
Marriage and A  Warning for Fair Women traversed the perceptual boundary 
between art and real life, re-presenting familiar crime narratives on the stage. 
In contrast, plays such as Shakespeare’s Othello and The Winter’s Tale rely upon 
Giraldi Cinthio’s Flecatommithi and Robert Greene’s prose Romance, Pandosto 
respectively as primary source materials. Shakespeare’s reworkings o f fictional 
narratives o f marital strife and infanticide around the tragic and tragic-comic 
structures o f the plays are shaped by an alternative set o f cultural imperatives 
and are concerned with exploring the societal rather than individual
5 Joel Fineman states, ‘In ways which are so traditional that they might be called proverbial, 
Shakespeare’s Taming o f  the Shrew assumes -  it turns out to make no difference whether it does 
so ironically -  that the language o f woman is at odds with the order and authority o f man (Parker
6  Hartman 1985: 138),
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implications o f events.6 Each work, however, replays and contests the 
meanings o f violence within the home, questioning the nature and legitimacy 
o f such violence, and the validity o f theological justifications for patterns o f 
violent behaviour. Moreover, they touch self-consciously upon the problems 
o f articulating violent experience. Domestic tragedy in particular interrogates 
the complicated presence of violence: although its meanings are always 
deferred in and through language, in subtle yet significant ways, domestic 
tragedies suggest that violence may be 'present’ in any representation o f 
violence. The violent potentiality embodied within linguistic structures is often 
the agent o f the violence inflicted within the domestic sphere. It is my 
intention here to attend to the latent violence that inheres within language and 
to examine its implications for the study o f violence within the Renaissance 
domestic sphere.
Domestic violence is defined by Women’s Aid7 as 'physical, psychological, 
sexual or financial violence that takes place within an intimate or family-type 
relationship and forms a pattern o f coercive and controlling behaviour’. 
Furthermore, they suggest that domestic violence 'is the result o f  an abuse o f  
power and control, and that it is rooted in the historical status o f women in
6 See, however, G. Wilson Knight’s essay on T he Othello Music’ in The Wheel o f  Fire where he 
argues that ‘Othello is eminently a domestic tragedy’ (1930: 120). See also Deats (1991; 79-94).
7 Women’s Aid is a charitable organisation which was established in 1974 to work with women 
who had experienced domestic abuse. It provides sheltered accommodation for families escaping 
violence in the home and campaigns to raise awareness of the issues surrounding domestic abuse. 
It also advises on the principles o f best practice for dealing with the victims and perpetrators o f  
violence and works to monitor and respond to policy development. The Women s Aid website 
contains more information.
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the family and in society’.8 These definitions are suggestive o f the current 
cultural meanings o f domestic violence, which necessarily form the parameters 
o f this argument. It may seem anachronistic or synchronic to employ a 
definition that is dependent upon current understandings o f domestic 
violence, and based upon modern conceptions o f the domestic. Indeed, the 
implicit suggestion that patterns o f abuse recur with such frequency that they 
appear contextually unspecific seems alarmingly essentialist. But it is 
undoubtedly true that women’s testimonies of men’s abuse replay similar 
experiences o f violence and injury. As Eagleton has observed, 'human history 
includes the history of the body, which in respect of physical suffering has 
probably changed little over the centuries’ (2003: xiv). He goes on to note that, 
‘the suffering body is largely a passive one, which does not suit a certain 
ideology o f self-fashioning’ (2003: xiv). However, cultures do fashion their 
modes o f enforcing violence and their responses to it, and changes to policy 
and practice are most readily discernible in societal approaches to the naming, 
control, and representation of violence.
In Elizabethan and Jacobean England, men were permitted to use moderate 
physical chastisement in order to ensure their wives’ good behaviour. The rule 
o f thumb governing the severity o f physical violence was just that: in the 
interests o f discipline, men were allowed to beat their wives with a stick no 
wider than their thumb. But despite this handy maxim, establishing 
permissible and impermissible uses of force remained highly subjective.
8 This definition is taken from their UK website: http://www.womensaid.org.uk
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Judging the level o f pain, and thereby arriving at a qualitative estimation o f the
level o f punishment was impossible.9 As Scarry notes, c[t]o have pain is to have
certainty-, to hear about pain is to have doubt (1985: 13). What is more, any
external intervention on behalf of the community was predicated upon shared
patriarchal objectives, and was usually designed to curb physical excess, rather
than to effect any changes to underlying motivations. As a consequence, suits
brought by women alleging men’s violence were far less likely to be successful
than those advanced by men on the basis o f a woman’s adultery.10
Ecclesiastical courts operated at a local level and provided a formal forum for
marital complaints. They administered canon law and their jurisdiction was
that o f sin, rather than crime. In order to bring charges o f cruelty, which
could only legitimately be pursued in cases o f alleged physical abuse, the
violence needed to be verifiably unjustified and life-threatening. The
disturbing testimony o f Margery Alyver indicates the type o f detail required:
Margaret ... hathe manie and sundry tymes ... come unto 
this deponent ... and make great mone and complayne unto 
her, weeping and crieinge, and tell this deponent howe cruelly 
her husband ... used and beaten her, showinge this deponent 
somtymes her eies which was blewe with her husbandes 
blowes, and tell this deponent that she knewe not what to 
doe, and that her husband would and had gryped her by the 
throte, and used her very cruellye wepinge bitterlye: showing 
this deponent she was in greate feare of her lyff with hym:
And further ... the said John Farmer had beaten ... soe 
greveouslye att one tyme, that she the said Margarett kepte 
her bed, for the space of 8 or nyne weeks, being sore brused 
and grypped in her body (cited in Gowing 1996: 209).
9 Note the etymology o f  the word ‘pain’ in the Latin ‘poena from the Greek poine meaning 
‘punishment or penalty’.
1 Only 26% o f women were successful in complaints made about violent spouses as opposed to 
42% o f  men alleging the woman’s infidelity (Gowing 1996: 181).
Margery s description of the abuse suffered by her neighbour Margaret Farmer 
makes for uncomfortable but familiar reading and suggests that patterns o f 
conjugal violence unfolded along very similar lines to those recognised today. 
And, as is still the case, such extreme treatment was undoubtedly more 
common than court records suggest. However, even in cases such as this, 
where incidents o f violence were detailed at length by a number o f witnesses, 
there was no guarantee o f bringing a successful suit. Because charges o f cruelty 
hinged upon establishing the boundaries beyond which violence became 
unjustifiable, men could engage in the process o f negotiating acceptable limits. 
In many instances, husbands worked to re-inscribe the verbal evidence against 
them within an alternative conceptual framework. If  it could be demonstrated 
that a wife’s conduct in some way warranted severe physical reprimand, 
allegations o f cruelty could easily be undermined.
Although violence was frequently advocated when women threatened to 
disturb the ‘natural’ order, the debate surrounding the issue o f men’s violence 
was escalating at the beginning o f the seventeenth century. Whilst popular 
ballads gave voice to opinions that, as a rule, were orientated unambiguously 
in favour o f men’s right to use force, the discursive tradition upheld by many 
writers and orators stimulated a number of considerate and sensitive 
contributions to the debate. A wholesale change in attitude was not a realistic 
outcome: even now, studies suggest that one in five young men and one in ten 
young women in Britain think that abuse or violence against women is
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acceptable.11 Blackstone summarises women’s legal position, stating that c[b]y
marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that is, the very being or
legal existence o f the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is
incorporated and consolidated into that o f the husband’ (1979, Vol I: 430). In
A n  Apology for Women, written in opposition to Gager’s oration o f  1608,
William Heale expounds his belief that it is actually unlawful for a husband to
beat his wife. He reasons:
The law ... being an artificial collection o f natural precepts, 
how can it dispense with so unnatural an action as for a 
husband to beat his wife, the one part himself: nay his other 
self, or his better half? No man did ever willingly hurt 
himself: or if any man hath, certainly he may jusdy o f all men 
be held a mad man: and therefore what mutual blows can 
lawfully pass between man and wife who are one and the 
selfsame? (1609: 10)
In common with his contemporaries, Heale reproduces an idea o f marriage as 
an institution which mirrors ‘natural precepts’, and upholds women’s 
subordinate legal position. However, he presses for a reinterpretation o f the 
meanings ascribed to the union o f husband and wife by insisting upon the 
physical, as well as theological consequences demanded by such a 
conception.12
11 These are the findings o f  a study undertaken by the Zero Tolerance Charitable Trust in 1998, 
cited on the UK’s Women’s Aid website http://www.womensaid.org.uk.
12 See Genesis 2:24 ‘Therefore shall a man leave his father and his mother, and cleave unto his 
wife: and they shall be one flesh’, and 1 Corinthians 7:4 ‘The wife hath not power o f  her own 
body, but the husband: and likewise also the husband hath not the power o f  his own body but the 
wife’. All quotations taken from the King James Bible (1611).
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In 1 he l.xnv s Resolution of Women s Rights T.E.’s argument is predicated upon the
same legal principles. He concurs that the law permits husbands to use a
certain degree o f force, but notes:
Fitzherbert sets down a writ which she may sue out o f 
Chancery to compel him to find surety o f honest behaviour 
towards her, and that he shall neither do nor procure to be 
done to her (mark I pray you) any bodily damage otherwise 
than appertains to the office o f husband for lawful and 
reasonable correction.
(1632: Ill.vii)
He also pursues a more robust interpretation o f the implications o f marital 
union, proposing that ‘if it be in none other regard lawful to beat a man’s wife 
then because the poor wench can sue no other action for it ... why may not 
the wife beat the husband again, what action can he have if she do?’ However, 
this beguiling logic worked better on paper than in practice, as the censure o f 
the local community was frequently brought to bear upon women who 
flagrantly challenged their allotted position.
The scold or shrew was the archetype o f such extreme female behaviour.
Women’s violent nagging, scolding or beating, was seen as the menacing
manifestation o f ill discipline and, as such, was seen to represent a threat to
societal order. Lynda Boose affirms that,
a ‘scold’ was, in essence, any woman who verbally resisted or 
flaunted authority publicly and stubbornly enough to 
challenge the underlying dictum of male rule. What is 
ultimately at stake in the determination to gender such 
criminal categories as ‘scold’ ... is the reinforcement of 
hierarchy through the production of difference (1991: 189).
A recurring m otif in the popular literature of the period, the figure o f the scold
served as a focus for pervasive male anxieties. Scolding wives were thought to
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emasculate their partners, overturning hierarchies that were central to the basic 
tenets o f society. Therefore, shrewish women were considered a significant 
problem and constituted recurring sites of resistance to the dominant 
patriarchal imperatives.
A  New Ye ares gift for Shrews (1620) pictorialises the actions of a husband beset 
by a disobedient wife. It portrays the husband’s week-long course of action:
fj
'iffc vmm A Moncitay ./ffjhewiff a o tb e jo c ln ^ a n 'a 'E ^ U y . fc & rb m jo ty  y\w A  vm o\ia^enji^ \ \ 
■u^ciliijrpontticUmrf^r. A n d  fay herJoundty uppon a F iyJq\A ndfhc m eA netyD hiittakN raSgti^ l 
'Then may be cate bis nttiaU in-jutue art t)te bondav  . • -  p j A /
___________  • ---- -—!—;---- —---- —■-------—----——-—' — ' .J?,
A  New Yeares Gift for Shrews c. 1620 (British Museum)
After marrying his wife on Monday, and becoming aware of her wayward 
behaviour on Tuesday, the husband takes a trip to the woods on Wednesday,
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efore spending Thursday gainfully employed in the fashioning o f a cudgel with 
which he knocks her soundly on Friday. By Saturday, it has become clear that 
she will not mend her ways, and we see her beating a quick retreat, pursued by 
the devil with his pitchfork. On Sunday, he is shown happily eating his meat in 
peace.
Strategies o f ‘shrew taming’ prioritised rituals o f humiliation and ‘naming and
shaming’. The enforced adoption of the terms ‘scold’ or ‘shrew’ had a
devastating and demeaning impact on the lives o f many women. In a
contemporary Elizabethan account o f England, Harrison notes that ‘harlots
and their mates’ were ‘often put to rebuke’ and punished by ‘carting, ducking,
and doing o f  open penance in sheets, churches and marketsteads’ although he
adds that, ‘as this is counted with some either as no punishment at all to speak
of or but smally regarded of the offenders, so I would wish adultery and
fornication to have some sharper law’ (1994: 189).13 George Riley Scott,
however, describes the punishment of the cucking stool in his comprehensive
work on the history o f torture, as ‘an ordeal to be dreaded’. He explains that
A chair or stool was fixed to the end of a long pole. When 
the culprit was seated in the chair, the pole was lifted, either 
by a number o f persons standing on the bank o f the river or 
pond, or operated by some mechanical contrivance, and the 
chair, with its human occupant, ducked in the water. In many 
cases a muddy or stinking pond was selected for the purpose.
(1995: 239)
13 It is worth noting that the process o f carting -  being dragged through the streets behind a cart 
was, in all other circumstances, reserved for those found guilty o f capital offences.
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Criminal and religious discourses o f shame were thereby inscribed upon the 
prostrate female body, reifying cultural constructions o f gender and 
reinforcing an ideology o f subjection. Reducing socially unacceptable 
behaviours to a degraded physicality, the cucking stool and also the bridling 
scold reinforced an abjected female body: neither subject nor object, the 
shamed female body occupied a liminal social space. As Julia Kristeva 
explains, what is abject ... is radically excluded ,.. And yet, from its place o f 
banishment, the abject does not cease challenging its master’ (1982: 2). In 
particular, the use of the scold’s bridle is suggestive o f widespread fears that 
shrewish women would continue to challenge the patriarchal order from their 
excluded position. Although records o f its use are less prolific than the local 
documentation detailing the use o f the cucking stool, it is frequently referred 
to in the recurring bridling metaphors found in texts o f the period. By 
physically preventing women’s speech, the bridle accentuates the fact that it 
was the female voice, rather than the female body as such, that was believed to 
threaten the social order.
Discernible tensions existed between the ideals o f female subordination and 
male ministration and the lived experiences o f married people. When 
repressive standards of womanly conduct were combined with the ambiguous 
expectations o f a man’s powers o f chastisement, the result was not always a 
happv marriage. The middle ground between harmonious relations and lethal 
violence was riven with a variety of physical, verbal and economic conflicts. 
Indeed, Houlbrooke remarks that ‘[mjarital disharmony and unhappiness ...
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were ... commoner than mutual affection or contentment in the view o f 
some’ (1984: 114). In addition to the overtly physical violence manifest within 
discordant relationships, violence could be effected on many levels. For 
example, men’s failure to provide their families with adequate financial 
support in their absence constituted abuse, and was articulated as such within 
the treatises and homilies on marital duties. In A  True Discourse of the Practices of 
Elizabeth Caldwell, an account o f Elizabeth’s attempted murder o f her husband 
Thomas, we are told o f the ‘continuance of [Thomas’s] absence’ and that ‘to 
the great discontentment o f his wife, and other friends, [Thomas left] her 
often times very bare, without provision o f such means as was fitting for her’ 
(1604: A4r). In this instance, the information is presented in mitigation o f her 
crime. William Vaughan draws attention to the husband’s obligations to 
‘provide for his wife and for her housekeeping’ (1608: N 7r). He also 
demonstrates sensitivity to the affective power of insult, counselling that ‘the 
husband must not injure his wife by word or deed’ (1608: N7r).
A robust language o f insult evolved to articulate the gamut o f connubial
experiences: Shakespeare’s Merry Wives of Windsor utilises this vocabulary and
explores its implications for gendered constructions o f identity. An
exasperated Ford, thinking he has been made a cuckold, complains:
See the hell o f having a false woman: my bed shall be abused, 
my coffers ransacked, my reputation gnawn at, and I shall not 
only receive this villainous wrong, but stand under the 
adoption o f villainous terms, and by him that does me wrong.
Terms! Names! (II.ii.280-285)
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Suggestions o f a woman’s promiscuous speech or sexual behaviour had 
potentially humiliating and repressive personal effects, but they could also 
have a similar substantive impact upon the lives of their husbands. Men’s 
reputations were undoubtedly affected by the behaviour o f their partners. 
Nevertheless, there was a marked disparity between the treatment o f m en’s 
and wom en’s transgressions within marriage. Men’s violence within the home 
was tried in the Ecclesiastical Courts, demonstrating that although it was 
recognised as unacceptable, it was not considered ‘criminal’ in the sense that it 
was not a civil offence. In contrast, violent acts committed by women were 
considered criminal, and, moreover, were thought to constitute an offence 
against the natural order. Women found guilty o f spousal murder, for example, 
were found guilty o f petty treason and sentenced to death at the stake.14
Before looking specifically at dramatic representations of domestic violence, it 
is first necessary to examine the domestic context in more detail. In his 
disquisition upon Christian economy, the Puritan preacher William Perkins 
states that ‘[a] family is a natural and simple society o f certain persons, having 
mutual relation to one another under the private government of one’ (1609: 1). 
The family unit generally consisted of a mother and children, subject to the 
authority o f the husband/father. However, during the Renaissance domesticity 
was not synonymous with ideas of privacy which we would now consider 
central. Lawrence Stone observes, ‘[t]he most striking characteristic o f the ... 
family, at all social levels, was the degree to which it was open to external
14 See Dolan (1992: 317-340).
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influences, a porosity that is in contrast to the more sealed off and private 
nuclear family that was to develop’ (1979: 69). Homilies and conduct manuals 
stressed an image of the family as a microcosm o f the wider overarching 
structures o f state. Utilising an extremely common metaphor, Thomas Smith 
offers an idealised account: ‘in the house and family is the first and most 
natural ... appearance of one o f the best kinds o f commonwealth ... for it is 
but an house, and a little spark, resembling as it were that government’ (1589: 
12-14). Consequently, disruptions to this order were communal concerns.
Mamage was considered a woman’s primary vocation, but was often seen as a
disadvantage to men. However, as the mainstay o f family life, it was upheld as
an ‘honourable estate’15, the closest one could come to achieving paradise on
earth. The Puritan theologian, William Perkins, states that marriage ‘is a  state
... far more excellent than the condition o f single life ... ordained by G od in
paradise, above and before all other states o f life’ (1609:10). But the prevailing
arguments in favour of marriage were, as Catherine Belsey points out, fraught
with contradictions and paradox:
Marriage is Paradise, but Paradise is the place o f loss; Adam 
was created happy, but not happy enough to manage without 
a help meet for him, a mate like him; the woman God made 
to supply what Adam lacked endangered and destroyed his 
God-given happiness; marriage both repairs and reaffirms the 
origmary loss (1999: 75).
The vision o f marriage expounded by the church was indebted to the gender 
hierarchies set forth in the Old Testament book of Cenesu as women were told
’■ -The forme o f  solemnization o f matrimony . The Book of Common Prayer (1559)
240
that ‘thy desire shall be to thy husband, and he shall rule over thee’ (Genesis 
3.16)16. In the main, conduct manuals, sermons and homilies were structured 
around this central point, unilaterally asserting that the woman ‘submit herself 
and be obedient’ (Dod & Cleaver 1614: 217). For example, in the popular 
wedding sermon, A. Bride Bush, Whately explains that ‘[t]he whole duty o f the 
wife ... is to acknowledge her inferiority, the next to carry herself as inferior’ 
(1617: 36) and William Gouge warns against the ‘fond conceit that husband 
and wife are equal’ (1634: III.4). But although preachers and writers cited the 
scriptures as the incontrovertible basis for their exhortations, there was an 
underlying anxiety about the disruption o f this ‘pre-ordained’ hierarchy.17 The 
position maintained by many o f the writers o f conduct literature was perhaps 
too severe, belying the precarious moral high-ground from which they 
pontificated. The ideals o f femininity they discussed at length were, after all, 
the products o f a patriarchal discourse rather than articulations o f ontological 
truths.
It was a popular assumption that the female partner was, inherently, m ost 
likely to undermine the institution o f marriage. Unchastity, purported to be an 
exclusively female vice, was proclaimed the foremost danger to marriage. W hat 
is more, this assumption was reified in law, as Gowing explains: ‘[effectively,
16 In this chapter, all references to the Old and New Testaments are taken from the King James 
Bible unless otherwise stated.
17 For examples o f  scripture used to justify patriarchy, see Ephesians 5: 22-24, which states ‘Wives 
submit yourselves unto your own husbands, as unto the Lord. For the husband is the head o f  the 
wife, even as Christ is the head o f the church: and he is the saviour o f the body. Therefore as the 
church is subject to Christ, so let wives be subject to their husbands in everything’. See also, 1 
Corinthians 11:3, ‘But I would have you know, that the head o f every man is Christ; and the head 
of every woman is the man’.
only women could be penalized for extramarital sex and only men could be 
guilty o f violence. The meanings o f these two offences were central to the 
gender relations o f marriage’ (1996: 180). This was compounded by the fact 
that, in practice, adultery was far easier to define, and was therefore, ostensibly 
easier to establish, than violent or cruel behaviour. Gowing observes that 
‘[m]ost couples had a servant or apprentice who was usually in the house; walls 
were thin, keyholes large, and partitions o f cloth easy to pull aside ... Clearly, 
some holes in the walls may have been legal fictions: there were particular 
conventions for testifying to adultery’ (1996: 190). As I have noted above, the 
home did not allow for privacy as it is understood today, and the opportunities 
created by the physical layout o f the household were open to exploitation. 
Frequendy, these opportunities did not work in women’s favour, as living 
conditions and legal conventions conspired to perpetuate the myths o f female 
conduct.
Conduct manuals were addressed almost exclusively to men, on the 
assumption that they had responsibility for their wives, sisters and daughters. 
Those sections o f sermons and manuals designed for the specific instruction 
of women emphasise the significance o f modest and temperate speech. 
William Gouge counsels that ‘[a] wife’s outward reverence consisteth in her 
reverend ... speech’ (1634: III.9). Patriarchal culture located the outward signs 
of a woman’s chastity in her discourse and although women were linked with 
words in a sense that suggested inaction, this association also had material 
implications. Henry Smith suggested that a woman ‘may learn her duty out o f
her names’ (1591: 69), names such as ‘goodwife’, ‘yokefellow’ and ‘com forter’. 
But although women were to ‘perform’ the designations attributed to them by 
a masculine discourse, they were discouraged from exercising linguistic 
independence. Rather, a woman must ‘hold the peace to keep the peace’ 
because ‘it becometh her to keep silence’ (Smith 1591: 69). Samuel Rowlands 
even condescends to reveal that women’s ‘hearts are sorry for their tongues, 
G od knows’ (1617: A4vf£). In his discussion o f The English Gentlewoman, 
Richard Braithwait informs his male readers that the ‘[t]ruth is, their tongues 
are held their defensive armour: but in no particular detract they more from 
their honour than by giving too free scope to that glibbery member ... It suits 
not with her honour for a young woman to be prolocutor’. ‘Silence in a 
woman’, he opines ‘is a moving rhetoric, winning most, when in words it 
wooeth least’ (1631: 88-90). Because o f shared concerns about the effects o f 
dilation, loquacity and uncontrolled speech were tacitly linked to unchasteness 
in a misogynistic conflation o f the mouth and sexual organs.18 Moreover, as 
Boose asserts, ‘[a] discourse that locates the tongue as the body’s “unruly 
member” situates female speech as a symbolic relocation o f the male organ, an 
unlawful appropriation o f phallic authority in which the symbolics o f male 
castration are ominously coimplicit (1991: 204). A woman’s honour was 
thought to inhere within her speech and, for women, skill in rhetoric or 
eloquence, the structured and persuasive use o f speech associated with 
masculine virtue, was considered incompatible with feminine virtue.
18 See, for example, Erasmus Lingua (1989) and Plutarch (1939). See also Paster (1993).
During the period there was an increase in the number o f cases o f marital 
litigation which provided an unprecedented platform for women’s speech. 
Gowing provides a comprehensive discussion of the way in which gendered 
stereotypes were both constructed and reconstituted in the narratives o f 
marital conflict. Although women were required to assimilate stereotypes o f 
femininity within their testimony, they were also engaged in a subtle process o f 
reconfiguring the meanings ascribed to wives and female litigants. In 
particular, documentation from local Ecclesiastical courts comprises a 
substantial body of contemporary evidence detailing violence within marriage. 
Despite positing women in a legally disadvantageous situation, the courtroom 
did allow women a prominent position that was precluded in every day life, 
affording their words verifiable agency. Gowing demonstrates that narratives 
o f abuse and adultery were adapted to conform to the conventions o f the legal 
system, as well as to withstand the scrutiny of the local community. In order 
for complaints to have both legal and communal currency they were bound by 
the precepts o f oral and print culture. Indeed, Gowing states that the function 
o f the stories o f abuse lay as much in their very telling, as in the decision they 
were meant to win’ (1996: 232).
The domestic sphere was increasing in significance around the turn o f the 
seventeenth century. In the fifty years between 1560 and 1610, the population 
o f London had doubled, transforming the urban landscape (Ackroyd 2001: 
102). As a result London became seriously overcrowded; disease spread 
rapidly, crime was rife and there were concerns about the availability o f basic
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provisions. Many attempts were made to address the problems spawned by the 
population explosion; in 1580 Elizabeth I issued a proclamation that 
prohibited any new buildings within three miles of the gates o f the city, and in 
addition, she prohibited more that one family from occupying each house. The 
increasingly prescriptive nature o f conduct literature focused specifically upon 
this evolving domain, and upon the institution o f marriage and the 
‘fundamental’ tenets of household government. The family unit was o f 
considerable political value, as it was an expedient method o f exercising social 
control at a domestic level which replicated the structures o f the governing 
authorities. Men were encouraged to manage their families as a little 
commonwealth, ensuring that the sphere o f patriarchal influence was 
widespread and diffuse. However, there were tensions underneath the surface. 
Arden of Faversbam and A  Yorkshire Tragedy provide dramatic representations of 
the ideology o f family life in crisis. The Renaissance theatre, and domestic 
tragedy in particular, adapted to confront and explore the tensions that 
intersected the institution of marriage and people’s experiences of family life.19
19 Women’s Aid affirms the importance o f accessible cultural representations o f domestic abuse, 
explaining that ‘Today, the issue o f domestic violence has become increasingly prominent... it is 
.... discussed by politicians and legislators, and in the media. Public interest in the issue has grown 
significantly, as indicated by the presence o f domestic violence as a key storyline in all the major 
British soaps in the last few years. Hardly a day goes past without a mention o f domestic violence 
... in the press, on the radio and the television. It is a regular topic for discussion in the women's 
press, daytime television and chat shows (http://womensaid.org.uk: Women’s Aid, A B rief 
History). Scriptwriters’ discussions o f a high profile storyline involving domestic violence for the 
soap opera EastEnders, illustrate the importance o f popular representations o f social issues. Alison 
Graham writes o f  the ‘singular responsibilities placed on soap bosses who inhabit a genre that can 
seem only too real to certain sections o f its audience’ (Radio Times 26 Oct — 1 Nov 2002: 21). 
Louise Berridge, executive producer of EastEnders, explains, ‘[w]e did a lot o f research and one 
o f the facts that kept recurring, one of the reasons women stay with abusive partners, is the belief 
that they will reform. My concern ... was that if we tried to redeem Trevor [the violent husband] 
and let him settle down to a happy life, then we were actually sending out the wrong message. 
Potentially you could have a woman saying, “He will change, because Trevor did (26 Oct — 1 
Nov 2002: 21). This demonstrates that representations o f social problems produced for popular
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Legislative procedure and the workings of the state were obscured from public 
view, and, therefore, the instrumentality of the debate effected perceptual 
rather than statutory changes that affected people’s everyday experiences.
The fashion for sensational stories from the domestic sphere reached its peak 
between 1590 and 1610 in domestic dramas that engaged with the anxieties 
generated by the circulation o f stories of violence within the home. The source 
material o f domestic drama was most commonly the work o f writers o f 
broadsides, ballads and pamphlets. Accounts of the trials and executions o f 
those guilty o f infanticide or spousal murder made extremely popular reading 
and in some instances were even included in collected works such as 
Holinshed’s Chronicles. Their frequent basis in truth rather than in myth or 
literature produced dramas with a distinctive affective power. Attending to the 
‘middling sort’ o f people rather than the nobility, the plays deviated self­
consciously from their classical antecedents. A  Yorkshire Tragedy is a self­
professed tragedy, but without doubt, a very different kind from that 
developed in plays such as Dr Faustus, King Lear and Macbeth. A definitive 
definition o f tragedy has proved notoriously problematic, and as a result, it is 
difficult to provide an explanation o f domestic tragedy in terms o f its 
deviation from conventions. However, beginning from Anstotle s assertion 
that ‘tragedy is an imitation o f people better than we are (1996: 25), 
perceptible differences begin to emerge. 1 his is, in part, a consequence o f the 
plays’ composition of characters from ‘ordinary life — not the usual subjects
consumption play a pivotal role in stimulating debate and allowing for the renegotiation o f  societal 
attitudes and responses to these problems.
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of tragedy. In his discussion o f Shakespeare’s imitation o f the world, A.D.
Nuttall explains that ‘proper’ tragedy is concerned with events that have
serious and far-reaching consequences; in contrast, domestic tragedy deals
with ‘murder on a level which involves no repercussions among nations’
(1983: 132). There is, therefore, an important distinction between the public
and private spheres. Indeed, as Eagleton observes,
the fortunes of the great are thought to be of more public or 
historic moment that the affairs o f the lowly. The high/low  
distinction is thus a private/public one too: the illustrious are 
symbolic representatives of a more general condition, and can 
thus catalyse a more world-historical tragedy that their more 
parochial, less well-connected inferiors (2003: 85).
In  contrast with the aesthetic ideals that characterise Elizabethan and Jacobean 
tragedy, domestic tragedy was informed by distinctive cultural imperatives. 
Analysis of the proliferation of domestic drama has identified a number of 
significant influences. Keith Sturgess suggests that ‘[a] domestic tragedy ... is a 
play with a sad end which seriously depicts crime and punishment in the lives 
o f ordinary men, often dwelling on the disruption o f normal family 
relationships’ (1985: 14). However, as Nuttall observes, ‘in the common run 
of Elizabethan domestic tragedy there is admittedly little sense o f tension 
between the idea o f tragedy and the idea of domesticity (198a: 133). This is 
suggestive of the status afforded to the institution o f marriage and the family 
unit, which, as Belsey argues, ‘becomes in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries the site of a paradoxical struggle to create a private realm and  to take 
control of it in the interests of the public good (1985: 130).
Critics such as Alfred Harbage have emphasised the homiletic content of 
domestic drama as one o f its distinguishing features, and there is no doubt that 
the abundant instructional material upon marriage was a pivotal aspect o f 
domestic drama. But although paradigms o f domestic patriarchy lie at the 
centre o f these plays, they are not deployed uncritically. A variety o f  societal 
factors combined at the end of the sixteenth century and the beginning o f the 
seventeenth century to put the institution and the ideology o f marriage under 
pressure. Unprecedented population growth and the emerging possibilities o f  
social mobility created a pervasive sense o f unease concerning the 
sustainability o f the social order. As a replica in miniature o f  the hierarchies o f  
state, the family was considered to be o f paramount importance for the 
continuation o f social stability. Indeed, an engagement with the institution o f  
marriage as an ideological structure sets apart the domestic from other forms 
o f drama that deploy an urban setting: domestic drama focused on the family 
in particular, rather than urban life in general Reflecting and renegotiating 
social attitudes to domestic crime, dramatic representations in particular reveal 
a fascination with the impulse to articulate stories o f violence, and with the 
limitations o f language that any attempt to do so discloses.20
Arden of Favers bam provides a representation o f domestic murder perpetrated 
by a woman. Belsey notes that c[a]t a time when all the evidence suggests that
20 The pam phlet. Two Most Unnatural and Bloodie Murthers (1 6 0 5 ), which provides the source  
for the p lay, exp la in s that: ‘There hath happened o f  late within the county o f  York not far from  
W akefield  a  m urder so detestable, that were it not it desires record for exam ple sake, h u m an ity  
could Wish it rather utterly forgot, than any Christian heart should tremble with the rem em brance  
o f  it’ (S turgess 1985: 303).
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crimes of violence were by no means uncommon, Alice Arden’s crime was
cited, presented and re-presented, problematized and reproblematized, during
a period o f at least eighty years after it was committed’ (1982: 83). Its
undoubted appeal is derived, at least in part, from its representation o f female
culpability. Ostensibly, the play reinforces gender stereotypes with a portrayal
o f an adulterous woman governed by her sexuality. However, as Vivianna
Commensoli contends, ‘The Tragedy of Master Arden of Taversham invites the
spectator to confront the possibility that, as collective obligations, civility and
domestic patriarchy are neither unchangeable nor metaphysically ordained’
(1999: 84). The characters resist reductive stereotyping, and Alice cannot be
considered simply as an adulteress any more than Arden can be regarded
principally as a cuckold. Easy distinctions prove untenable, as the audience is
privy to information about Arden’s chequered past and current unethical
business dealings. We are invited to consider the possibility that Alice Arden
may function as the agent of providence, exercising God’s vengeance. In the
epilogue, Arden’s friend Franklin remarks,
Arden lay murthered in that plot of ground 
Which he by force and violence held from Rede;
And in the grasse his bodyes print was seen 
Two yeeres and more after the deed was done.
(Epilogue 10-13)21
Arden’s avariciousness is stressed throughout the play, and the unnatural mark 
left by his corpse suggest that he too has violated the natural order.
21 All quotations are taken from The Tragedy of Master Arden o f  Faversham, (Tucker Brooke 
1967).
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Alexander Leggatt notes that ‘One matter to which he [the playwright] returns 
almost obsessively is the striking o f bargains. The play is full o f oaths, 
obligations, words given and kept, given and broken’ (1983: 124). Belsey and 
Leggatt offer persuasive readings of the play, suggesting that it forms a critique 
o f the institution of marriage, and more generally, of the repressive nature o f 
oaths and vows. As women were supposed to perform their gender through 
their speech and gesture, their social position was constructed by the verbal 
commitments they made. Alice’s sense of obligation vacillates wildly and 
lethally throughout the narrative, however. Arden’s friend and confidante, 
Franklin, remarks that ‘sweete words are fittest engines/ To race the flint 
walles o f a womans breast’ (1.46-47). Indeed, Alice herself suggests that she 
had fallen victim to the rhetorical dexterity o f her lover, Mosbie: ‘Fore I was 
tangled with thy tysing speech, Arden to me was dearer then my soule’ (197- 
198). Later, however, she exclaims
ALES What? shall an oath make thee forsake my love?
As if I have not sworne as much my selfe 
And given my hand unto him in the church!
Tush, Mosbie; oathes are wordes, and wordes is winde, 
And winde is mutable: then, I conclude,
Tis childishness to stand upon an oath.
(435-440)
Exploiting the possibilities o f language for her own advantage, Alice maintains 
a keen sense o f her own linguistic agency, and at one point declares, I whetted 
on the gentleman with words (565). Except when it may appear expedient, and 
then, only for appearances sake, Alice does not demonstrate her subordination 
to the prescriptive codes governing women’s speech. In contrast, the wife in A
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Yorkshire Tragedy functions as the embodiment of the male ideal o f women’s 
speech.
In the opening scene o f A. Yorkshire Tragedy the serving man, Samuel, arrives 
"Fumisht with things from London with an almanac in his pocket and three 
ballads in his codpiece. He declares "I am the true picture o f a Common 
servingman ... hanged after the truest fashion’ (1.26-36). His burlesque 
habiliments — three hats, two glasses, rebato wires and a capcase — render the 
actor’s "picture’ o f a fashionable serving man palpably mimetic. Moreover, the 
contents o f his pocket and codpiece serve to situate the play within an 
expanding network of plays, publications and rumour involved with the 
dissemination o f information, gossip and scandal. Although a character within 
the play, and therefore a representation, Samuel is also figured as a 
representative consumer o f the sensationalist printed materials that provided 
the source o f plays such as A  Yorkshire Tragedy. Consequently, the play focuses 
reflexively upon the conditions of its production and reception within a wide 
cultural contexture. In their discussion of the "the news from London the 
three serving men open the play by sharing and exchanging gossip, which 
provides the audience with a perspective on the Calverlys marnage. Calverly, 
although previously engaged to another woman, is now marned to another 
woman, ‘beates his wife, and has two or three children by her (1.52-53). The 
serving men pun upon the sexual connotations o f beating and inflicting blows, 
remarking "you must note that any woman beares the more when she is beaten 
... for she beares the blowes’ (51-56). However, they report, with obvious
disapproval, that Calverly ‘calls lus wile a w hore as familiarly as one w ould cal 
M ai Do I, and his children bastards as naturally as can bee’ (69-72). Audience 
reaction to the husband is primed by this exchange.
Renowned for his extreme verbal and physical aggression, the husband enjoys
a profligate lifestyle incompatible with his responsibilities as husband and heir.
His Jack o f circumspection causes his wife great anxiety:
~WIEE Thinke on the state of these three lovely boies
You have bin father to.
HUSBAND: Puh! Bastards, bastards, bastards;
begot in tricks, begot in tricks,
WIFE: Heaven knows how these words wrong me, but I maie
Endure these greifes among a thousand more ... 
HUSBAND: Ha done, thou harlot ...
thinkst thou thy wordes 
Shall kill my pleasures? (II. 67-80)
Here he responds to her supplications with characteristic excess. With the pre-
hgurative metaphor of murder -  ‘thinkst thou thv w ords/ Shall kill my
pleasures?5 -  he contends that his wife's words can have no effect upon his
actions. Simultaneously, however, his words enact a form of verbal violence
.upon his wife and children. This metaphor of the damaging physical effects of
.language recurs throughout the play, running parallel to the portrayal o f
corporeal violence.
Despite his wife’s entreaties, gaming and gambling remain compelling 
pastimes for the husband. His increasing discomfort with the burdens o f 
familial obligation is articulated in a vehement rebuttal of the institution of 
marriage. He complains, ‘I hate the very hour I chose a wife, a trouble,
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trouble! Three children like three evils hang upon me. Fie, fie, fie, strumpet & 
bastards, strumpet and bastards!’ (106-110). But his disillusionment reaches 
crisis point when he identifies with the experience o f the scold or shrew: ‘that 
mortgage sits like a snaffle upon mine inheritance, and makes me chaw upon 
Iron’ (II.50-51). He believes that marriage and primogeniture have, as Francis 
Bacon warns, ‘given hostages to fortune, for they are impediments to great 
enterprises’ (1985: 81). Realising his feelings of impotence through the 
m etaphor o f the bridling scold, he envisions himself emasculated by 
patriarchy. The methods of physical correction cultivated to address the 
problems o f women’s wayward speech now function as a metaphor for his 
financial estate. The unashamedly phallic spike o f the bridle -  a signifier of 
patriarchal power -  is metaphorically turned inward, penetrating and deflating 
all vestiges o f  male authority.22
His ‘feminisation’ is further emphasised by the peculiarities o f his speech. 
W omen’s language was, as I have shown, subject to rigorous controls that 
were established upon the premise that their language would betray their 
lubricity and ultimately disturb the social order. The husband, however, 
displays all the characteristic linguistic excesses attributed to women. His 
insults are uttered unchecked: he lacks the qualities o f restraint, and thereby 
exemplifies the notion of ‘dilation’ associated with feminine speech. His
22 Interesting parallels may be drawn with Scarborrow’s feminised perception o f himself in The 
Miseries o f  Enforced Marriage 1607, a play based upon the same events: ‘Here she remembers me 
I am a manJ  Black whore with perjury, whose sinful breast,/ Is character like those cursed o f the 
blessed’ (II i 99-104) See also Sir Francis Ilford’s description o f him as a woman giving birth: 
‘How now my young bully, like a young wench forty weeks after the loss o f her maiden head,
crying out’ (Il.i. 105-106).
repetitive utterances such as ‘bastards, bastards, bastards’ and ‘many, many, 
mony’ devalue the meanings ascribed to his words, and the sense o f what he 
says becomes lost in the way in which he says it. Principally, however, his 
verbal and financial incontinence debases the currency o f his family name.
W ith what would have been understood as characteristically ‘femwioe’ 
injudiciousness, the husband insults his wife and family with no concern about 
being heard. However, he is overheard by a group o f gentlemen, one o f  whom 
chooses to speak out against his conduct:
1 GENTLEMAN Still doe those loathsome thoughts 
Jare on your tongue?
Yourself to stain the honour of your wife,
Nobly descended! Those whom men call mad
That wounds himselfe, whose own wordes do  prockim
Scandals unjust, to soil his better name: (111-1 lb)
Expounding an ideological position similar to that described in the writings o f 
William Heale and T.E., the Gentleman develops the recurring metaphor 
which lin k s  words with physical injury, arguing that the husband’s 
imprecations will impact negatively upon him. In marriage the husband and 
wife became one, and, therefore, the insults o f his own wordes wound 
himselfe’, and in  particular, his family name. Indeed, the Galverly name, he 
suggests, is .figu r a tiv e ly  bloodied and soiled by the wTounds the husband has 
inflicted. The corporeal imagery is continued as the Gentleman adds, I a tn  
sorry for thee: that a man spends with shame/ That with his ritches does 
consume his name’ (139-145). Here, the family name is pointedly 
conceptualised as a tangible entity, as mutable as the human body itself- His
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declining status is signified by the change in the Gentleman’s use of personal 
pronouns. In the first instance, when he asks ‘Still doe those loathsome 
thoughts/ Jare on your tongue?’ he retains the respectful ‘your’. The 
subsequent use o f the disparaging ‘thee’ indicates a marked shift in opinion.
The husband is quick to reduce the sense of the Gendeman’s argument to a 
quibble upon his wife’s chastity. When the Gentleman states that ‘o f all the 
w orst:/ Thy virtuous wife, tight honourably allied,/ Thou hast proclaimed a 
strumpet’, the husband responds with the deliberately provocative suggestion, 
‘Thou art her ... privat friend,/ The partie you wot on’ (11.159-164). However, 
it is the husband’s reputation that has been metaphorically violated by the 
expediencies o f a patriarchal authority he no longer has any claim upon. 
Injured in the fight which follows their argument the husband complains, ‘My 
strumpet wife,/ It is thy quarrel that rips thus my flesh,/ And makes my brest 
spit blood, but thou shalt bleed.’ Reifying the verbal dispute over his wife’s 
imagined infidelity in terms of his own wounds, the husband explicitly 
acknowledges the violent potential of language. But because he conceives o f 
the injuries he sustains as a cause to impose further violence upon his wife — 
vowing ‘thou shalt bleed’ — he denies his own agency by refusing to accept 
responsibility for his speech. The Gentleman proposes, Strike thine own 
follies, for it is they deserve/ To be wel beaten (11.138-139), but the husband 
pursues his violent course.
The husband’s boundless capacity for inflicting violence is dem onstrated  
when, in an attempt to improve her husband’s dire financial situation, Mrs 
Galverly, with her uncle’s help, secures for him a place at Court. Enraged by 
her failure to raise money from the sale o f her dowry, the husband kicks her, 
for the second time, then threatens her with a knife:
HUSBAND Money, whore, money, or lie -  (Dram his dagger)
Enters a servant very hastily.
What the devel? how now? thy hasty news? {to his mm) 
SERVANT Maie it please you, sir — {Servant in a feare)
HUSBAND What? maie I not looke upon my dagger? Speake villain,
or I will execute the point on thee: quick, short ...
WIFE Was ever wife so wretchedlie beset? (1Vif. Alone)
Had not this newes stept in between, the point
Had offered violence unto my brest
That which some women call great misery
Would show but little here: would be scarce be seene
Amongst my miseries. 1 maie Compare
For wretched fortunes with all wives that are.
Nothing will please him until all be nothing.
(III.76-93)
T he initial insults and demands are followed by physical threats which leave 
the wife powerless to contend with his violent and destructive impulses. 
Significantly, at this particular moment o f potentially murderous action, the 
implied relationship between words and wounding is reversed, so that verbal 
utterance now becomes a barrier to the threat o f bodily harm, rather than its 
agent. Here, the motion of the dagger is halted by the .arrival o f  the servant 
with news.
The play as a whole traces a complex and powerful relationship between 
language and violence, linking the effects of words metaphorically with the
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infliction o f physical violence. As the play progresses, however, it becomes 
clear that the link is not simply metaphorical, and that language has the 
potential to inflict material harm. For the husband, language is, paradoxically, 
both a means with which to effect violence, and the site upon which his 
agency is forfeited. The wife experiences die insidiousness o f a widespread 
cultural restraint upon women’s free speech which is actuaiised jn her 
articulation o f a language which is not her own: her verbal respouse to the 
violence she suffers at the hands o f her husband is restricted by itTje 
available to her.
Scarry’s study o f the body in pain explores the implications o f  the 
inexpressibility o f physical pain. She writes that -in the ease -of pain >the 
‘objecflessness, the complete absence of referential content, almost prevents it 
from  being rendered in language’ (1985: 162). Testimonies such as Margaret 
Farm er’s reveal the inherent difficulties of talking about the physical pain o f 
abuse. Acting as a witness, her neighbour paraphrases her story in  court, 
detailing the moans and cries, and the points at which Margaret had relied 
simply upon showing her bruises. Unable to find words, she lets her injuries 
signify the pain she was experiencing. Our contemporary understanding of 
violence within the home is informed by the term domestic violence which 
we now  ascribe to it. In Elizabethan and Jacobean England, the .available 
vocabulary for naming domestic violence oscillated between two extremes, as 
it was conceptualised either as extreme cruelty or as legitimate discipline. 
Although the aesthetics of violence may be culturally determined, the reality1 of
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physical pain remains, and, as Scarry argues, the purposeful infliction of pain is 
‘inextricably bound up with the generation o f a political “fiction”3 (19.85: 161). 
The family was the locus for the inculcation of women, children and men with 
the ideologies of male dominance and female subjection. The long tradition o f 
male violence used to aid this process meant that pain was im pfedy  
considered instrumental in the construction o f pervasive ficdons3 o f  m fc  
authority.
In  Hi Yorkshire Tragedy, however, the husband’s initial violence cannot maintain
the fiction o f male power. His violence becomes progressively m ote
pronounced when the fiction o f  -his authority, symbolised in  the Galverly
name, is exposed* His anxieties are revealed as -his utterances become
repetitive and lose grammatical coherence:
My Lands shewed like a full moone was mine; Mine and my 
fathers, and my forefathers -  generations, generations: downe 
goes the bowse o f us, down, downe it sincks. Npw is thy 
nam e a  beggar, begs in me! that name, which hundreds of 
years has made this shire famous, in me, .and my posterity,
-runs out. (IV.94)
Galverly recognises the repercussions of his actions .and realises .that/his ;fiame 
is o f particular significance because it functions as a contraction o f ;tfie je lf  
outside the self. Moreover, he is aware .that there is a  significant gap bem een  
the nam e, or sign, and what is signified: Mow is thy name a beggar. 
his discussion o f the verbal sign, contends:
The Word is a contraction in the guise of its very opposite, o f 
an expansion — that is to say, in pronouncing a word, the 
subject contracts his being outside himself, he coagulates the 
core of his being in an external sign. In the \ erbal sign, I — as
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it were — find myself outside myself, 1 posit my unity outside 
myself, in a signifier which represents me (1996a: 43).
He elabourates:
The fundamental paradox of symbolization — die paradox the 
term "symbolic castration’ aims at recapturing -  is that Nature 
can attain itself, its self-identity, only at the price of a radical 
decentrement: it can find itself only in a medium outside 
itself. A father becomes a father "as such5, the bearer o f 
symbolic authority, only in so far as he assumes his 
"castration5, the difference between himself in the immediate 
reality of his being and the place in the symbolic structure 
which guarantees his authority: die father’s authority is 
radically "decentred’ with regard to father qua flesh-and-blood 
person — that is, it is the anonymous structure o f the symbolic 
Law which speaks through him (1996a: 47).
Galverly can no longer posit his unity outside himself in a signifier — "Galverly5 
— that can be said to represent him. His surname proves to be his .linguistic 
undoing. What previously functioned as a symbol o f enduring patrilmeage and 
patriarchal authority now signifies the collapse of one man’s coherent sense o f 
self. Paradoxically, this is also the point at which he comes to understand his 
symbolic importance as Father, and therefore the point from which he derives 
true symbolic authority. It is only through the experience o f loss that he gains 
a sense o f what he once represented. As the flesh-and-blood father, he is now 
unable to provide for his children. In this respect, he has assumed his 
castration — that is to say, he has acknowledged the difference between 
himself in the immediate reality of his being and the place in the symbolic 
structure which guarantees his authority — and we see this process,,and his 
recogmuon of it, verbalised in the metaphor o f the emasculating snaffle o f
patriarchal obligation.
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Throughout, the husband is presented as the architect o f his own downfall, 
recklessly but consciously dismantling the symbolic underpinning o f his 
position in the social order. His wife, however, has no such claim to linguistic 
autonomy. Her words, often uttered in the direst o f circumstances, develop no 
discernible character, or at least, no sense that another archetypal ‘obedient 
wife’ could not speak her words to equal effect. H er reactions to her 
husband’s spending, verbal abuse, violence and ultimate murder o f  their 
children are articulated in so inflexible a language o f obedience that is it 
difficult to believe that it is her voice we are hearing. Rather, she speaks a 
patdarchally ordained discourse o f wifely compliance that bears no real 
correlation to her lived experiences.
The wife is constructed as an ideal o f feminine virtue who consistently ahides
by the letter o f conjugal law. Indeed, her character embodies the ideology o f
uxorial submission detailed in the marriage literature o f  the period. In  her first
appearance onstage, she soliloquises:
What will become o f us? all will awaie.
My husband never ceases in expence,
Both to consume his credit and his house;
... Ill beseeming 
The ancient honour o f his howse and name!
And this not all: but that which killes me most,
When he recounts his Tosses and false fortunes,
The weakness o f his state so much dejected,
N ot as a man repentant but halfe madd,
His fortunes cannot answer his expence ...
N ot penitent for those his sinnes are past,
But vext his mony cannot make them last: - 
A fearull melancholic, ungodly sorrow.
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(u. 1-21)
During her enumeration of her husband’s many vices and their impact upon 
the family, he returns. In accordance with her wifely duties, she pledges, ‘now 
in despight o f ills/ lie speake to him, and I will hear him speake,/ And do my 
best to drive it from his heart’ (ii.22-24). In his O f Domestical Duties, Gouge 
asserts that ‘[rjeverence hath respect to the titles whereby a wife nameth her 
husband: meekness to the manner of framing her speech to him’ (1934: 
III. 14). In  A. Yorkshire Tragedy, the wife’s location o f the fulfilment o f  her 
obligations in her prudent choice o f words is demonstrated through the 
textbook reverence o f her communications to her husband. Greeting him as 
T)eere husband’, despite his violent outburst o f cursing and blaspheming, she 
wonders that he is ‘so much unlike/ Him selfe at first, as if some vexed spirit/ 
Had got his form upon him’ (ii.37-39). She responds to his virulent 
denunciation with the defensive admission that her own language has always 
been dutiful: ‘He saies I am the cause; I never yet/ Spoke lesse than wordes o f  
duty and of love’ (41-42). She maintains a respect and reverence, audible in  her 
use o f the more formal personal pronoun ‘you .
W hen the husband returns home, having lost five hundred Angels .aC^dice, his 
wife asks the cause o f  his bad temper and is told, Mony, mony, mony, ,and 
thou must supply me’ (II. 6"1)• 'Without demur she assents, saying, what is 
mine, either in nngs or jewels,/ Use to your own desire’ (11.62-63). The law 
dictated that, although ft]hat which the husband hath is his own ... if  before
marriage the woman were possessed of ... money, plate, and jewels, all 
manner o f moveable substance is presendy by conjunction the husband’s to 
sell, keep or bequeath if he die’ (T.E. 1632: IILix). Upon hearing her husband 
declare ‘thy jewels I will play as freely/ As when my state was fullest’, she says 
simply, ‘Be it so.’ Men’s financial obligations to their wives and family were 
clearly defined, although Mrs Galverly displays an understandable degree o f 
anxiety about her husband’s reckless spending habits. However, despite the 
fact that she is eager to preserve her lands, she confirms her adherence to 
conjugal law, saying ‘what the law shall give me leave to d o / Y q u  shah 
command’ (11.96-97). A model of wifely compliance, she submits without 
objection to the material demands made o f her, working within the limited 
means at her disposal to ensure the financial stability o f their family.
Calverlv’s abhorrent murder o f his two sons provides the tragic climax of the 
play, and these murders are shown to have been motivated by a combination 
o f male anxieties. The husband claims he does not want to see his family 
reduced to beggary: he has squandered the monetary value of their estate und 
with it, exhausted the currency o f their family name.
SON Mother, mother; I am kild, mother.
WIFE (IDakes) Ha, whose that cdde? oh me, my children! 
Both, both, both; bloudy, bloudy \catches up,the 
yomgest\
HUSBAND Strumpet, let go the boy, let go .the beggar.
WIFE Oh my sweet husband!
HUSBAND Filth, harlot.
WIFE Oh what will you doe, deare husband?
HUSBAND Give me the bastard.
WIFE Your owne sweete boy!
HUSBAND There are too many beggars.
W IFE Good my hus-band —
HUSBAND Doest thou prevent m e still?
WIFE Oh god!
(V. 14-28)
He attempts to justify his actions on the grounds o f his children’s future 
poverty, arguing that ‘There are too many beggars’. Harrison describes the 
‘thriftless poor’ such as ‘the rioter that hath consumed all, the vagabond that 
will abide nowhere’ in his discussion of the provision made for the poor (1994: 
180-186). The ‘Acte for the punishment of Vacabondes and for the Relief o f  
he Poore & Im potent’, o f 1576, stated that the punishment o f rogues and 
vagabonds was to be ‘grevouslye whipped, and burnte through the grisde o f  
the right Eare with a hot Yron o f the compasse o f an Ynche about’.23 
Although the severe treatment of beggars and the contempt in which they 
were held goes some way to suggest Calverly’s motivation, additional concerns 
underlay his explanation. Even with an exemplary wife, who genuinely has 
‘never yet/ Spoke lesse than wordes of duty and o f love’ (41-2), the husband is 
unsure that he is their father. This doubt exposes one o f the fundamental 
anxieties at the heart o f patriarchy: men had no means o f verifying the 
physiological paternity o f their children. Indeed, Ben Jonson’s remarks in ‘To 
Penshurst’ draw attention to this: Thy lady's noble, fruitful, chaste w itha l/ 
His children thy great lord may call his own;/ A fortune, in this age, but rarely 
known’ (1954: 79). Although conduct literature and marriage manuals 
maintained an unrelenting focus upon the importance o f women s chastity, the 
prescriptive formulations they sought to enforce were directed almost 
exclusively at women’s speech: they did not explicitly address the reproductive
2- The act w ent through a series o f  revisions in 1572, 1576 & 1584-85.
process. The patriarchal ideologies underpinning the institution of the family 
were unable to definitively establish the physical reality o f patrilineal ffliation. 
In order to be ‘chaste’, the wife must speak a language that men considered to 
be synonymous with chastity. In doing so, she exercised control over her own 
language on behalf of the patriarchal social order. Therefore, she becomes the 
agent and administrator o f the violence directed at her language, a Hojknce 
that is required by, and yet insufficient to fully maintain, the patriarchal
I t  is the husband, however, who most fully discloses the fundameu^al
weakness o f this regime’s foundations. The play illustrates the way in  wbich
m en fall victim to the so-called ‘feminine’ language chat -they seek tp subdue.
The husband turns against the dominant patriarchal .ideology, and in particular,
the  institution, o f  marriage. He reasons, ‘If  marriage be honourable, then
Cuckolds ate honourable, for they cannot be made without marriage. Eoole!
W hat m eant I  to marry to get beggars?’ (11.43-46). His language, repetitive and
iramsgressive, is an attempt to rebel against his tple as -husband and  father.
Michel Pecheux discusses this process o f  counter-identification.'
•the subject, a ‘bad subject’, a ‘trouble-maker, cownt^ ndwntijus 
with the discursive formation imposed -on him by 
‘interdiscourse’ as external determination -of his subjective 
mtenonty, which produces the philosophical and  political 
form s o i the discourse-against (i.e., counter-discourse) (19-82: 157).
pn -this wav, -the husband debases thek family name, permanently altering the 
meanings attached to it. But despite his counter-identification and the resultant 
-erosion o f his social status, he retains the capacity to exert an influence over
the semantic value of the name he confers upon his wife and subsequent 
children through marriage.
Throughout the play, it is the husband who provides a commentary upon his 
own actual and intended acts o f violence, offering pithy, misogynistic wisdom 
in the process. During his attempts to kill the second son, he threatens the 
maid, saying, l ie  breake your clamor with your neck: down stakes! ... The 
surest way to charme a womans tongue is break her neek; (V. 11-13). The play 
is replete with violent imagery, as well as explicit representations o f  violent 
acts. But despite its candour, the effects o f the husband’s violence remain 
largely unspoken. In the aftermath of the murders, the husband asks that he be 
allowed to talk with his wife:
Enter his wife, brought in a chaire.
GENTLEMAN See heer she comes o f her selfe.
Oh my sweete Hus-band, my deere distressed husband, 
Now in the hands o f unrelenting Jawes!
My greatest sorrow, my extremest bleeding,
Now my soule bleeds.
How now? kind to me? did I not wound thee, left thee 
for dead?
Tut, farm greater wounds did my brest feele:
Unkindness strikes a deeper wound than steele 
You have been still unkinde to mee.
(X.1-14)
WIFE
HUSBAND
WIFE
In  the dialogue, it is significant that the description o f the wife’s injuries is 
given, n o t by her, but by her husband: did I not wound thee, left thee for 
dead?’ ‘Silence in woman’, Braithwait has argued, is a moving -rhetoric, 
winning most, when in words it wooeth least (16j1. ,90). Indeed, the stage
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direction, which states that she is brought on stage in a chair, effects a 
powerful non-verbal depiction o f the wounds she has sustained, and suggests 
the pain she is experiencing. In this way, the play performs what is 
inexpressible in language. The wife talks metaphorically o f bleeding, but on no 
occasion does she articulate her actual pain. Scarry explains that ‘jtjfee failure 
to express pain ... will always work to allow its appropriation and conflation 
with debased forms o f power’ (1985; 14), However, in drama, silence does not 
always signify either the appropriation or the conflation o f  pain wtih trie 
absent voice o f debased patriarchal power. In fact, it can be a oynscKyusjly 
defamiliarising and subversive gesture,24
The wife’s moments o f silence are her only gesture towards deliberate non-
compliance because their meanings are unknowable. O f  particular signfcanoe,
however, is the way in which these moments are appropriated by #nd
incorporated into the dominant discourse. The wife remains silent about the
violence she has suffered, bypassing any discussion o f  her physical pain, and  as
a result, her experiences and responses are open to a  process o f  regulation and
rem ttrpretation. The play persistently explores the gaps that both -threaten
and, to a large extent, structure the patriarchal order. Towards its close, we
begin to  see the ways ;in which the dominant order attempts to recuperate
tmeaning from the wife’s silence. These elusive silences are co-opted by 'the
dominant discourse, as meanings are ascribed to them, first by the Mr. who
will Tver praise a woman’ for her sake, and then by her husband, in his
24 S ee , for exam ple. Measure fo r  Measure. Isabella s silence at the end o f the play .contrasts .with 
the perform ative sp eech  required for the w edding vow s, and hints at her non-conform ity.
confession o f guilt. He expresses his deep regret, saying M of thy wrongs 
repent me with my harte ... Let every father looke into my deedes,/ And then 
their heirs may prosper, while mine bleeds.’ (X.57-63). The husband uses his 
wife’s silence as a means of recognising his own mistakes; because site has 
acted as the catalyst for his re-capitulation to the ideals o f patriarchy, her 
support o f  the established social order is assumed to be a corollary o f  her 
silence.
In addition to her muted gestures towards non-compliance, however, the 
wife’s too literal identification with the male-sanctioned ideals o f  femininity 
serves to highlight the fact that patriarchy is in crisis. The effects o f  the wife’s 
identification with patriarchal ideals are thrown into relief a t the close o f  the 
play when, after having been severely abused physically, emotionally and 
financially, she articulates a seemingly wholehearted backing o f her husband. 
Provoking a profound sense o f unease, she says publicly ‘O h my repentant 
husband ... Thou shouldst not (be assured) for these faults die,/ I f  the Jaw 
cold forgive as soon as F (X.29-33). At the close o f  the play she asserts,
WIFE More wretched am I now in this distress,
Exeunt Husband with halberds.
Then former sorrows made me.
Ism. Oh kinde wife,
Be comforted. One joy is yet unmurdered:
You have a boy at nurse; your joy’s in him.
WIFE D earer then all is my poore husbands life:
Heaven give my body strength, which is yet faint 
With much expense of bloud, and I will kneele,
Sue for his life, number up all my friends,
To plead for pardon (for) my deare husbands life.
Here, in a recuperative gesture, Mr. suggests that the wife will take comfort
from her remaining live male child, who will perpetuate the Galverly name. At
this profoundly ambiguous moment, however, the wife maintains that her
husband is her priority. Because o f her vocalisation o f her unadulterated
support fo r him, the choric Mr. proclaims ‘lie ever praise a woman for thy
sake’ (X.75). Adherence to the linguistic codes o f feminine obedience appears
-to result in  the wife’s -enforced complicity with the political fictions that
develop to  explain the violence she endures. In fact, the wife’s uncritical
voicing o f the male ideals of female speech wurks to radically destabilise its
ideological grounding. Whilst she stays faithful to the doctrine o f wifely
subjection, the imperatives o f marriage and patrilineal filiation separate, and
are no longer-mutually constitutive. Patriarchy appears, therefore, to fall victim
to its own logic. As Drakakis notes, in tragedy, the possibility o f resistance to
the dominant discourse involves the
transformation of symbolic structures as the ideologies which 
hold them in place are no longer able to disguise the material 
contradictions which the confrontation throws up. In this 
respect, tragedy retains its ambivalence in that it uncovers the 
very contradictions that it sets out aesthetically to 
domesticate, and those contradictions are located at both the 
personal and the public levels o f communal experience 
(1992b: 18).
Throughout the plav there is no gap between expectations o f female behaviour 
and the wife’s behaviour and this seamlessness is one of the fundamental ways 
in which the play challenges the ideals of domestic patriarchy. Ziiek states that 
‘distance is ideologv’. Indeed, he goes on to sa} that, an ideological edifice can
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be undermined by a too literal identification, which is why successful 
functioning requires a minimum of distance towards its explicit rules' (ltyfy6h: 
85). Unlike her husband, the wife never appears to counterddentify' ydd1 the 
dominant patriarchal discourse; on the contrary, she is its greatest exponent. 
But by sticking to the letter o f the law too closely, she undermines (the very 
position she is advocating.
The popularity o f domestic tragedies such as A  Y #rk$m  WM <<fee
large part to ihek  tektionship to actual events. This reiatiooship also ,t$d a ti 
•effect upon the dynamics o f  spectatorship, in that it influenced people’s 
naaaierstant&g o f  the mimetic quality7 o f  the -drama. Simultaneously mpte ‘real’ 
:and m ore obviously a  -re-presentation o f events, A  Yfflkshire is
structured by -the relationship between language and violence. In particular, it 
identifies and explores women’s complex relationship with the language?they 
;are expected to  speak, and considers its impact upon the positions they m ust 
inhabit, -in -relation to men. At one level, the play -demonstrates that ;the 
husband's verbal utterances, as well as his acts -of physical violence, constitute 
coercive and controlling behaviour. Moreover, it demonstrates tha t;m ens 
coercive and controlling behaviour can be levelled >at women’s speech, ^ apd 
that this can have far-reaching consequences. The husband is also subject to 
'the 'material consequences of language, a fact which is emphasised b y ; the 
recurring metaphor of the physically damaging effects o f words. At another 
level, language is shown to be a limited system of signitication, which, as a 
result o f its limitations, imposes severe restrictions upon the speaking subject.
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The wife, bound by expectations of reverence in her communications with her 
husband, and abused nevertheless, is precluded from fully expressing her own 
experiences. The hierarchical system, which imposes prohibitive codes o f 
conduct upon her, also denies her an effective means with which to articulate 
the experience o f violence. By giving voice to the ideals o f  the system that has 
oppressed her, she is forced into a situation where she must act as the agent o f 
much o f the violence she suffers. Scarry argues that ‘the obsessive display o f 
agency that permits one person’s body to be translated into another person’s 
voice ... allows real human pain to be converted into a regime’s fiction o f 
power’ (1986: 18). The demonstrable absence o f the wife’s individual voice — a 
result o f  the obsessive display o f patriarchal agency — goes some way towards 
highlighting these fictions. Her silence constitutes a subde, limited form of 
resistance. She not only has to endure the violence enacted against her and the 
fatal violence vented on her children, but she must also undertake the process 
o f translation: she must produce and articulate the fictions o f male power. 
Clearly there is an inherent violence in this. As Armstrong and Tennenhouse 
remind us, ‘the words we use to represent the subjects and objects o f violence 
are part and parcel o f the events themselves’ (1989: 24). However, the rigour 
with which the wife approaches the process of translation actually serves to 
expose and discredit these fictions. Tragedy, therefore, can be both ideological 
and counter-ideological. Indeed, for the play to be able to contest the 
meanings o f violence, it must be both. A  YovkshiTe Thrcijzedy is an attempt to 
represent the unrepresentable, and, whilst the way in which the drama 
negotiates these difficulties is important, the attempt itself is significant.
Conclusion
Bataille suggests that ‘violence ... clings to a silent contempt for the words used 
about it’ (cited in DeBoer 1999: 5). This study emerged out o f  a longstanding 
personal fascination with the way that violence seems peculiarly resistant to 
language. For its victims and its perpetrators, the experience is singular and 
intense, the effects instantaneous and often enduring, but in many ways, yjoience 
remains unspeakable. This fascination, and consternation, has developed and 
expanded into a deeper understanding of, and continued preoccupation with, the 
intimate and indivisible relationship between violence and language. An 
undergraduate encounter with Shakespeare’s Titus Andronicus consolidated these 
interests and helped to situate them, as an area for academic study, in the 
^Renaissance. My aim throughout this dissertation has been to demonstrate that 
language and violence are inextricably linked, and to explore this connection in 
relation to representations o f violence in Renaissance England. It was not my 
intention here to construct an argument that would lead to a definitive conclusion, 
But rather to set out this thesis and to pursue its implications for an understanding 
o f  language and violence in the Renaissance. Concentrating on selected works o f 
Shakespeare, I have explored the way in which language figures acts o f sapience, 
w hilst m a in ta in in g  that language is in itself an agent o f violence. Language works 
-performativelv to effect violence. But more than this, a t the m ost basic level, it 
inheres within the structures o f language.
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The scope o f this study is necessarily limited, and the choice o f texts for close 
examination necessarily effects a form o f exclusionary violence. I have not, for 
example, undertaken a sustained analysis o f any texts by women. N or have I 
looked at any texts written by those marginalized on the grounds o f religion. In 
addition, the discussion o f language has remained a discussion o f English as it was 
used in England. The argument advanced throughout the dissertation is, however, 
applicable to a discussion of language as the agent o f violence in the colonising 
ventures o f the period. Language, as Lecercle reminds us ‘is both the locus o f and 
the means o f historical (political) intervention’ (1990: 179). There are a number o f 
directions in which this study could be extended; however, any discussion o f these 
issues will itself constitute a political intervention.
In Shakespeare’s representations, we encounter the difficulties that Bataille draws 
attention to: in many ways, violence seems to resist language. In The Tape of hucrece 
and Titus Andronicus, Lucrece and Lavinia both struggle to articulate their 
experience o f rape, and in each instance, their words are displaced by the words o f 
men. After her assault, Lucrece’s determined but ultimately futile speech contrasts 
pointedly with the rousing and politically effective language of the men who 
avenge her assault. Lavinia is doubly degraded by rape and by her subsequent 
reliance upon men who must speak for her. Throughout Coriolanus, the pain 
caused by violence can only be articulated figuratively in the metaphors o f the 
bear pit, and in A  Yorkshire Tragedy, Mrs Calverly says nothing o f the violence she 
has suffered. Indeed, a great deal o f what violence achieves is achieved precisely 
because it cannot be shared. But violence inheres within language, and it is not
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correct to say that violence necessarily resists articulation. W hat I have shown, 
however, is that usually it is not the victim o f violence who has control over the 
way in which it is linguistically encoded. Often, the power that enables a group or 
individual to inflict violence goes hand in hand with the ability to influence the 
way in which it is represented. It follows on from this that the efficacy o f violence 
is, in large part, derived from the language used to talk about it.
Lecercle notes that language is ‘pervaded not only by the violence o f affects but by 
the symbolic violence o f institutional struggle’ (1990: 107). In all o f the texts under 
consideration here, acts o f violence initiate the symbolic violence o f institutional 
struggle within the structures o f language. In chapter three, the patriarchal 
organisation o f family and governmental structures, which is thrown into crisis by 
the violation o f the female body, is subsequently reaffirmed as a result o f the 
violent contestation and ultimate recovery o f the meanings o f sexual assault for 
the political order. In the following chapter, I show that representations o f 
military and judicial violence are central to the ideology o f monarchical rule, and 
are deeply bound up with the production o f historical narratives. The metaphors 
o f bearbaiting examined in chapter five acknowledge Christian paradigms o f 
violence, but do not ultimately resolve the tensions between the teleological 
impetus o f the tragic form in which they are embedded and the experience o f 
continual violence that they represent. Similarly, through Mrs Calverly s too-literal 
identification with the masculine discourse, A  Yorkshire Tragedy exposes profound 
weaknesses in the ideology of domestic patriarchy which remain unresolved. In
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each o f these texts, the patriarchal order works to contest the meanings o f 
violence, which are produced at the level of the signifier.
Language is the place in which the subject is produced: it is language which 
constructs and institutes the limits o f the self, effecting a radical, but formative 
violence. From the point o f his/ her entry into language, the individual is subject 
to its structures, and to the ideologies — which collectively form ‘culture’ — 
embodied within it. The meanings of violence are produced in ideological conflict 
at the level o f the signifier, and are registered in the symbolic order to which we 
are all subject. However, because language is a dynamic system of signification, in 
which signifiers are meaningful because o f their (continually changing) 
relationships with other signifiers, the meanings o f violence are neither fixed nor 
stable. By drawing attention to a range of violent practices in Renaissance 
England, I have shown that violence was integral to ‘culture’, operating both 
overtly and covertly at the level of language. In doing so, I have endeavoured to 
return Shakespeare, and specifically his works, to context, and to demonstrate that 
their ‘language exquisite’ (Kermode 1965: 38) is stratified at all levels by violence.
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